Security, Trust and Privacy (STP) Model for Federated Identity and Access Management (FIAM) Systems by KHATTAK, ZUBAIR AHMAD
  
STATUS OF THESIS 
Title of thesis 
Security, Trust and Privacy (STP) Model for Federated Identity and 
Access Management (FIAM) Systems 
I,                                         ZUBAIR AHMAD KHATTAK  
hereby allow my thesis to be placed at the Information Resource Center (IRC) of 
Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS (UTP) with the following conditions: 
1. The thesis becomes the property of UTP 
 
2. The IRC of UTP may make copies of the thesis for academic purposes only. 
 










The contents of the thesis will remain confidential for _______ years. 
 




 Endorsed by 
________________________________ _____________________________ 
Signature of Author Signature of Supervisor 
Permanent address:   Name of Supervisor 
House #. C-G-14,  Dr. Suziah Sulaiman  
Apartment Orkid, 
Jalan Cemara Taman Bukit Serdang 47000  
Seri Kembangan, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Date : ___________________________ Date : ________________________
√ 




UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI PETRONAS 
SECURITY, TRUST AND PRIVACY (STP) MODEL FOR FEDERATED 
IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT (FIAM) SYSTEMS 
by 
ZUBAIR AHMAD KHATTAK 
 
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Postgraduate 
Studies Programme for acceptance this thesis for the fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree stated. 
 
 
Signature: ______________________________________  
 
Main Supervisor:  Dr. Suziah Sulaiman                                           . 
 
 
Signature: ______________________________________  
 
Co-Supervisor:  Dr. Jamalul-Lail Ab Manan                                . 
 
                                                                                
 
Signature: ______________________________________  
 
Head of Department:  Dr. Jafreezal Bin Jaafar                                       . 
Date:                                      ______________________________________ 
 
  
SECURITY, TRUST AND PRIVACY (STP) MODEL FOR FEDERATED 








Submitted to the Postgraduate Studies Programme 
as a Requirement for the Degree of 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI PETRONAS 






DECLARATION OF THESIS 
Title of thesis 
Security, Trust and Privacy (STP) Model for Federated Identity and 
Access Management (FIAM) Systems  
I,                                         ZUBAIR AHMAD KHATTAK   
hereby declare that the thesis is based on my original work except for quotations and 
citations which have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that it has not been 
previously or concurrently submitted for any other degree at UTP or other institutions. 
 
 Witnessed by 
 
________________________________ ___________________________ 
Signature of Author Signature of Supervisor 
Permanent address: Dr. Suziah Sulaiman 
House #. C-G-14,  
Apartment Orkid, 
Jalan Cemara Taman Bukit Serdang 47000  
Seri Kembangan, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
 
 











First of all, I am extremely grateful to Almighty Allah, the most beneficent, forgiving 
and generous, for His sanctifies and intensifies my valor to polish and complete this 
work successfully. I am extremely grateful to Dr. Suziah Sulaiman for her incessant 
encouragement, precious suggestions, inspiration, and unending vigor to guide me in 
the completion of this research. I am as well vastly appreciative to my field-supervisor 
Dr. Jamalul-Lail Ab Manan for his eager attentiveness, caring research directions, 
valuable technical suggestions and ethical support. I am also grateful to the joint effort 
of Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS, Malaysia and MIMOS Berhad, Malaysia 
management making it possible for me to conduct the implementation of this 
research. 
I am extremely grateful to Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg (Goethe University 
Frankfurt, Germany), Prof. Dr. Audun Jøsang (UiO, Norway) and Dr. Reiner Sailor 
(IBM, USA) for their time and precious technical views to enhance this research. 
I am enormously grateful to my beloved parents, brothers, sister, wife and all my 
family members whose hands always rise in prayer for my success and are the source 
of my inspiration all through this work and my life. I am also grateful to all of my 





The federated identity and access management systems facilitate the home domain 
organization users to access multiple resources (services) in the foreign domain 
organization by web single sign-on facility. In federated environment the user’s 
authentication is performed in the beginning of an authentication session and allowed 
to access multiple resources (services) until the current session is active. In current 
federated identity and access management systems the main security concerns are: (1) 
In home domain organization machine platforms bidirectional integrity measurement 
is not exist, (2) Integrated authentication (i.e., username/password and home domain 
machine platforms mutual attestation) is not present and (3) The resource (service) 
authorization in the foreign domain organization is not via the home domain machine 
platforms bidirectional attestation. Furthermore, absence of bidirectional trust in 
federated organizations machine platforms may cause the threats such as worms, 
phishing via Trojans, keyloggers and rootkits). The Trusted Computing solutions 
(e.g., trusted platform module and mutual attestation technique) may assist to 
overcome the machine platforms security and trust issues in federated identity and 
access management systems. However, the use of mutual attestation scheme in a 
federated environment may lead to the machine platforms measurement (security 
credential) privacy issue. The aforementioned issues motivated this research to 
construct a practicable and unified security, trust and privacy solution for federated 
organizations to collaborate in a secured, trustworthy and privacy-enhanced fashion. 
In this work Shibboleth was chosen to construct a practicable and unified security, 
trust and privacy framework. The proposed solution: (i) integrates mutual attestation 
technique with Shibboleth basic user authentication mechanism, (ii) ensures bi-
directional platform trust formation between the home domain identity provider and 
client machine, (iii) ensures privacy of the home domain machine platforms security 
credentials conserved at the foreign domain and (iv) resource authorization in a 
foreign domain linked with the home domain machine platforms bi-directional.
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integrity measurement  
The research methodology used in this research was divided into four different 
phases: (1) The framework foundation phase, (2) The design of framework phase, (3) 
The test-bed prototype implementation phase and (4) The assessment of the 
framework. The experiment result assessment suggests that the trusted computing 
bidirectional platform integrity measurement integration with the Shibboleth basic 
authentication mechanism: (1) Intensify federated organizations machine platforms 
security and trust and (2) Reduces the home domain machine platforms measurement 
privacy concern. In addition to that the assessment of the result also shows that 
sharing of machine platforms security credentials in inter-domain or intra-domain 
setup depends on the trust association (i.e., strong or weak). The newly created data 
connector - mutual integrity provider is flexible because in the future it can 
accommodate any other mutual attestation scheme. The mutual attestation 
performance measurement and benchmarking of client and server machine platforms 
shows an increase in the attestation time with the increase of in the number of stored 
measurement log. The increase in the attestation time because of the mutual 
attestation scheme (i.e., integrity measurement architecture) used in this work which 
heavily depends on the stored measurement log. The mutually attested machine 





Identiti persekutuan dan sistem pengurusan akses memudahkan pengguna-pengguna 
organisasi home domain untuk mengakses pelbagai sumber (perkhidmatan) dalam 
organisasi domain asing melalui kemudahan laman sesawang single sign-on. Dalam 
persekitaran bersekutu pengesahan pengguna dilakukan pada awal sesi pengesahan 
dan dibenarkan untuk mengakses pelbagai sumber (perkhidmatan) sehingga sesi 
semasa menjadi aktif. Dalam identiti persekutuan semasa dan sistem pengurusan 
akses, ciri utama keselamatan yang perlu dititik beratkan adalah: (1) ketidak wujudan 
platform mesin ukuran integriti dwiarah di organisasi home domain (2) ketidak 
hadiran pengesahan bersepadu (iaitu, nama pengguna/ kata laluan dan platform 
penyaksian bersama mesin home domain) (3) sumber (perkhidmatan) kebenaran 
dalam organisasi domain asing tidak melalui platform mesin pengesahan dwiarah 
home domain. Tambahan pula, ketiadaan amanah dwiarah dalam platform mesin 
organisasi persekutuan boleh menyebabkan ancaman seperti worms, dan phishing 
melalui Trojan, keyloggers dan rootkit). Penyelesaian Trusted Computing (misalnya, 
modul platform yang dipercayai dan teknik pengesahan bersama) boleh membantu 
untuk mengatasi isu-isu keselamatan dan amanah platform mesin dalam identiti 
persekutuan dan sistem pengurusan akses. Walau bagaimanapun, penggunaan skim 
pengesahan bersama dalam persekitaran bersekutu boleh membawa kepada isu privasi 
ukuran platform mesin (tauliah keselamatan). Isu-isu yang dinyatakan di atas 
memberi motivasi untuk menjalankan kajian ini bagi membina keselamatan bersatu 
yang praktis, amanah dan penyelesaian privasi untuk organisasi bersekutu agar dapat 
bekerjasama dengan cara yang selamat, boleh dipercayai dan mutu privasi yang 
dipertingkatkan. 
Dalam kajian ini Shibboleth telah dipilih untuk membina rangka kerja 
keselamatan, amanah dan privasi yang praktik dan bersatu. Penyelesaian yang 
dicadangkan (i) mengintegrasi teknik pengesahan bersama dengan mekanisme asas 
pengesahan pengguna Shibboleth, (ii) memastikan pembentukan amanah platform 
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dua-arah antara pembekal identiti home domain dan mesin pelanggan, (iii) 
memastikan privasi platform mesin kelayakan keselamatan home domain dipelihara di 
domain asing dan (iv) memastikan kebenaran sumber di dalam domain asing 
dikaitkan dengan ukuran integriti dwiarah platform mesin home domain. 
Kaedah kajian yang digunakan dalam penyelidikan ini telah dibahagikan kepada 
empat fasa berbeza: (1) asas rangka kerja, (2) reka bentuk rangka kerja, (3) ujian 
prototaip fasa pelaksanaan dan (4) penilaian rangka kerja. Penilaian hasil eksperimen 
menunjukkan bahawa integrasi ukuran platform dwiarah trusted computing dengan 
mekanisme asas pengesahan Shibboleth: (1) meningkatkan keselamatan dan 
kepercayaan platform mesin organisasi bersekutu dan (2) mengurangkan 
kebimbangan terhadap privasi ukuran platform mesin home domain. Di samping itu 
penilaian keputusan juga menunjukkan bahawa perkongsian kelayakan keselamatan 
platform mesin dalam persekitaran inter-domain atau intra-domain bergantung 
kepada trust association (iaitu, samada kuat atau lemah). Penyambung data yang baru 
diwujudkan - pembekal integriti bersama adalah fleksibel kerana pada masa akan 
datang ia boleh menampung apa-apa skim pengesahan bersama yang lain. Prestasi 
pengukuran dan penanda aras pengesahan bersama milik platform mesin pelanggan 
dan pelayan menunjukkan peningkatan dalam masa penyaksian dengan penambahan 
bilangan log pengukuran yang tersimpan. Peningkatan dalam masa penyaksian 
disebabkan oleh skim pengesahan bersama (iaitu, seni bina integriti ukuran) yang 
digunakan dalam kerja-kerja ini yang amat bergantung kepada ukuran log tersimpan. 
Privasi platform mesin yang saling disahkan adalah dipelihara dalam domain asing 
melalui sifat kepercayaan - integriti platform bersama. 
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This chapter explains the motivation, research problem statement, objectives, scope, 
questions to be addressed, the adopted research methodology, and related research 
activities. This chapter is wrapped-up with research contributions and thesis 
organization. 
1.2 Motivation 
The Security, Trust and Privacy (STP) unification in a federated environment is 
challenging because of the unbalanced relationship among STP. In a federated setting, 
the home domain and foreign domain organizations are increasingly using the user’s 
identification information and the attributes in Authentication (AuthN) and 
Authorization (AuthR) processes. In such federated settings, the home domain users 
and foreign domain Service Providers (SPs) often put their trust in the home domain 
Identity Provider (IdP) for critical tasks such as home domain user AuthN, attribute 
resolution and their correct assertion. Cryptographic protocol techniques can be used 
to protect sensitive information while they are being transferred on top of 
communication links between: (1) the Home Domain user and IdP machines and (2) 
the Home Domain IdP and foreign domain SP machines. However, cryptographic 
protocols only provide communication link security but not a safeguard for the home 
domain IdP and the user’s machine platform against the theft of private information. 
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Malevolent programs, Trojans, viruses and worms, are the threats that cause the 
aforementioned risks. For example, in malware based attacks, the invader may 
deceive the home domain user or home domain IdP by installing software over their 
machines to remotely allow the invader to capture the keyboard inputs. In addition to 
that, the invaders may also be interested in acquiring the user’s login credentials from 
the user’s or the IdP’s machines. Therefore, the home domain user’s and IdP’s 
machine platforms infection by malevolent threats may lead these machine platforms 
into a dishonest or un-trusted state. 
The Trusted Computing [14], [127] based security and trust solutions will most 
likely overcome such issues in a federated setting. However, to establish mutual trust 
between the communicating machine platforms, these machines need to exchange 
their platform security credentials (i.e., measurements) which will probably lead to the 
platform privacy issue. Therefore, trusted computing based security demands the 
sharing of all private information which is related to the proof of ownership of the 
platform. On the other hand, privacy demands the minimal sharing of private 
information so that platforms cannot be traceable or linkable to a particular user, 
entity or data. Hence, among STP, there are some conflicting issues that have to be 
resolved and harmonized. 
To demonstrate the STP unification challenge, consider a federated research 
collaboration scenario that consists of two organizations: (1) the Department of 
Defence (DoD) which can be called a home domain organization and (2) the 
Department of Research (DoR) which is also known as a foreign domain 
organization. The DoD: (1) is managed autonomously, (2) is responsible for the 
management of users and their machine platform registration, which involves AuthN 
and attestation, and (3) possesses privacy conserving related policies. The home 
domain consists of an entity call the IdP which is responsible for performing user 
AuthN. The foreign domain is a Resource Provider (RP)/ SP organization. However, 
there are concerns in such a scenario that include: (1) weak AuthN, (2) missing 
machine platform mutual attestation and (3) resource AuthR in the foreign domain is 
not on the basis of successful mutual attestation “Trusted Attribute”. In addition to 
that, releasing of mutually attested machine platform security credentials (i.e., 
platform measurements) between the attesting machines raises platform privacy 
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concerns. The STP concerns are further exemplified with the help of the following 
example: 
Farida is a senior research officer in organization “A” and physically working in 
organization “A”. Farida has given consent specifically to her Principal Researcher 
(PR), to access her new innovative security software design and implementation 
document which resides at the organization “A”. The PR believes that Farida’s recent 
new innovation has the potential to have huge success and profit in the near future.  
The PR would like to “use” her consent to refer her design to an External Principal 
Researcher (EPR), who is also a notably experienced practitioner in that field, at 
organization “B” outside her home domain. It has also been assumed and expected 
that she would also give access consent to some of her previous product designs and 
test results to the EPR. In such a scenario, when the relevant documents are being 
released from organization “A” to organization “B”, the process of releasing should 
be in such a way that only those permitted persons (i.e., the EPR) at the organization 
“B” can access the documents. In this example the STP concerns are as below: 
Security 
• Existing solution permits organizations to authenticate within its own 
organization, i.e. organization “B” can only verify the local PR 
authenticity. In some situations, a PR may be authentic, but the machine 
(i.e., desktop/laptop) that he/she is utilizing and the Identity System (i.e., 
IdP machine) may not be in a trusted state.  
• There may be non-existence of platform mutual attestation in its 
infrastructure, for example, between the IdP and PR in organization “B”.  
• There may be non-existence of integrated AuthN and integrity verification 
schemes, for example, within organization “B”. 
Trust 
• Mutual Trust does not exist in the federated setting. In the federated 
setting, the user’s trust is within its own organization only. Similarly, the 
foreign domain puts its trust into the home domain IdP for AuthN, 
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attribute resolution and the assertion tasks. Therefore, the absence of 
mutual trust between the home domain organization entities may lead to 
security risks. 
• For example, in organization “A”, resource AuthR is not on the basis of 
organization “B’s” user’s and IdP machines’ successful mutual attestation. 
Privacy 
• The machines’ platform security credentials (i.e., integrity measurements) 
which are being exchanged between communicating machines, while it 
helps to strengthen trust, may also raise privacy concerns. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The existing security measures such as anti-Trojans/malware/spam and the Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL), based on software based security solutions instead of hardware, 
[6, p. 134] cannot determine the communicating machine platforms mutual integrity 
measurement within the Web Single Sign-On (WSSO) schemes (i.e., trusted or 
otherwise) [1], [2], [3], [153]. In third party based federated identity and resource 
(service) access systems software based encryption and digital signature are utilized 
to secure the information in transit, guarantee identity credentials integrity and home 
domain IdP authentication to the foreign domain SP [11], but what about the 
communicating machine platforms mutual integrity measurement? Therefore, the 
absence of mutual trust (i.e., bidirectional platforms mutual integrity measurement, 
reporting and validation) in WSSO schemes could lead to security and trust concerns, 
and challenges [67], [122], [137], [4], [5], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [132] in the 
federated identity and resource (service) access management systems. Furthermore, 
the STP concerns in the federated identity and resource (service) access mode are 
described through a threat model in section 4.2.2. It is possible that the message 
integrity, in transit, may be protected [6] but the communicating platform health may 
not be trusted (i.e., infected by malware). 
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In third party based proxy WSSO scheme (e.g., Shibboleth) SSL is used to secure 
the communication channel in online transactions between the client-IdP, IdP-SP and 
client-SP. However, it is incapable to counter against malevolent code injection 
attacks such as attacker may inject dishonest portion of code onto the honest portion 
of code and service requester identity spoofing attack [154], [155]. Online E-
commerce and federated identity and resource (service) access management system 
has one thing common that both make use of untrusted global network (i.e., Internet) 
in online transaction. In e-commence online transaction SSL is used to protect 
confidentiality of data (e.g., credit card numbers in online shopping) [6]. Whereas, in 
online federated identity and resource (service) access environment SSL is used to 
protect: (i) user basic authentication data (e.g., username/pwd) between the home 
domain client and IdP machine in untrusted network. However, in both cases 
communicating machine platforms integrity state always remains in a question (i.e., 
trusted or untrusted). 
Jensen [8] provides a structured survey with many others on security, trust and 
privacy challenges in federated identity and resource (service) access management 
systems. In online federated identity and resource (service) access the prime security 
concern is an identity theft. Bertino et al. [156] commented that identity theft is hard 
to prevent in online federated resource (service) access scenario because the home 
domain client machine online presence is mandatory for an authentication to the home 
domain IdP machine (i.e., 24x7 online) and to access geographically federated 
resource (service) located in a foreign domain. Therefore, the UN/PWD pairs in the 
login process as well as stocking of the home domain users UN/PWD pairs at the IdP 
machine must be protected [4]. Madsen et al. [64] points that an identify theft flaw in 
a federated access scenario may allow an attacker to access unauthorized resources 
(services) in an unbroken chain. The misuse of authentication credentials and identity 
attributes stored at the home domain IdP must be protected [156] in away that only 
trusted machine perform such operations.  
The federated identity and resource (service) access systems are not full filling the 
identity and attribute provider’s trustworthiness requirements [157]. In third party 
based true WSSO scheme the home domain client machine trusts the home domain 
IdP machine to correctly identify the authenticated users through an authentication 
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mechanism. Whereas, the foreign domain SP trusts the home domain IdP machine for 
an authenticated user correct attribute fetching from attribute authority and assertion. 
In worst case scenario untrusted home domain IdP machine may behave dishonestly 
[11]. 
The basic privacy concern in all federated identity and resource (service) access 
system is entity (i.e., user identity or hardware identity) identity information [11]: (1) 
Utilization, (2) Compilation, (3) Stocking them and (4) Intra or Inter domain sharing. 
In this work privacy threat (i.e., discloser) for home domain IdP and client machine 
focuses on the protection and use of their platform security credentials by the home 
domain IdP  and foreign domain machine. 
In summary, neither the client, IdP and SP machines in the proxy true WSSO nor 
the client and SP machines in the native true WSSO: 
• have the right mechanism to create mutual trust formation in between 
communicating platforms. 
• can fight against any malevolent activity initiated by the invader. 
In following the problem of the security and trust in federated identity and 
resource (service) access are discussed. Whereas later, the attestation scheme 
limitation and privacy concerns in federated resources (services) access enviornement 
are discussed. 
• Home Domain Dishonest Client Platform: This refers to a situation in 
which a user is authenticated to the home domain in Shibboleth [12], [13], 
and [146] (or to the foreign domain in the native true WSSO scheme). In 
both native true WSSO and proxy true WSSO cases the home domain and 
foreign domain do not have any knowledge about a client’s machine 
platform integrity status (i.e., whether in a trusted state or not). So, such an 
un-trusted machine may lead to security threats (e.g., user credential theft). 
• Home Domain Dishonest Identity Provider Platform: This refers to a 
situation in which the home domain IdP machine may be tampered by a 
malevolent activity. In Shibboleth [12] and [13], an open source Federated 
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Identity and Access Management (FIAM) based on the proxy true WSSO 
design, the entity IdP must always be online to authenticate the user and 
deliver AuthN and AuthR information to the SPs. So, such an infected IdP 
machine, which has become a dishonest machine and may carry out 
malevolent actions, may lead to a massive user login credential theft and 
the attacker may misuse them to access sensitive resources. 
• Foreign Domain Dishonest Service Provider Platform: This refers to a 
situation in which the foreign domain SP machine may be compromised 
by an attack. So, a dishonest SP machine may become a stepping stone for 
an attacker to access sensitive resources or user credentials. 
The mutual attestation and privacy limitations in trusted computing remote 
attestation schemes are: 
• Remote Machine Attestation Technique Limitations: The two main 
limitations of the remote attestation scheme are: (1) it cannot mutually 
evaluate the client and challenger machines’ health and (2) the concern on 
platform measurement privacy. 
1.4 Research Objective 
The main objective of the research is to develop a Practicable Unified Security, Trust 
and Privacy Framework (PUSTPF) for federated identity and resource (service) 
access management. To achieve this obective, a number of specific tasks have been 
defined: 
• To select and specify STP aspects/ charactesistics (given in section 4.2.3), 
as the necessary building blocks for a PUSTPF. 
• To select and extend the Remote Attestation (RA) protocol into a 
Trustworthy Mutual Attestation Protocol (TMAP) for the proposed 
framework. 
8 
• To solve the privacy issue in the TMAP of the proposed framework. 
• To integrate TMAP with a user’s basic AuthN mechanism in a federated 
resource (service) access environment for the proposed framework. 
• To benchmark the performance (i.e., attestation time vs number of 
measurement logs) of the bidirectional integrity measurement technique 
with the existing solution. 
• To construct a PUSTPF test-bed prototype that merges the selected STP 
aspects/ characteristics given below (for detail see section 4.2.3): 
o Integration of the TMAP with a user basic AuthN (i.e., username and 
password),  
o Mutual trust formation between communicating machines in a 
federated resource (service) access environment, and  
o Privacy conservation in the proposed TMAP. 
1.5 Research Scope 







Figure 1.1: Scope of the research 
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The scope of the research is restricted to the following: 
• The STP aspects (section 4.2.4), the building blocks of a PUSTPF. 
• The existing trust aspects (section 4.2.3.2) in remote attestation schemes 
and to select and extend remote attestation for the TMAP for the proposed 
framework. 
• The privacy aspect (section 4.2.3.3) of mutually attested machine (i.e., 
client and server) platform measurements in the TMAP for the proposed 
framework. 
• The security aspect (section 4.2.3.1) in integrating the TMAP with a user 
basic AuthN mechanism (i.e., username and password) in a federated 
resource (service) access environment of the proposed framework. 
• The mutual trust formation between communicating machines in a 
federated resource (service) access environment of the framework.  
1.6 Research Questions 
The following research questions are to ensure the relevance of the research focus in 
the federated resource (service) access environment. 
• Why do we choose certain technologies/approaches/methods to build the 
proposed framework? 
- Why the Trusted Computing based security solution is chosen? 
- Why the hardware rooted secure and trusted component solutions are 
chosen? 
- Why the machine mutual attestation is used instead of the remote 
attestation? 
- Why is there a need for a practicable framework? 
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• What are the choices of architectures from the past research that can be 
adopted/ adapted works for the federated resource (service) access 
environment? 
• What STP aspects (section 4.2.3) are essential/ desired to be part of a 
PUSTPF?  
• How to integrate the proposed TMAP for it to work harmoniously with 
Shibboleth in the proxy true WSSO schemes/ FIAM mode? 
• How can the AuthN and mutual attestation processes are implemented to 
ensure that home domain and foreign domain organization processes (such 
as AuthN, mutual attestation and AuthR) happen in a fully integrated and 
unified way? 
• How can the privacy in a TMAP are mitigated for parties with conflicting 
conditions between two federated organizations such as: (i) in the proxy 
true WSSO scheme and (ii) in the native true WSSO scheme. 
• How can all of the STP aspects (section 4.2.3) be implemented to realize 
the proposed PUSTPF? 
1.7 Research Activities 
The Fig. 1.2 below specifies detailed research activities in each research methodology 



















Figure 1.2: Research activities 
1.8 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this research work are: 
• Integration of Basic User AuthN Mechanisim with the TMAP: Intigration 
of a TMAP with a Shibboleth user basic AuthN to validate the home 
domain user authenticity (i.e., by username/password proof of knowledge) 
as well as the home domain IdP and client machine platforms mutual 
integrity. To access a protected resource in a foreign domain the results of 
user basic AuthN and home domain communicating machine platforms 




machine platforms mutual imtegrity measurement the user is not authentic 
to access a protected resource in a foreign domain.  
• Home Domain IdP and Client Machine Platforms Privacy Conservation: 
Providing a solution for the HD machine platform’s measurement (i.e., 
platforms security credentials) privacy problem in the federated resource 
access environment by preventing the exposure of: (1) Home Domain IdP 
platforms security credentials to the clients, and (2) Home Domain client 
and IdP machines’ platform security credentials to the foreign domains.  
• MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector (MIPDC): Providing the own 
DataConnector (DC) (i.e., the MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector 
(MIPDC) which is in-control of invoking Corroboration (i.e., Validation) 
Service (CS) located at the IdP machine to carry out platform mutual 
attestation.  
• Trustworthy Mutual Attestation Protocol (TMAP): Proposed TMAP 
solution for: (i) A non-Trusted Third Party (TTP), Emergent Unified 
Security, Trust and Privacy Framework (EUSTPF), federated identity and 
resource (service) access system and (ii) A Trusted Third Party (TTP), 
Practicable and Unified Security, Trust and Privacy Framework 
(PUSTPF), federated identity and resource (service) access management 
system. 
• Unified STP for Federated Identity and Access Management System: 
Proposing and constructing a PUSTPF prototype which integrates the 
TMAP in the FIAM system (such as Shibboleth) which uses the proxy true 
WSSO scheme for user AuthN. It should be mentioned here that in the 
proposed solution, to access a resource in a foreign domain, four steps 
must be followed, namely: (1) Both AuthN verification and mutual 
platform attestation must be validated, (2) Mutual trust formation between 
communicating machines for resource (service) access, (3) Privacy 
conservation of client and IdP machines at the foreign domain and (4) 
Resource access in the foreign domain based on the “trusted mutual 
attestation attribute” in a federated environment. 
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• Practicability of the Unified Framework: The practicability of the 
proposed USTPF is very high. First, the framework makes use of an Open 
source FIAM system Shibboleth. So, each HD organization needs to set its 
own Shibboleth IdP and FD, and the Shibboleth SP entities, respectively. 
Second, only the HD IdP needs major changes to perform the HD clients’ 
and IdP’s machine platform mutual attestation which is quite viable and 
easy because both entities are members of the same network (internal). 
• Enhanced Security and Trust in the Home Domain Machine Platforms: 
The security and trust between the HD client’s and IdP’s machines are 
enhanced because the TMAP mutually assures that the HD client and IdP 
machine platforms are secured and trustworthy. 
• Open Source Solution: Open source and standard Trusted Computing 
technology based mutual attestation scheme notion proof of concept 
implementation is carried out for the native true WSSO scheme. In 
addition to that, the security and trustworthiness of the attested machine 
platforms is tested against a rootkit attack execution and the performance 
analysis is carried out of the TMAP in PUSTPF. 
• Test-bed Prototype Construction: The PUSTPF test-bed prototype is 
constructed by combining the pros of the Shibboleth, an open source and a 
standard FIAM solution with the Trusted Computing standards and open 
source solutions (e.g., TC for the Java platforms, IMA and TPM). 
1.9 Thesis Organization 
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation, research problem statement, objectives, scope, 
questions, methodology, activities, and contributions. 
Chapter 2 provides the background study of the research work. This chapter 
presents the concept of identity in a virtual environment. This is followed by an 
explanation on what Identity and Access Management (IAM) is, its basic processes, 
and the distinct IAM modes. It then describes different WSSO AuthN schemes, their 
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related types and their differences. This chapter also explains the FIAM mode and its 
related elements, pros and cons, basic standards and technologies (such as, Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [17] and [18], Shibboleth and SSL), and the 
association between the federated mode and the proxy true WSSO scheme. The 
identity masking schemes such as the public key digital signature and the blind 
signature, their respective pros and cons are also explained. In addition, the Trusted 
Computing notions such as: (1) Trusted Platform Module [16], [125], [126], (2) 
Trusted boot, (3) Privacy Certificate Authority (PrivacyCA), (4) Attestation, and (5) 
open source trusted computing service packages for the Java (tm) platforms are 
included in this chapter. This chapter ends by describing the Integrity Measurement 
Architecture (IMA) [15], what is integrity, the Integrity objective and the architectural 
design of the integrity measurement. 
Chapter 3 provides a critical review of the previous studies on the techniques, 
technologies and standards that are pertinent to the current research. It presents a 
detailed literature review with the sub-sections: (1) Elucidation on the distinct IAM 
mode failures and advancement, (2) An overview of trust and security in the FIAM 
mode, (3) A description of the related work allied to the unification of STP,(4) The 
related works on the identity masking schemes and the practicability of these schemes 
in a real environment, and (5) An explanation on the different machine platform 
attestation techniques, related challenges, practicality and the associated work.   
Chapter 4 describes comprehensively the approaches, techniques and technologies 
employed in this work. This chapter presents the research activities leading to the 
implementation of the framework such as design considerations, architecture and 
implementation limitations for the federated identity and resource (service) access 
mode. This chapter also explains the four phases of the research methodology adopted 
in the thesis which include: (1) The framework foundation, (2) The design of the 
framework, (3) The test-bed prototype implementation, and (4) The assessment of the 
framework.  
Chapter 5 presents the system design, architecture and system implementation. It 
explains the design of the system which includes the proposed system use-case, 
activity, class, the sequence diagrams, packages and classes and flowchat of 
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algorithms. It then explains the architecture of the proposed system which covers: (1) 
The different entities or stakeholders of the system, (2) The PUSTPF, and (3) The 
comprehensive PUSTPF protocol architecture. 
Chapter 6 provides the experiment outcomes. It describes the experimental desgin, 
test-bed technologies and implementation details, such as to demonstrate how the 
IMA based mutual attestation protocol is integrated in the Shibboleth framework. It 
also presents the TMAP proof of concept implementation result analysis obtained for 
the native true WSSO scheme, which includes: (1) The security and trustworthiness 
test results and (2) The TMAP performance results. This chapter also presents the 
PUSTPF test-bed result analysis. The results obtained from this test-bed experiments 
are: (1) The integrated user basic AuthN mechanism and the Home Domain 
machine’s mutual attestation results, (2) The Home Domain client’s and IdP machine 
platforms performance measurement and benchmarking, (3) The security and 
trustworthiness testing with the help of the home domain mutual attestation scenarios, 
and (4) The mutually attested machines’ platform privacy conservation results. This 
chapter also provides: (1) Comparisons between the emergent and practicable 
frameworks, (2) Comparison of mutual attestation performance analysis and (3) 
Compression of the proposed works with the existing works.  
Chapter 7 is the summary of the research work. This chapter presents the research 
conclusion, limitations and the potential future works. 
1.10 Summary 
This chapter presents the introduction, illustrates the motivation scenario, and the 
related problem statement. It then highlights the research objectives and the research 
scope. The research questions, research methodology, research activities, and research 





This chapter discusses the fundamental background study of federated identity and 
resource (service) access management systems. The identity concept in a virtual 
environment is discussed in the second section. The third section describes the IAM 
related basic processes and the evaluation of the IAM systems. The types of WSSO 
authentication schemes are explained in the fourth section. The fifth section explains 
the FIAM mode and associated FIAM elements, FIAM Pros, FIAM standards and 
presents a comparison of the federated and the proxy true WSSO schemes. The 
identity masking schemes and their practicability in a real environment is discussed in 
the section six. The seventh section describes Trusted Computing and its related 
concepts and technologies. The IMA, particularly such as what integrity is, the 
integrity objective and the architectural design of the integrity measurement are 
discussed in the eighth section. The ninth section summarizes this chapter. 
2.2 Identity in a Virtual Environment 
To access online resources (services) such as e-university resources, e-government 
and e-health services, users need to have an identity. The electronic virtual identity is 
assigned to a person or device upon successful registration with an organization’s 
authority [109], [128].  
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2.3 Identity and Access Management 
To manage the user’s virtual identities and allow access to the multiple services of an 
organization in a virtual environment, the diverse nature of IAM modes has been 
developed. Usually, each IAM system is a combination of a group of guidelines, 
processes and technologies [150]. The purpose of IAM is to create, manage and 
revoke user identities, as well as put into effect the organization’s policies, which are 
enforced on each user after successful authentication and authorization. The basic 







Figure 2.1: IAM basic processes 
• Authentication: The AuthN process ascertains that the user is certainly the 
one who or what he/she/it claims to be and consists of three main phases 
such as: (1) presenting the credentials, (2) the claim, and (3) conceding the 
privileges. A user AuthN scheme maybe be a single factor or two factors 
such as something the user knows (i.e., secret) or possess (i.e., smartcard 
with secret). The passwords and digital certificates are the most common 
user AuthN mechanisms used in a virtual environment. 
• Identification: Identification of a user is a single-time action and depends 
on two dimensions: (1) The user’s information (e.g., the person’s name, 
date of birth etc.) is assembled and is associated with the identity and (2) 




• Authorization: In the AuthR process the FD SP/RP organization fully 
depends on a user’s HD organization for a valid attribute derivation. The 
FD SP then, on the attribute resolution, decides whether the HD user 
should be granted or not to access a protected resource (service) sited at 
the FD. 
2.3.1 Identity and Access Management (IAM) Modes 
IAM models have evolved and consequently more novel models have appeared [19], 
[20], [21]. The security, trust and privacy challenges in IAM modes are given in Table 
2.1. Each model is described afterward. 





2.3.1.1 Isolated Mode 
The isolated mode is the mode in which each isolated domain operates independently 
from other domains. In the isolated mode, threats related to user identity theft and 
privacy (e.g., association of the end user’ attributes to the same user distinct 
identifiers) are negligible because these attributes are in the control of a solitary 
organization [4], [10]. 
2.3.1.2 Centralized Mode 
In the centralized mode, a single user’s credential and identifier are used by every SP 
(Microsoft.Net Passport [22], [147], [148], [149]). The centralized mode overcomes 
IAM Modes Trust Platform Security Privacy in Foreign Domain 
Trust Association IDtheft User Attributes Association  
Isolated Strong  Low Low 
Centralized Weak Vulnerable Vulnerable 
User-centric Strong Vulnerable Low 
Federated Strong Vulnerable Low 
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the issue of the inconvenience to link isolated systems. However, the security and 
privacy elements in the centralized mode are not promising because of the centralized 
control over the user’s identity. 
2.3.1.3 User-centric Mode 
In this mode, the user is in power as to what information is to be disclosed and what 
not to be disclosed to the SPs [23]. In this mode, the problem of multiple credential 
and identifier management is eased and improved by storing them in a tamper 
resistant hardware device. 
2.3.1.4 Federated Mode 
In the federated mode [24], the HD is responsible for user registration and AuthN 
while the SP is responsible for resource (service) AuthR. The advantages offered by 
the federated mode are diversified well over any other kind of modes. The FIAM 
mode overcomes the issues in previous modes such as: (1) The inefficiencies in the 
isolated mode, and (2) The security and privacy issues in the centralized mode. 
2.4 Web Single Sign-On (WSSO) Authentication Schemes 
The web AuthN schemes are also known as Web Single Sign-On (SSO) AuthN 
schemes. The acronym WSSO will be used in the rest of this thesis. The two types of 
WSSO schemes are [3]: (1) the native true WSSO and (2) the proxy true WSSO. 
2.4.1 Proxy True Web Single Sign-On 
In the proxy true WSSO, the HD IdP acts as a broker between HD users and the FD 
SPs.  This scheme allows the HD user to authenticate only once, via the SSO protocol, 
to the HD entity IdP until a session has expired. This scheme is described in Figure 
2.2. 
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How the proxy true WSSO differs from the native true WSSO include: 
• Trusted Third Party (TTP) Involvement: The main entity in proxy true 
WSSO scheme is the TTP entity (i.e., IdP). This enity is responsible for 
the home domain users AuthN, produce and dispatch the users attribute to 
the foreign domain SP.    
• Trust Association: In proxy true WSSO scheme the HD users and FD SPs 
have a strong trust in the HD IdP. In this scheme: (1) the HD user trusts 
the HD IdP for AuthN, (2) the FD SP trusts the AuthN and AuthR 
assertions it has received from the HD IdP.  
• Open Source Package Availability: The key proxy true WSSO schemes/ 
federated identity and resource (service) access schemes (e.g., Shibboleth 
etc.) are designed on open source and standard technologies.  
• Privacy Preservation Features: The proxy true WSSO scheme strongly 
supports the privacy features [133]: (1) Pseudonymity and (2) 
Unlinkability. The pseudonymity means that the identity does not include 
any user’s Personal Identifying Information (PII), while unlinkability 
means that the SPs are unable to work out which pseudonym belong the 













Figure 2.2: Proxy true WSSO scheme 
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2.4.2 Native True Web Single Sign-On 
The native true WSSO consists of two main entities: (1) a user machine which is set 
with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and an Authentication Service Provider 
(ASP) and (2) an SP. The SP validates the client machines, trusted state on the basis 
of its platform security credentials. In this scheme the ASP’s role is shifted to a 






Figure 2.3: Native true WSSO scheme 
The proxy and native schemes comparison is given in Table 2.2. How the native 
scheme is different from the proxy true WSSO are: 
• TTP Elimination: In the native true WSSO scheme the user no longer 
relies on an external entity such as an IdP /ASP for AuthN.  
• TPM as IdP: The TPM plays the role of an IdP. The challenger (e.g., 
server) validates the client machine’s TPM legitimacy by checking that the 
received quote is really signed by a legitimate TPM or not.  
• Trust Association: In this scheme, the SP trusts the PrivacyCA chosen by a 
user for certifying the Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) and the client 
machine platform security credential measurement.  
• Open Source Package Availability: The unavailability of open source 
packages is the biggest practical constraint of a native true WSSO scheme 
adoption in federated identity and resource (service) access schemes. 
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2.5 Federated Identity and Access Management (FIAM) 
A FIAM mode is constructed on the notion of the identity federation [129]. The main 
purpose of the identity federation is the linkage of the HD user identities at a variety 
of FD SPs (Figure 2.4). An identity federation is a suite of three elements [158]: (1) 
business contracts (e.g., policies- method of AuthN, attributes and resource access 
etc.), (2) standards (e.g., OSAIS and SAML, Identity-FF, Web Service-Federation, 
and Identity-Web Service Federation) and (3) technologies (e.g., Shibboleth, Liberty 
Aliiance, Card Space and OpenID). The objective of these elements is to work 
together to enable an assemblage of FD SPs to identify the HD end user identifiers 














Figure 2.4: Federated identity and access management mode 
2.5.1 Elements of Federated Identity and Access Management 
The basic three main elements taking part in FIAM schemes are: 
WSSO Schemes TTP Trust 
Association 
Trusted Computing 





Proxy True WSSO  Yes  Strong No Vulnerable Low 
Native True WSSO No Weak  No Vulnerable High 
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• The Home Domain User: In the FIAM mode, the HD user is also known as 
an HD subject/ principal.  
• The Home Domain Identity Provider: In the FIAM mode, the IdP entity is 
also known as an Asserting Party (AP). The purpose of this entity is to 
authenticate the HD users and share their AuthN and AuthR assertions 
with the FD SP.  
• The Foreign Domain Service Provider: In the FIAM mode, the SP entity is 
also recognized as a Relying Party (RP) and trust the HD IdP asserting 
information about an HD user. The SP then uses this asserting information 
to carry out the resource (service) access decision. 
2.5.2 Pros of Federated Identity and Access Management 
The Pros of the FIAM to the different stakeholders are: 
• Web Single Sign-On as AuthN Service: The WSSO AuthN service permits 
the HD users to shift among distinct FD SPs.  
• Cut-down the Management Cost: The FIAM reduces the management cost 
by transferring it to an organization who is a member of the federation. For 
instance, the SPs are free from the headache of users credential 
management.   
• Enhanced Scalability: FIAM enhances the HD IdP and FD SP scalability 
such as: (1) The HD IdP can easily add a new user and at the same time 
revoke the existing user accounts without disturbing the HD basic 
infrastructure, (2) New FD SPs can easily join the federation and (3) It 
allows resource (service) access to a much greater number of users.  
• Element Association: The HD IdPs are in close association with the HD 
users and FD SPs. This association has two pros: (1) The promotion and 
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retail of extra resources (services) and (2) The ease of the billing 
acquisition of the FD SPs that they uphold. 
• Reduce Information Redundancy: The roles of the HD and FD 
organizations in a federation are clearly stated: (1) The FD SP does not 
maintain the users’ registration and AuthN information and (2) The HD 
IdP does not need to be anxious about the resource (service) AuthR 
information.   
• Privacy Conservation: The HD conserves the user’s identity privacy at the 
FDs. 
2.5.3 Standards of Federated Identity and Access Management 
To exchange the user’s related information between the HDs and FDs in Inter domain 
scenario, the major FIAM schemes use the standard SAML protocol [17], [18]. 
Shibboleth is a FIAM mode standard [12], [13] which uses SAML protocol. These 
two standards are discussed in the following sub-sections: 
2.5.3.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
The OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) 
is a non-profit international organization found in 1993 under the Standard 
Generalized Markup Language (SGML). The objective of the OASIS establishment is 
to promote the expansion and adoption of open standards for security and Web 
services. It is the OASIS which defines the SAML standards and security [18]. The 
SAML specification suggests a variety of security and privacy mechanisms [27] 
described below: 
• Security in SAML 
o Integrity and confidentiality of messages may protected by using 
the HTTP over SSL 3.0 (such as HTTPS) or TLS 1.0 [6]. 
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• Privacy of the  SAML 
o  User identity privacy is protected by of Pseudonymity at the FDs. 
o One-Time Identifier (transient identifiers) conserves user privacy. 
The SAML uses XML [111] for exchanging user information among the HD IdP 
and FD SP. In other words, the SAML builds on the XML framework for exchanging 
user AuthN and AuthR data (information) in Inter-domain scenarios. The two SAML 
versions are: (1) SAML 1.0/ 1.1 [31] and (2) SAML 2.0 [28]. The SAML protocol can 
be divided into several main components as: 
• Assertions: The assertion contains user security information placed 
between these tags: <saml: Assertion> ... </saml: Assertion>. The SAML 
assertions consist of three basic statements: (1) Authentication statement, 
(2) Attribute statement and (3) Authorization decision statement. 
• Protocols: The HD and FD communicate with each other for the assertions 
through the SAML protocols. The SAML is consisting of the main 
protocols such as: (1) Authentication request protocol, (2) Attribute query 
protocol, (3) Authorization decision query protocol and (4) Single sign-out 
protocol. 
• Metadata: The SAML makes is easy for the HD and FD to encode and 
present their essential configuration data using metadata files [29]. 
• Bindings: Bindings are used to map the SAML protocol messages onto the 
lower network communication protocols to transport the SAML assertions 
between the HD and the FD [30]. 
• Profiles: The profiles deal with the question of how SAML assertions, 
protocols, and bindings combine to achieve an SSO in between the HD 
and FD. Some examples of profiles are web browser WSSO and single 
sign out profiles. 
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2.5.3.2 Shibboleth 
Shibboleth is a standard and complete open source FIAM software package. 
Shibboleth uses a standard SAML protocol for AuthN assertion and attributes 
exchange between HD and FD. The well-known body working on the identity 
federation is Internet2 with Shibboleth. The aim of the Internet2 project was to build 
federation of identities for academic institutions and their partners. The roles, features, 
pros and working of Shibboleth are described below: 
a) Roles of Shibboleth 
The four roles of Shibboleth architecture are [12], [13]: 
• Home Domain Principal (or User): The resource (service) consumer.  
• Home Domain Identity Provider: The HD IdP architecture is drawn from 
SAML. In Shibboleth, a user AuthN and an attribute assertion are carried 
out in accordance to the SAML protocol specification [31], [32], [33].  
• Foreign Domain Service Provider: The module “mod_shib” which is an 
Apache web server “plug-in” controls access to a protected resource. The 
Shibboleth FD, which consists of a daemon “shibd” and Apache module 
“httpd”, listens to AuthR requests from a web server.   
• Discovery Service: Through the DS HD users can select their HD IdP to 
authenticate with. The FD, upon receiving a resource request, redirects a 
user to the HD to select the preferred IdP through the DS. 
b) Features of Shibboleth 
The main features of Shibboleth are: 
• The HD IdP is responsible for users’ AuthN through any in-place AuthN 
method.    
• The HD of an organization is the owner of its users’ identity information.  
• The FD SP trusts the HD IdP for assertions, while the HD user trusts the 
HD IdP for AuthN and privacy conservation.  
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• The FD in a federation is free from the burden of user administration and 
the HD is free from the AuthR decisions. 
c) Pros of Shibboleth 
The pros of Shibboleth are described below: 
• The Shibboleth AuthN mechanism has numerous advantages: (1) WSSO 
AuthN across multiple FDs, (2) Each organization may adopt different 
AuthN mechanisms and (3) It eliminates to authenticate a subject at every 
remote SP instance.  
• In the Shibboleth architecture the HD IdP releases limited amounts of user 
information to the FD SPs for AuthR decisions which certainly conserves 
the users’ privacy. 
• Shibboleth provides flexible AuthR management which makes use of 
users or group identifiers. This enables the FD SPs to: (1) Leverage multi-
grained access control, and (2) Provide resource access constraint on the 
basis of the users’ attributes. 
d) Workings of Shibboleth 
Shibboleth offers resource or service access in Inter and Intra domain scenarios. The 
HD IdP and FD SP use the metadata files, with many others, to exchange the AuthN 
and AuthR data. These metadata files are usually XML files. The purpose of these 
metadata files is to precisely identify the providers’ domains. Shibboleth works 
(Figure 2.5) as below: 
A HD end user requests a protected resource sited at the FD SP (step-1). To 
access a protected resource the FD SP requires the HD IdP user AuthN and AuthR 
information. Therefore, the HD end user is redirected to the “Discovery Service (DS)” 
to choose his/her HD IdP entity using a Graphical User Interface (GUI) (step-2). The 
HD IdP presents a login page to the user, which depends on an AuthN mechanism. 
The HD user submits his/her basic AuthN credential that he/she acquired from the HD 
IdP in the registration process (step-3, 4 and 5). 
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At this point, if a HD user is successfully authenticated, the HD IdP then establish 
a session (S) and create an authentication handle (H) for the authenticated HD user 
(step-6, 7 and 8). The “H” communicates by a user agent (browser) and passes on the 
“H” to the FD (step-9). The FD SP employs this “H” to ask for an HD end user’s 
“attributes” from the HD IdP machine (step-10). After fetching the “attribute” from 
the HD machine, it then is sent to the FD SP (step-11). The requested attribute is 
passed through a sequence of steps such as: (1) Pulling the attribute as found in a 
system of catalog such as “LDAP”, (2) Assigning specific protocol encoders, and (3) 
Finally, it is ready to be filtered for the propose of releasing (step-12). 
Shibboleth HD IdP machine does not keep any HD user’s associated attributes. 
For this purpose, it depends on the outer data storehouses such as the LDAP 
storehouse. The IdPs release an authenticated user attributes to the FDs for the 
purpose of AuthR, associated to the FDs’ SP policies (i.e., who can access a protected 
resource) (step-13 and 14). The aim of these policies that the FDs are interested in 
what types of attributes about a particular home domain authenticated user, in the 
form of a metadata file, for an access control policies. The HD IdP employs the 
“Attribute-Filter” which is an XML file that contains attribute descriptions such as the 
attributes that are released to the FD. The information requested for AuthR is passed 















Figure 2.5: Shibboleth architecture 
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2.5.4 Federated Mode and Web Single Sign-on Relationship 
In the FIAM mode, the HD IdP is responsible for collecting and maintaining the 
integrity of a person’s virtual identity information and the FD SP for resource 
(service) access which the HD users are of interest in using it. The user’s virtual 
identity information may be any electronic information which is possibly associated 
to a real physical person to identify this particular user [34]. The purpose of the FIAM 
mode is to manage and control the releases of users’ personal information in any type 
of electronic communication in a federated environment [35]. 
Whereas, WSSO is an AuthN service, particularly the proxy true WSSO, used by 
the FIAM to authenticate the HD user and then exchange the AuthN and AuthR 
information with the FD SP. The SAML [17] works as a main inter-domain protocol 
to exchange the AuthN and AuthR information between the HD and FD. Shibboleth, 
an example of a federated mode, which will be discussed next, provides the HD users 
access to multiple resources (services) sited at FDs via the WSSO facility. These 
shows that the proxy trues WSSO and the federated mode are related concepts 
because they are associated with one another. 
2.6 Identity Masking Schemes 
In a virtual environment, every subject (user) has some kind of credential (e.g., 
username and/or password) to be authenticated and identified by for accessing 
resources (services). To access a protected resource (service) the users must 
demonstrate the ownership of these credentials to the interested parties (e.g., IdP, ASP 
or SP which is linked to the trust association between the users and the parties). The 
purpose of the identity masking scheme is to mask the resource (service) consumer 
identity at different parties (i.e., maybe internal or external to the user). The two 
existing identity masking schemes are: (1) the multi-show and (2) the extended one-
show (in which identity masking is achieved via a blind signature [36]. 
In the multi-show scheme, the possession of credentials can be demonstrated a 
random number of times without being linked and would not compromise the user’s 
30 
identity anonymity. While, in the extended one-show scheme, the user’s identity 
anonymity and unlinkability is achieved through the adoption of a blind-signature. In 
emergent unified security, tust and privacy framework (section 4.3.1.1), the focus is 
on the blind signature practicality in FIAM mode. The public key digital signature is 
an example of a one-show credential scheme; its cons, blind signature and advantage 
over the public key digital signature, and how the user identity privacy is conserved in 
the one-show scheme through a blind signature scheme is discussed in the following 
two sub-sections: 
2.6.1 Public Key Digital Signature Scheme 
The conventional public key digital signature scheme consists of a: (1) private signing 
function (S), and (2) public verifying predicate (V) [90]. The private signing function 
(S) is known only to the signer. Whenever a message (m) is sent, it is first provided to 
the signer to get a signature on this message (m), e.g., the S (m). Next, the verifier 
performs a validation procedure to check the V (m, S (m))’s validity. The main 
problem in this scheme is: 
• It cannot produce a signature (S) on the message (m), such as S (m), 
without the knowledge of the signer. This issue certainly raises a mesaage 
(m) privacy concen because the signer can know the message (m) detail. 
2.6.2 Blind Signature Scheme 
The blind signature scheme [36] is based on an RSA digital signature [37]. The blind 
signature is the enhancement of a conventional system with blind and unblind 
functions (e.g., BF and BF-1). In this scheme, whenever a user wishing to sign a 
message (m) he/she first blinds the message using the blind function (e.g., BF (m)). 
Next, the user sends the blinded message to the signer to get a signature on it. After 
receiving the blind message, the signer signs it and returns the S(BF (m)) to the user. 
In the end, the user unblinds the message using the unblind function to obtain the 
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signature on the message (e.g., BF-1(S(BF (m))) = S(m)). The advantage of this 
scheme over the scheme in section 2.6.1 is: 
• The blind signature scheme is used to sign data (e.g., electronic data). This 
data can later be authenticated in a manner without disclosing a user’s 
identity. In the blind signature, the signer: (1) has no knowledge of what is 
in the messages they signed, or (2) about the signatures that were obtained 
by the receivers for their messages. 
2.7 Trusted Computing (TC) 
In the year 2000, the trusted computing or trusted platform step was initiated by the 
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) [38]. It is recognized as TCG [14]. The 
TCPA’s basic notion was to introduce or place trust into the computing platforms 
(Figure 2.6) through an embedded TPM chip [16]. The Core Root of Trust for 
Measurement (CRTM) is the first component to run during the boot process. This 
CRTM may be physically located inside the TPM or externally. However, in either 








Figure 2.6: Trusted computing group standards [14] 
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Another reason behind the adoption of trusted computing is of the conventional 
security mechanism’s continuous failure to protect computer systems against 
malevolent software. The TCG notions related to this work are discussed in sub-
section 2.7.1 to 2.7.4. 
2.7.1 Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
TPM is a small coprocessor chip that performs mixed security functionalities (Figure 
2.7): (1) private key protection like a smartcard, (2) RSA key generation, (3) signature 
generation etc. The TPM also has many components which consist of among others: 
(1) Endorsement Key (EK)-a manufacturer built-in key to uniquely identify a 
particular machine TPM, and (2) Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) (pseudonym keys)-







Figure 2.7: Trusted platform module 
In addition to the TPMEK and TPMAIK, each TPM also contains Platform 
Configuration Registers (PCRs). The main function of PCRs is to verify the 
anticipated machine (i.e., target) platform configuration to the challenger machine. 
Each PCR register is made of 20 bytes (160bits) broad which holds a specific machine 
hardware & software “condition” hash (i.e., using SHA-1 scheme) digest. For 
instance, PCRs are competent to accumulate a wide-range of entities such as BIOS, 
BOOT LOADER, Kernel and Application measurement (i.e., cryptographic hashes) 
 
33 
using the SHA-1[39]. PCR_EXTEND can be used for PCR manipulating. This is a 
two step operation given as: 
• In step-1, the current VALUE (i.e., measurement value of component) will 
be accrued in the PCR, and then the hash of this VALUE is added on to 
the existing PCR VALUE.  
• In step-2, the ensuing structure of the SHA-1 is recorded in a similar PCR. 
Later in the validation process, the accrued measurements are presented to the 
challenger. This is to confirm that a machine’s platform trustworthy configuration is 
as proof to which the TPM belongs. 
2.7.2 Trusted Boot 
The trusted boot supports the remote machine platform attestation (AuthN). On a 
target machine (the machine which wants to attest its platform integrity states to the 
challenger), the first trusted base is the “immutable base”, the CRTM, which may 
reside in BIOS and is always trusted. Whenever the target machine is powered on the 
control, it is always transferring to the “immutable bases” and is the first piece (i.e., 
CRTM) to be executed. The “immutable base” then measures itself and then the BIOS 
and stores the computed SHA-1 result over the BIOS content in the TPM. This 
mechanism is then utilized recursively, creating a boot time chain root of trust as 






Figure 2.8: Chain of trust 
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2.7.3 Privacy Certificate Authority (PrivacyCA) 
The PrivacyCA is a trusted TTP. The PrivacyCA needs to have knowledge about each 
organization machine’s valid TPMEK (i.e., TPMEK), an RSA key pair, and the public 
part (i.e., TPMEKpublic) of the keys. The TPMEK key cannot be used due to privacy and 
that is the reason to authenticate this particular TPM to an entity called a verifier. So 
to protect the EK privacy, the pseudo (i.e., AIK and RSA key pair) key is used to 
obtain a certificate for the newly generated TPMAIK. Through this certificate, the TPM 
then proves its authenticity to the verifier with respect to the AIK. 
2.7.4 Attestation 
In general, attestation is analogous to signing a peace of document, such as degree, 
certificate etc. The signing process represents the authenticity and geniuses of a 
respective document that it is issued to ‘X’ by the authority ‘Y’. However, to attest a 
computing platform electronically and remotely, the TC novel concept called the 
“Remote Attestation (RA)” is utilized. The remote attestation technique is used to 
affirm two things: (1) That the remote machine contains a genuine TPM and (2) Its 
corresponding machine platform integrity is not compromised. The TCG remote 
attestation scheme is discussed in sub-section 2.7.4.1 to 2.7.4.2. 
2.7.4.1 Remote Attestation 
Remote attestation is a technique through which a client machine validates its 
platforms (i.e., hardware and software) measurement to a remote machine (also 
known as a challenger). The main objective of this technique is to let the remote 
machine ascertain the degree of trust in the attestor machine on the basis of the 
measurement health status. The remote machine platform attestation architecture is 
made of two key elements: (1) the IMA [15] or any other attestation scheme and (2) 
the remote machine platform attestation protocol. The two main entities taking part in 
a remote attestation scheme are: (1) a challenger machine, and (2) a target machine. 
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In remote attestation, the challenger is an entity that challenges the target machine 
for its platform authenticity. The protocol used among the challenger and target 
machines is called the integrity challenge-response protocol. In a simple remote 
attestation process, the challenger (e.g., a server machine) challenges a remote target 
(e.g., a client machine). The target machine then collects the requested component’s 
integrity and returns it to the challenger. The integrity measurement process between 




Figure 2.9: Remote attestation technique 
The machine platform integrity process consists of a series of measurement steps 
starting with the CRTM. The CRTM consists of a boot-strapping process which 
measures the next component (e.g., boot-loader, OS, applications etc.) in the chain 
and adds the measurement value in to the TPM. In this manner, each component is 
measured and the measurement is added to the TPM before it is executed. The 
malevolent software cannot conceal its existence in a machine platform. The reason 
for this is that after storing the values in a TPM, it cannot be rolled back until the 
platform is rebooted. The IMA based attestation mechanism, which is the most 
practicable attestation mechanism, is utilized in this work and is discussed below. 
2.7.4.2 Mutual Attestation 
The traditional remote platform attestation approach supports only the remote 
machine attestation (or remote AuthN) of a specific target machine. The problem with 
this approach is that it is unable to carry out the attestation (or check the authenticity) 
of a challenger machine. The lack of mutual attestation in between communicating 
machines may bring along several machine platform security and trust issues. The 
work presented in this thesis solves the existing issues by extending the remote 
platform attestation protocol into a mutual machine attestation protocol. 
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This mutual attestation technique allows the communicating machines: (1) to 
build a mutual trust and (2) to validate each other’s machine platform trustworthiness’ 
state. The client and the server machines in a federated research collaboration 
scenario (section 1.2) will use this mutual attestation protocol to prove each other’s 






Figure 2.10: Mutual attestation flow 
2.7.5 Open Source Trusted Computing (TC) for JAVA 
The trusted computing for Java platforms was initiated by the Institute for Applied 
Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) [113], Graz University of 
Technology, supported by the European Commission as part of the OpenTC project. 
The objective was to develop trusted computing services for Java software 
developers. The main packages developed by IAIK for Trusted Computing for the 
Java Platforms are [40]: (1) jTSS-TCG Software Stack, and (2) jTPM Tools etc. 
These packages are described subsequently in the followings: 
• jTSS: The jTSS package is compliant with the TCG software stack which 
is the key element of Trusted Computing platforms. The key features 
supported by jTSS are the TSS Device Driver Library (DDL), TSS Core 
Services and TSS Service Provider (SP). 
• jTPM: The jTPM Tools consist of command line tool sets which represent 
communication with the TPM and TSS. The jTPM Tool package includes 
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taking and clearing the TPM ownership, releasing of current PCR 
registers, Extending the PCRs and the creation of quotes etc. The basic 
requirements for utilizing jTPM Tools are: (1) Real  TPM hardware chip 
or TPM emulator, (2) Root level (administrative) permission consent, (3) 
Sun Java ver. 5 or above, (4) Running of the TCG compliant jTSS on a 
machine, and (5) TC cert bundled in jTPM Tools 0.7. 
2.8 Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) 
In future federated identity and resource (service) access systems, mutual trust 
formation among communicating stakeholders/entities is becoming highly imperative 
because of the emerging security threats (e.g., Malwares and Trojans) to the 
computing platform.  
2.8.1 What is an Integrity 
In general, integrity refers to a particular program binary possession which represents 
this particular program’s secured state or the defense capability against unauthorized 
alteration. For some programs’ integrity, contagion means the program association 
with the low integrity data [139] and to others, certification of the high integrity data 
[140]. However, in practice, both meanings have their own limitations [139], [140]; 
such as, in the first case, the programs frequently run the low integrity data devoid of 
being infected and in the second case, the application certification can become 
extremely costly [15]. In addition to the above, IBM introduced the IBM 4758 in 
which the program integrity is ascertained by means of the program code [141]. 
However, the disadvantage of the IBM 4758 is the unavailability or impracticality of 
these aspects in current machines [15]. To overcome such challenges, Sailor et al. [15] 
introduced “IMA”, a more flexible and practical integrity measurement scheme for 
computing platforms. 
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2.8.2 The Integrity Objective 
The main goal of the integrity is to demonstrate to the challenger machine that a 
program integrity running on a target machine is sufficient to make use of a resource 
(service) provided by the challenger. The program integrity is a binary possession. 
Therefore, utilizing the program integrity, the challenger can detect the unauthorized 
alteration of a program.  
2.8.3 The Architectural Design of the Integrity Measurement 
The overall architectural design of the integrity measurement (Figure 2.11) consists of 
three fundamental units: (1) The Integrity Measurement Acquiring, (2) Integrity 
Challenge/ Response and (3) Integrity validation. These units are described in the sub-








Figure 2.11: Integrity measurement architecture 
2.8.3.1 Integrity Measurement Acquiring Phase 
The IMA is based on the boot time measurement. In the boot time measurement, 
whenever an IMA and TPM enabled machine is powered on, the machine takes the 
measurement of all the loaded executables till the last application is loaded. The 
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integrity measurement notion steps are: (1) First, the BIOS measures (i.e., the 
components integrity) the Boot-loader, (2) The Boot-loader then measures the OS 
kernel and (3) The OS kernel then measures the loaded applications. The IMA 
actually maintains the loaded components history or record in an in-kernel ML. The 
ML holds the text report and the loaded measurement components’ corresponding 
hash entries. The measurement is put into practice as a 160bit outcome calculation in 
the form of a SHA-1 hash function. The hash function is applied to the files during the 
booting of the system. The file actually holds the data or executables which are loaded 
during the booting process. To protect the in-kernel ML, the TPM is used to keep the 
integrity value over the in-kernel ML. The TPM protects the in-kernel ML integrity 
and the challenger can sense the unauthorized alteration to the in-kernel ML during 
the integrity measurement validation step. The TPM uses the Platform Configuration 
Registers (PCRs), which are the protected data registers, to keep the integrity 
validation value over the total number of measurements taken during the booting 
process. Therefore, the TPM PCR (e.g., 10 or 13) aggregates any measurement using 
the TPM_EXTEND function. For instance, if j measurements have been taken (i.e., 
M1, M2, M3, M4…Mj) then the aggregation of these in selected the PCR are: SHA-
1(…SHA-1(SHA-1(SHA-1(SHA-1(0||M1) ||M2) ||M3) ||M4)…||Mj). 
2.8.3.2 Integrity Challenge/ Response Phase 
The challenging party uses the integrity challenge/response protocol to retrieve the 
current ML and TPM_QUOTE. The steps involved in the integrity retrieval and the 
validations are described here: 
• The challenger machine creates a 160-bit non-inevitable nonce and pushes 
it in the integrity challenge request message towards the target machine.    
• After receiving the attestation challenge request, the target machine 
prepares the response which includes two outcomes: (1) Signed 
TPM_QUOTE and (2) Ordered ML. First, the target machine loads the 
AIK, a 2048-bit RSA key, into the TPM chip which is known only to this 
TPM. For the TPM AIK public part, a certificate is obtained from the 
PrivacyCA. The generated signature actually associates the PCR signature 
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to the particular machine TPM. The TPM_QUOTE is generated by signing 
the chosen PCR and nonce received in the integrity challenge request with 
the TPM AIK key private part. The ordered ML and the signed 
TPM_QUOTE are then returned to the challenge machine as an integrity 
challenged response. 
2.8.3.3 Integrity Validation Phase 
To validate the target machine’s integrity, the integrity validation unit consists of the 
following steps: 
• The nonce validation is received in the integrity challenge response. This 
is to ensure that the QUOTE is not a replay attack by an infected machine.  
• The TPM_QUOTE signature validation determines two things: (1) The 
honesty of the QUOTED PCR values and (2) The QUOTING TPM 
authenticity that it is really the one on the attested machine. 
• The Boot aggregate computation and evaluation is added to the initial 
measurement of the ML. This is to ensure that the boot aggregate is not 
tampered with. In addition to that, individually, each and every 
measurement in the ML is validated against known good hashes in the 
Data Base. 
• To validate that the MLs have been tampered or not, the ML PCR value is 
virtually recomputed. This process is started with the initial measurement 
of the ML until the ML is consumed. The outcome of the virtual PCR 
value is then compared with the signed TPM PCR value (i.e., PCR-10). If 
they do not match then the target machine attestation fails.   
2.9 Summary 
This chapter presents the background study which covers the nature of the 
technologies and notions that are used in this work. This chapter consists of nine 
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sections. The first section provides the introduction. The identity in the virtual 
environment is discussed in the second section. The identity and access management, 
related basic processes and distinct modes are presented in the third section. The 
difference between the WSSO authentication systems is discussed in the fourth 
section. The fifth section coveres the FIAM mode related elements and standards, and 
a comparison between the federated mode and the proxy true WSSO. The identity 
masking schemes and their practicability are discussed in the sixth section, 
particularly the blind signature scheme. The trusted computing and integrity 
measurement architectural notions and technologies are discussed in the seventh and 
eight sections, respectively. These sections also explain how IMA and TPM 
integration can bring mutual trust and security among communicating machine 





This chapter provides the pertinent allied research work. The first section presents the 
introduction of the chapter. The literature review related to this work is presented in 
the second section. The overall literature covering the related work to this research 
area described in sequence in the five sub-sections. The first sub-section describes the 
IAM mode failures and advancements. The trust and security in FIAM is described in 
the second sub-section. The unification of security, trust and privacy is discussed in 
the third sub-section. The fourth and fifth sub-sections, respectively explains the 
practicability of the identity masking scheme and the remote attestation techniques. 
The analysis of the past works, and the security, trust and privacy unification is 
discussed in the third section. The fourth section summarizes this. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Identity and Access Management (IAM) Mode 
The IAM concept is not new. Many offline IAM modes have been operating for 
decades. The examples of common and widespread offline IAM modes include 
country passports, National Identity Cards (NICs) and driving licenses issuers. 
Different online IAM modes are used. Online IAM modes evolved from isolated to 
federated form and are classified into five basic modes: (1) Isolated, (2) Centralized 
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(3) Distributed, (4) User-centric and (5) Federated [19], [21]. In online IAM modes, 
the security, trust and privacy challenges involve are: (1) User identity credential 
security concerns (i.e., safe or not against online threats), (2) Trust in the user (client) 
and home domain server (IdP) machine platforms, that they are really in trustworthy 
state (i.e., the users credentials are protected), and (3) User identity privacy concerns 
(e.g., some one knows the real identity and which resources (services) are being 
accessed). This section presents the reasons why the earlier IAM modes (i.e., isolated, 
centralized and distributed) were failed and the needs for advanced IAM modes. 







a) Isolated Mode 
The reasons for the isolated mode (section 2.3.1.1) failure are [4], [10]: (1) Concern of 
credential burden which introduced inconvenience to the users, (2) Users failed to 
remember passwords, (3) Users cannot access the resources (services) sited in another 
domain. The strength of an isolated mode that they keep the users information in 
isolated way. Therefore, the isolation makes harder to combine the users information 
for the purpose of precise users information matching. The different user AuthN 
mechanisims and policies also makes harder to achieve the end user expediency. The 
user information privacy is protected because it not leaves the organization boundries. 
b) Centralized Mode 
In Passport, an example of a centralized IAM mode (section 2.3.1.2), all user 
information are stored in a central repository. So in case of any malevolent activity 
nothing will be protected [41], [147], [148]. The two main security problems in 
Technology 
Aspects 
IAM Modes  
Federated User Centric Centralized Isolated 
AuthN.  IdP Through IdP Single major record Every occasion 
AuthR. SP SP centralized Every occasion 
Identity locality IdP User selected IdP  Stored in a major Record Detach SPs records 
Trust 
Association 
Strong at IdP Account divisions User dependent on SP for 
security and privacy 
Strong 
Linkability Not linkable Not linkable Linkable Not linkable 





No protection after 
revealing the 
information. 





Passport wallet via Hotmail are identified in [42], [43], [136] as: (1) reusing of cashed 
AuthN information and (2) the cross site scripting bugs. In addition to those, the main 
reasons of Passport failure, given in the following, are relative to its “trust model”. 
• First, Microsoft participates in every transaction between company “X” 
and company “Y”.  
• Second, the users attribute privacy concern: (1) Microsoft is in authority to 
access each and every user attribute and (2) the lack of the fine grained 
polices (e.g., user attributes releasing policies). 
c) Distributed Mode 
In distributed mode the users identity information exchange across a single or 
multiple trust domains (i.e., witnin between different domains or a single domains). 
The distributed mode is an alternative solution to the centralized mode. However, the 
user identity information privacy issue is associated with the design, execution and 
distributed identity mode active life. In distributed mode the “globally unique 
identifier” was introduced such as in X.509 based PKI systems. However, the 
problem with the “globally unique identifier” is the privacy concern becuase everyone 
knows everyone else’s “globally unique identifier” [43]. The knowledge of the 
“globally unique identifier” certainly raises user identity privacy concerns. 
d) User-Centric Mode 
Traditionaly a user handles his/her multiple personal identity credentials and 
indentifiers by memorizing the credentials (e.g., password) or recording their 
identifiers on a paper. However, increases in the number of these credentials and 
identifiers causes the credentials and identifiers management issue. To solve the issue 
of multiple user credentials and indetifiers issue Josang and Pope [23] introduced a 
user-centric mode (section 2.3.1.3) which let the users store their identifiers and 
credentials from different SPs in a single tamper resistant hardware device. They 
merged a Personal AuthN Device (PAD) with an isolated mode. The Privacy and 
Identity Management (IdM) for Europe (PRIME) [44] and OpenID [45] discussed in 
[46] are examples of a user-centric mode. The user-centric approach solves the user 
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credentials management issue. However, lacking of platform trust in the user-centric 
approach may raise security concerns. 
e) Federated Mode 
The concerns discussed above related to earlier IAM modes illustrate the needs to 
develop a new IAM mode. In such a new IAM mode, the dispersed HD organization 
should be responsible but not the users [43]. This has lead to the federated modes 
(section 2.3.1.4) which is based on a proxy true WSSO AuthN scheme [3] or WSSO 
[47], [134], [135]. The examples of federated mode are (e.g., Passport, Athens, 
Shibboleth [13] and CardSpace [48], [49]). The identity federation technology such as 
SAML [17] fulfills at least some of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) privacy guidelines by [50], [123]: (1) Allowing the HD IdP to 
create an arbitrary identifier for each user and (2) The attribute assertions should be 
short lived (i.e., added by the HD IdP to the FD SP). The property “short lived” of an 
attribute reduces, in the end of each transaction, the FD SP control over the attributes. 
3.2.2 Trust and Security in Federated Identity and Accesss Management  
Trust in general has been studied in a range of numerous areas and thus a lot of 
dissimilar trust definitions may exist in the literature. These trust definitions, in 
dissimilar areas, may mean a bit different to each person and the environment it is 
used in. Therefore, this section first describes how trust is observed and exists in 
different areas as well as in personal interaction with, the focus on trust in the FIAM 
mode. 
Trust in computer science signifies: (1) Peer quality measurement in Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) schemes [51], [151], (2) Web services trust in World Wide Web [152] and 
distributed environment [130], (3) Inspiration in the online transactions and 
recommender schemes [52], (4) AuthN technique type/digital signature names [53]. 
Trust, in literature, has also been defined in terms of: (1) The sensation of security 
(e.g., the subject’s feelings that he/she is secure in an action/task) [54], [55], [121], 
[131], [132], (2) Solace [56], [57] lack of fear. Gove stated that for trust formation it 
is necessary that the subject who confronts a threat must be eager to depend on 
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another entity with the “sensation of security” or the recommendation of the previous 
entity [58]. This means that trust is important for someone to feel secure in an action 
or a task. 
To some, trust signifies the level of confidence of a party in someone (or 
something) [59]. Jøsang et al. illustrated this trust definition clearly and completely 
comprised the trust fundamental constituents such as: (1) Reliance on the TTP, (2) 
TTP trustworthiness, and (3) Associated threats to the TTP if it is functioning 
malevolently [21], [60].  
Trust in existing FIAM modes is achieved in different ways such as: (1) Liberty 
Alliance (LA) [61], [145] defines a Circle of Trust (CoT) to which the SPs and IdPs 
adhere by signing a business agreement in order to support secure transactions among 
CoT members [24], (2) Trust association similar to CoT is absent in the OpenID [62], 
[143], [144] because trust is shifted to the social echelon as of the application echelon 
[63]. 








Trust absence in the FIAM mode may raise security concerns [66], [67], [132] 
because the FIAM mode connects previously isolated collections of user identity 
information. Therefore, if a user’s account at his/her HD IdP were successfully 
phished then the attacker would also have the opportunity to access other associated 
FD SPs [64]. Also, the security concerns [65], [122], [137], [138] are discussed in a 
 Federated WSSO Approaches 
OpenID Microsoft 
Passport 
Liberty Alliance SAML Shibboleth  
WSSO facility  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Attribute 
swapping 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Dissemination 
type 
Obtainable Not freely 
Obtainable 
Obtainable Obtainable Obtainable 
Security OpenID 
reliant 
Microsoft reliant  IdP and SP 
dependent 











Privacy Not entirely Not entirely To some extent Yes  Yes 
Scalability High Petite federations High High High 
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Web Service (WS)-enabled FIAM: (1) Where the receiver of a message may not be an 
ultimate destination and (2) Improper security measures may result in the 
unauthorized access to a user's personal information which will lead to the violation 
of privacy [4], [5].  
To overcome such security concerns, the TCG [14], [125], [127] introduced a 
hardware based security and trust solution. The TCG defines the trust as, “Trust is the 
anticipation that a device will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose” 
[68]. Alam et al. further make clear the terminologies “specific purpose” and 
“particular way” [69]: (1) The term “particular manner” is concerned with the 
question of how a task is expected to be performed and (2) “specific purpose” refers 
to a particular task or scenario, e.g., usage of an object, web service access, or some 
computational activity.  
Therefore, in this work the trust definition in a federated environment is derived 
from the TC notion. The TC trust definition is precise to the trust in machine 
platforms (i.e., BootLoader, OS and Applications) integrity. The TC defines the trust 
as “Trust in a device platform is the expectation that a device will behave honestly 
and faithfully to carry out a designated function. A device can be any pervasive 
device, a desktop (i.e., client) and a server (e.g., IdP or SP) equipped with an entity 
(i.e., TPM- a tamper-resistant piece of hardware security solution). So, in federated 
research collaboration scenario (section 1.2) the home domain target’s and the 
challenger’s machine platforms are said to be mutually trustworthy if both of the 
machine platforms integrity is mutually validated. 
3.2.3 Security, Trust and Privacy Unification 
Watanabe and Tanaka [70] proposed a federated AuthN scheme using a cellular 
phone: (1) to improve ID assurance and (2) to secure the AuthN in OpenID. They 
solved the security and privacy problems in the current OpenID scheme. However, 
their solution did not include the communicating machine’s platform integrity 
measurement. Therefore, the user will be unaware as to whether he/she is interacting 
with honest or dishonest FAPs or OPs. 
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Lutz and Campo [71], introduced the identity token concept in Multi-domain-
Federations (MdFs). The purpose of this work was to bridge the gap between security 
(e.g., the identity of the user can be detected definitely), and privacy (e.g., minimal 
information sharing about the user). To protect the user’s privacy in the MdF, the user 
in the FD is visible only with pseudonymity. This guarantees that no private 
information will be kept at the FD. They examined the user identity security and 
privacy but not the trust in machine platforms. 
Dey and Weis [72] identified a key privacy concern in the OpenID federated login 
scheme. The concern is that the IdPs could possibly link the user’s identity and track 
his/her visit across multiple sites. In a proposed solution, they solved the problem by 
pseudonymity and unlinkability which are achieved through a blind signature [36] 
scheme. The concerns in their scheme are: (1) The token storage and (2) The absence 
of client and the IdP machine platforms mutual attestation.  
The idea behind the Shibboleth design is to ease the formation of federations and 
collaborations [150] between the participating organizations [13]. The advantage of 
Shibboleth over other FIAM modes is the privacy preservation [43]. However, the 
issues in Shibboleth are: (1) A lack of integration of the user AuthN mechanism with 
that of the HD client and IdP machines’ mutual attestation, (2) The absence of mutual 
trust formation between the HD clients and the IdP machine and (3) The FD resource 
AuthR decision not made on the basis of the HD client and the IdP machines’ 
successful mutual attestation trusted attribute.  
Hacket et al. [159] identified several significant security and privacy concerns in 
BrowserID and WebID federated identity systems that need to be addressed in a 
cohesive way. Singh et al. [73] introduces privacy, trust and policy based AuthR 
framework for web and grid services in distributed environment. Kungpisdan [74] 
presents a framework for agent based SET mobile set payment. Their proposed 
solution is practicable because it is fully well-matched with the existing SET payment 
infrastructure. 
In addition to the above, Mond [75] discusses trust, privacy and security issues in 
peer-to-peer environments. Karnouskos et al. [76] discusses how security, trust and 
privacy concerns are tackled in the Secure Mobile Payment Service (SEMPOS) 
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project from the technology and business model perspective. Whereas, Rooy et al. 
[77] discusses privacy and trust concerns in the future Internet because of unseen 
users’ data collection. 
The above discussion shows the previous steps that have been taken to bridge the 
gap between SP (Security and Privacy). However, to build a unified STP framework 
that combines some STP related aspects (in a single framework) still does not exist. 
Solving the STP puzzle in the future FIAM mode is an interesting but hard challenge. 
The construction of PUSTPF for FIAM mode is discussed in the chapter 4 (section 
4.2.2). For this, first STP threats are described in federated identity and resource 
access scenario through a threat model. The threat model, given in section 4.2.2, 
covers: (1) Weak AuthN, (2) The absence of a mutual trust formation among the HD 
clients and the IdP machines’ platforms and (3) The HD clients and IdP machine 
platform privacy-conservation in mutual attestation protocol at the FD SPs. On the 
basis of the identified threats two different holistic frameworks (section 4.3.1) are 
contributed: (1) The EUSTPF (section 4.3.1.1) which does not include a TTP and (2) 
The PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2) which includes a TTP. 
3.2.4 Practicability of Identity Masking Schemes 
This section describes the Identity Masking Schemes (IMSs) practicability in real 
environment and particularly in a USTPF.  
The identity masking schemes are anonymous credential schemes. The purpose of 
identity masking is to mask the original user’s identity with a pseudo identity. In early 
non-anonymous credential schemes such as in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
[79], [108], the concern was about the user identity privacy (section 2.6.1). To 
overcome such an issue, anonymous credential [80], [81] or identification schemes 
[82], [83] were introduced.  
Chen [82] proposed one of the earlier anonymous schemes. The proposed scheme 
offers the echelons of effectiveness vital for practicable systems. However, the Chen’s 
scheme suffered of privacy issue because of the participation of a third entity in the 
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consumer’s registration activity. Damgård [84] proposed a complexity theoretic 
primitive scheme, which is based on the “one-way function” and “zero-knowledge 
proofs”, but the practicability of Damgård is low. The general credential scheme [83] 
has low practicability as well because it is contrasted upon the “one-way function” 
and “zero-knowledge proofs”. Brands [85] introduced the “Certificate based scheme”. 
However, the major drawback of this scheme is that all participating issuer 
organizations must concur on pertinent “set of security” parameters. Therefore, to 
build such a scheme in reality is not any easy task. As well, the other anonymous 
credential systems [86], [87], [88], [89] are also not yet possible to be implemented in 
daily practices [72]. The main issue related to such schemes in a practical 
implementation scenario is the underlying mechanism complexities that it is created 
on.  
Diffie and Hellman [90] introduced “a private signing function” such as (Pvt-
SF)”. The (Pvt-SF)” is only known to the signer’s authority whereas the “public 
verifying predicate” such as (Pub-VP) is in the knowledge of the validator. However, 
to be in this scheme’s signature generation without the knowledge of the signer’s 
authority is not possible. To overcome the aforementioned issues, Chaum [36] 
introduced a “Blind Signature (BS)” which is a practicable signature generation 
scheme. The BS improves the user’s privacy concerns by using a “Blinded Function 
(BF)” and an “Unblinded Function (BF-1)”. The EUSTPF (given in section 4.3.1.1) is 
based on Chaum scheme. However, the EUSTPF is not practicable (section 1.8) 
because of the unavailability of an open source packages [74], [78]. 
3.2.5 Practicability of Remote Attestation Techniques 
Remote attestation in computing and mobile machine platforms is an emerging 
research and distinct attestation techniques have been developed. The selection of the 
attestation technique depends on: (1) The practicality of the scenario, (2) Open source 
technology availability, (3) Privacy concerns, (4) The possibility of putting it into 
practice, (5) The complexity of the attestation scheme and (6) The machine platform 
measurement management.  
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The IMA based remote attestation technique relies on the machine platform 
measurement configuration (or binaries), Figure 3.1 (given on the next page), 
developed by the IBM T.J Watson Research Center [15]. The IMA is a most 
practicable attestation technique due to fewer complexities and the availability of 






Figure 3.1: Integrity measurement architecture attestation scheme [15] 
The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [160] (Figure 3.2) was proposed to 
overcome the issue of the recurring process of obtaining the AIKs’ certification from 
the PrivacyCA in the TPM1.1b version. Through the DAA scheme, the users can 
obtain the AIK certification without the presence of the PrivacyCA. The DAA scheme 
[91], [92] is formed upon cryptographic schemes: (1) group signature, (2) credential 
systems and (3) identity escrow. The new TMP1.2 specification supports the DAA 
instead of the earlier TPM1.1b. The DAA protocol consists of two stages [91], [92]: 










 The PBA [93] probably overcomes the security and privacy issues in the external 
networks introduced by the binary integrity measurement scheme. Distinct attestation 
techniques were designed [94] which can utilize the PBA such as: (1) The Delegation 
Based Attestation (DelegationBA), (2) Derivation Based Attestation (DBA) and (3) 
Enforcement Based Attestation (EBA). The PBA scheme is new and it still has many 






Figure 3.3: Property based attestation scheme [93] 
Garris et al. [95] discusses the design and implementation of a trustworthy kiosk 
computing prototype. The proposed prototype is based on two protocols: (1) The first 
protocol allows a mobile device owner to establish trust on a public computer kiosk 
before revealing any personal information to the kiosk and (2) The second protocol 
allows a kiosk owner to verify that the kiosk is running approved software. The 
concerns in this scheme are: (1) The kiosk cannot assess the mobile device platform 
authenticity (or trustworthiness) and (2) Kiosk platform privacy concerns. 
A trustworthy AuthN scheme was introduced by [96], [97] of which: (1) was 
designed on the OpenID concept and (2) makes use of a remote attestation technique 
to measure, report and validate the integrity of a target machine. However, the 
OpenID concept is different from other IAM systems. The OpenID IdPs issue “global 
identifiers” to their users through which the users then login to any SP. In the rest of 
the transactions, the IdPs and SPs then refer to the user this “global identifier”. 
Therefore, the problem of using a “global identifier” OpenID does not support any 
anonymity or unlinkability [98], [142]. 
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Ali and Nauman [99] proposed trust-aware web server architecture for enforcing 
access control policies based on a client integrity state which they called Integrity 
Based Access Control (IBAC). The limitations in this scheme are: (1) The client 
machine platform privacy-concern and (2) The client side cannot assess the web 
server platform trustworthiness.   
Pashalidis and Mitchell [2] proposed a theoretical scheme that eliminated or 
restricted the role of the ASP. The main contribution in this work is the design of an 
integrity/challenge response based SSO protocol for the local true SSO scheme. The 
concerns in their scheme are: (1) The architecture complexity, (2) The client platform 
privacy concern and (3) The absence of the machine platform mutual attestation.  
Ali et al. [100] integrated a remote attestation technique in a FIdM to strengthen 
the client machine security. As the proposed scheme is constructed on a remote 
attestation protocol the main concerns are: (1) The client cannot assess server 
platform integrity, (2) The resource access not linked with mutual attestation result. 
Sailer et al. [115] propsoed the mutual attestation and showed how at some point, 
such as in the areas of Software as a Service (SaS), Grid and Cloud computing, the 
bidirectional trust formation using TC attestation technique may play a major role. 
Shane et al. [116] explained how to enable protection against “crimeware” threats 
such as rootkits, worms, keystroke-loggers, viruses and Trojans in open environments 
using a TC technology. Zhan et al. [117] proposed a Trusted Grid (TG) model 
utilizing the TC technology based trust and security solutions. They demonstrated 
“how to construct a trustworthy sub-domain” for Grid Environment (GE) through TC 
mutual attestation scheme. Cáceres et al. [118] presented mutual attestation scheme 
for mobile devices.  
The concerns related to federated resource (service) access are discussed in 
section 4.2.2. These concerns include: (1) The user AuthN and, AuthR and (2) the 
trust formation between communicating machines. To access federated resources 
(services), the concerns associated with the traditional certificate based AuthN 
scheme are: (1) The key pair estimation or calculations through modern software 
based attacks, (2) The storing of a private key on a user system which probably 
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increases the vulnerability of theft. The TPM provides: (1) protection of private keys 
through pseudonyms and (2) machine platform mutual attestation. 
Bringing together the strengths of trusted computing technology based mutual 
attestation protocol and of Shibboleth to tackle security, trust and privacy concerns in 
a unified way, also practicability of the end product is an important concern. 
In addition of addressing the issue of security, trust and privacy unification in a 
federated environment the practicability issue needs to be solved too. Therefore, to 
achieve this in federated scenario the major modification is carried out in the HD 
organization, minor changes in the FD SP application level, and the SP modules are 
unchanged. The PUSTPF is compatible with the current FIAM system infrastructure 
(e.g., Shibboleth), whereas the EUSTPF is not [74]. The practicability scope is 
restricted to the framework scalability, flexibility and simplicity – login convenience 
[73], [74]. 
3.3 Past Works Comparison 
The past works consists of: (1) related works with the author’s last name and the 
publication year (given in rows) vs. (2) the STP and attestation scheme columns. 
Table 3.3 (given on the next page) shows the past works have considered the STP 
unification in different styles (i.e., some focus on the integration of the SP, while 
others focus on the integration of the ST). Not many of the works focus on the STP 
unification in a composite mode. Therefore, if server gets infected by a malevolent 
activity then the corrupted server might misuse (i.e. the adversary) the user’s 


























This chapter presented the critical review of the associated works pertinent to this 
research. The introduction of the chapter was provided in the first section. The second 




Cantor et al. 2005 [12] 
They provides communication link 
security, but missing TC based security 
and mutual trust formation 
Not included Shibboleth provide privacy 
protection at the FDS 
 
Dey et al. 2010 [72] 
This scheme missing  TC provided 
security and trust solutions 
Not included The user privacy  is protected 
at the HD and FD 
 
Ali et al. 2010 [100] 
The TC security and trust solutions are 
used to protect only the client machine 
platform integrity but not the IdP 
Remote 
Attestation 
The client platform privacy is 
not protected at the server 
 
Klenk et al. 2009 [96] 
TC solutions are used to harden the 
client machine platform security and 
bring trust in it 
Remote 
Attestation 
The client platform privacy is 
not protected 
 
Leicher et al. 2010 [97] 
The client platform embedded TC 
based security and trust notions  
Remote 
Attestation 
The client platform privacy is 
not conserved at the OpenID 
provider 
 
Lutz et al. 2006  [71] 
Missing TC provided bidirectional 
security and trust solutions   
Not included The user identity privacy is 
protected via IDToken 
 
Watanabe et al. 2009 [70] 
The scheme not included TC mutual 
security and trust nations  
Not included Not discussed 
 
Pashalidis et al. 2003  [2] 
The client platform integrity protected 
via TC provided solutions  
Remote 
Attestation 
The client platform privacy is 
not protected at the SP 
 
Garriss et al. 2007 [95] 
The mobile platform user can find that 
he /she connected to a secured and 
trusted kiosk, but kiosk cannot  
Remote 
Attestation 
Kiosk platform privacy is not 
protected 
 
Ali et al. 2009 [99] 




The client platform is not 
conserved 
 
Sailer et al. [115] 
Incorporated TC bidirectional security 




The client and server privacy 
against each other is not 
protected 
 
Zahn et al. 2007 [117] 
TC bidirectional security and trust 
solution is provided in the sub-domain 
Mutual 
Attestation 
The platforms privacy is not 
conserved 
 
Cáceres et al. [118] 
Introduced TC mutual security and trust 
notion mobile platforms 
Mutual 
Attestation 
The privacy of the interacting 
platforms is not protected 
Khattak et al. [74], and 
[75] 
Embedded TC Bidirectional security 
and trust solution 
Mutual 
Attestation 
The user privacy is protected, 
but the client and server 




section discussed the literature review related to this work. The literature review 
covered different IAM modes and the advancement of these modes to show why the 
early IAM systems failed. It also presented how trust and security are managed in the 
existing FIAM mode, the unification of security, trust and privacy, and the 
practicability of the identity masking schemes in the real environment. This chapter 
also explains different machine platform attestation techniques, the related challenges 
of the existing attestation techniques and the practicability of the attestation technique 
such as the implementation possibility in the real environment or experiments/ test-
beds. The comparison of the past works and the security, trust and privacy unification 





 Constructing a framework is cyclical, which consists of repetitive constructions and 
examination steps prior to the achievement of the end design artifact [101]. The work 
presented in this thesis is also cyclic in nature, which consists of several phases to 
refine the process of the framework construction. The research methodology 
established for this work consists of four main phases (Figure 4.1). The framework 
foundation phase is discussed in the second section. The third section describes the 
design of the hypothesis. The test-bed prototype implementation phase is presented in 
the fourth section whereas the assessment of the framework is discussed in the fifth 








Figure 4.1: Research methodology phases
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4.2 Framework Foundation 
This phase forms a base for the designing of a PUSTPF. This phase is divided into 
four sub-phases. The first sub-phase presents the pros and cons of the four basic 
procedures of the FIAM mode. The threat model for the federated identity and access 
mode sub-phase explores the flaws in the four basic procedures. The third sub-phase 
presents the proposed PUSTPF aspects whereas the machine platform mutual 
attestation technique selection is discussed in the fourth sub-phase. Each of these sub-
phases is discussed in sequence: 
4.2.1 Federated Identity and Resource (Service) Access Scenario 
In this work, Shibboleth is chosen to construct the PUSTPF which uses the proxy true 
WSSO design to access resources (services) in the Inter-domain scenario. Shibboleth 
fulfills the pros of each of the four basic federated identity and resource (service) 
access procedures [43]. However, Shibboleth does have the major cons in the four 
basic procedures. They are described in 4.2.1.1 to 4.2.1.4.  
4.2.1.1 Home Domain end User Authentication 
The main concern in all the FIAM modes’, end user AuthN mechanisms, is that they 
are used only to validate the end user identity or authenticity. The cons in Shibboleth 
end user traditional AuthN mechanism are: 
• Current AuthN mechanisms are lacking in identifying and confirming the 
HD end user and the IdP machines platform mutual integrity state or 
authenticity. 
• They are highly vulnerable to advanced ID theft threats.  
• In HD, for security reasons, the end user puts all of his/her trust in the HD 
IdP for AuthN and needs to share all of his/her private information with 
the HD IdP. So, if the HD IdP is not in a trusted state any more (e.g., 
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running with a malicious activity), platform security as well as user data 
privacy may be jeopardized.  
4.2.1.2 Home Domain end User Authorization 
In all existing federated scenario the cons of the AuthR process: 
• In the FD, the resource (service) AuthR decisions are carried-out on the 
basis of the user attributes which are generated from the AuthN 
mechanism. However, it is not on the HD client and IdP machines 
platform successful mutual attestation attribute. 
4.2.1.3 Trust Binding 
In existing FIAM the cons of the trust binding: 
• There is a complete lack of TC based mutual trust formation between the 
HD IdP and the client machine platform. 
4.2.1.4 Identity Masking 
Practical identity masking techniques could solve the end user privacy problems but 
the cons of this scheme are: 
• Key existing identity masking schemes are impractical. 
• Moreover, the practical identity masking scheme (i.e., blind signature) 
protect the end user’s identity privacy.  
• Shibboleth a standard FIAM solution conserves the HD end user identity 
privacy in the FD via an alias. 
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4.2.2 Threat Model for Federated Identity and Access Mode 
The cons of the four basic processes, discussed in section 4.2.1, clearly demonstrate 
the flaws and vulnerabilities of the FIAM mode in Shibboleth. The flaws and 
vulnerabilities can be illustrated through a threat model, given in Figure 4.2. It 
explains how these flaws and vulnerabilities could possibly lead to STP risks. The 
threat model is precise to the federated identity concerns in the Inter-domain resource 








Figure 4.2: Federated identity threat model 
4.2.2.1 Threat-1: Identity (ID) Theft 
The end user’s machine (i.e., client) is probably easily infected by a variety of ID theft 
threats such as Phishing attacks by Trojans and rootkit attacks, etc. So, in the case of 
any successful attack, the invader could possibly use the acquired credentials to gain 
personal advantages. 
4.2.2.2 Threat-2: Dishonest Identity Provider 
The HD IdP has to always be present online and is in charge of authenticating the end 
user and exchanging the authenticated user AuthN and AuthR claims with the FD. 
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Therefore, a potentially dishonest (i.e., malevolent) HD IdP could misuse the user 
credentials if it is infected with any malicious activity. 
4.2.2.3 Threat-3: Weak Trust Binding 
The lacking of mutual trust between the communicating machines’ platforms leads to 
security threats. So, HD IdP and client machines infected by any malevolent activity 
causes the trust ambiguity (e.g., whether the HD IdP and client machines are 
trustworthy to converse or not). In addition to that, the FD does not have any 
knowledge regarding the HD IdP and client machines’ platform trustworthiness and 
the resource AuthR in the FD is not on the basis of a trusted attribute. 
4.2.2.4 Threat-4: Attested Platforms Privacy Anxiety 
A mutually attested machine platform possibly raises platform measurement privacy 
risks. 
4.2.3 Security, Trust and Privacy Aspects Specification 
On the basis of the four basic federated resources (services) access procedures and 
threats discussed in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively, this section discusses the 
PUSTPF chosen STP aspects/ characteristic (see section 4.2.3). The chosen STP 
aspects signify the STP unification to achieve the research objective. The final 
product, PUSTPF prototype, is then evaluated on the basis of the following chosen 
STP aspects. 
4.2.3.1 Security Aspects 
The PUSTPF security aspects are: 
• The Fusing of the end user AuthN mechanism with the machines mutual 
attestation technique. 
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• To bring in preemptive threat detection capability because the HD 
machines have no anti-threat capability against Trojans and rootkit attacks. 
• The prevention of the attested platforms security credentials traceability. 
4.2.3.2 Trust Aspect 
The PUSTPF trust aspect is: 
• The introduction of TMAP in FIAM to establish bidirectional mutual trust 
among interacting entities. 
4.2.3.3 Privacy Aspects 
The PUSTPF privacy aspects are: 
• The mutually attested machines platform credentials privacy conservation. 
• The mutually attested machines anonymity and unlinkability curing. 
• Linkage of the resource (service) access in FD with a Trusted-attribute. 
4.2.4 Mutual (Bidirectional) Attestation Technique Selection 
The literature review on the attestation schemes assist in the selection of the most 
practicable attestation scheme. On the basis of the attestation sechemes pros and cons 
IMA is selected to utilize it in the PUSTPF testbed prototype experiment. The pros 
and cons of each scheme described in 4.2.4.1 to 4.2.4.3: 
4.2.4.1 Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) 
The pros of the IMA [15] given below shows that the IMA practicality is higher than 
any other attestation scheme. In addition to that, from the perspective of the HD 
(Internal) network, in the PUSTPF prototype, all cons of the machine platform binary/ 
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integrity measurement most likely turn into the pros [102]. The pros and cons of the 
IMA scheme are: 
• The Pros: 
o Open source tool availability (e.g., TC for the Java Platforms [40]). 
o The PrivacyCA in the TTP based attestation scheme provides a 
higher level of privacy than that provided by the DAA scheme 
[103], [104]. 
• The Cons: 
o There are platform measurement privacy concerns. 
o There are software monopoly concerns.  
o If the entity challenger is located out of the internal network, then 
the holding of the HD clients’ trusted certificates by the challenger 
generates the trust uncertainties such as how can the external entity 
be trusted when the user is not in a direct trust association. 
4.2.4.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) 
The pros and cons of the DAA scheme are [91], [92]: 
• The Pros: 
o In the DAA scheme, the target (client) machine anonymously 
validates itself to, the verifier, show the possession of a DAA 
certif. acquired from the DAA issuer.  
o It accomplishes “random base” DAA signature linkability (e.g., if 
identical TPMs, for the identical verifier, two random based 
signatures cannot be associated with each other. 
o The key privacy feature of the DAA scheme is that it minimized 
the role of a TTP. 
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• The Cons: 
o Highly intricate. 
o The unlinkability issue – Embedding of covert identifying 
information into the DAA certif. from the DAA Issuer can link the 
TPM’s transactions to locate who the DAA certif. belongs to. 
4.2.4.3 Property Based Attestation (PBA) 
The PBA [93] scheme is still in the early stages and applicability in practical 
distributed scenarios has several challenges that still need to be addressed [94]. The 
pros and cons of the PBA scheme are [94]: 
• The Pros: 
o The properties probably conceal machine platform susceptibilities 
by not unveiling the machine platform measurement details.   
o The properties preserve the attested machine (target) privacy at the 
verifier (challenger) by not disclosing the identity of the attested 
machine measured pieces.  
o Writing meaningful Access Control (AC) - policies on the basis of 
the machine properties is an added advantage. 
• The Cons 
o The machine platform property scope clarification is intricate 
because the platform consists of diverse kind of properties. For 
instance, to one person, property in a platform may be any feature 
(or behaviour) of a particular tangible or intangible component, 
while to others, the whole platform may be a property.   
o Attested machine platform property requirement consideration is 
important because the platforms of these properties may be seen as 
components, for instance, security allied properties. So, if a 
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property consists of several sub-components such as confidentiality 
(i.e., confidentiality is probably achievable by an SSL [6] in a 
transit or via encryption in a storage component etc.) then probably 
it would reveal extra information).  
o There are limitations of the software application specific 
properties. For instance, unavailability of several general types of 
application specific properties that are possibly described for the 
software in every OS in every kind of hardware.   
o In real time systems, the issue of property certification is important. 
For instance, the faith in a client’s machine configuration state is 
that it complies with the configuration state when it is tested and 
certified in the lab. 
o The issue of the properties’ reliance on each other is a concern. For 
instance, property “A” depends on another property “B” for its 
functionality. This issue arises when the previous property “A” is 
not independent for its functionality from the latter “B”. 
o There are issues of property certificates being revoke or shared. 
4.3 Design of the Hypothesis 
The design of the hypothesis phase presents the potential design and development 
methodology used in this work. The design and development methodology is a 
collection of actions and techniques which examines the procedures, difficulties and 
complexities in order to reduce the design and development requirements [105]. In the 
development of the PUSTPF, the Rational Unified Process (RUP) is used as a 
software product development methodology.  
The architecture designs of PUSTPF and EUSTPF are discussed in the section 
4.3.1. The answer of the question that why PUSTPF is chosen as final design 
architecture is explained in 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.2  
66 
4.3.1 Possible USTPF Design Architectures 
The two different kinds of design architecture are possible: 
4.3.1.1 Emergent USTPF / Non-Trusted Third Party Solution 
A theoretical EUSTPF for federated identity and resource (service) access is proposed 
in Figure 4.3. The EUSTPF consists of: (1) A blind signature [36] and (2) A TMAP. 
The beauty of this scheme is that the client and the RP/SP machine platforms must be 
carried out through the machine platform mutual attestation protocol. So if: (1) the 
client machine platform integrity check fails, then the SP/RP will not release a 
resource to the client and (2) if the RP/SP machine platform integrity check fails, then 









Figure 4.3: EUSTPF - With-out a trusted third party 
However, due to impracticability and mutual platform privacy concerns the 
EUSTPF is not suited for federated resource (service) access. Therefore, such 
limitations of the EUSTPF lead this research to construct a PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2) 




4.3.1.2 Practicable USTPF/ Trusted Third Party Solution 
As discussed in the previous section that the EUSTPF has own limitations and does 
not complies to the chosen research objective Therefore, third party based open 
source and standard FIAM solution is selected to build a PUSTPF. The main entities 
in trusted third party solution are HD user and IdP, and FD SP. The methodology is 
given in section 4.3.2, whereas the PUSTPF design, architecture and implementation 









Figure 4.4: PUSTPF - With-a trusted third party 
4.3.2 Rational Unified Process (RUP) 
The Rational Unified Process [110], [124] is a software engineering process which 
consists of techniques and phases to steers the software product developer in his/her 
activities [106]. The four main phases of RUP are: 
• The Initiation: Inception - The inception is a phase of the project initiation. 
The aim of this phase is the comprehension of the early requirements 
gathering. The most significant deliverables in the end of the inception 
phase is the “statement of the scope (Table 4.1)”. Chapter 5 discusses the 
system design, architecture and implementation. 
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• The Touching On: Elaboration - After the collection of the project 
requirements at the high level in the initial phase, the elaboration stage 
mainly focuses is on the collection of the project requirements at the lower 
level. The requirements collected at the lower level are captured using 
“use case models”. The elaboration phase’s main deliverables are the use 
case models. This phase assists to identify the project related use cases and 
the actors. The descriptions of the majority of the use cases have been 
constructed in Chapter 5. 
• The System Design and Execution: Constriction - In the inception and 
elaboration phases after adequate requirements have been captured, the 
system design and implementation may start, the third phase construction 
is to be carried out. The main purpose of this phase is the software system 
development to the level of deployment.  The main activities carried out in 
this phase use sequence plus activity diagrams as a manual in the system 
design, system coding, interconnection of different devices (computers 
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using switch via LAN), attestation collector (daemons) and validation 
agents’ (modules’) development and integration. 
• The End: Transition - The RUP’s first three phases are the heart of the 
methodology for the software product development. Transition is the end 
phase of the RUP, the main focus of this phase is the testing of the final 
software product. 
4.4 Test-bed Prototype Implementation 
4.4.1 Verification of the Hypothesis 
The test-bed prototype experiment is used in this work as the verification of the 
hypothesis instrument. The test-bed experimentation requirements are categorized in 
the followings (4.4.1.1 to 4.4.1.3): 
4.4.1.1 The Pre-requisites Requirements 
The declarations of the requirements given below were utilized as the prototype 
construction prerequisite requirement declaration. 
• The Hardware-based Security chip Ownership such as The HD clients’ 
and IdPs’ TPM chips must be enabled, switched-on, and owned by the HD 
administrator (e.g., IT support department of the HD organization).  
• The HD administrator should generate the AIKs for the HD clients and IdP 
set TPM chips, and enroll these AIKs with an HD trusted PrivacyCA.   
• The HD clients’ and IdPs’ machines have to be configured with the IMA 
configuration. 
• The HD clients’ and IdPs’ machines must have the attestation collector 
and validator agents. Each of these agents further are sub-divided into sub-
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agents, for instance the AttestationCollectorAgent’s are divided into the 
AttestClientSML, AttestClientPCR, AttestIdPSML and AttestIdPPCR, 
while the AttestationValidationAgent’s are divided into the Validation of 
the Received SML (VRSML), Validation of the Received PCR (VRPCR), 
Validation of the Received Nonce (VRN) and Validation of the Received 
Certificate (VRCertificate). 
4.4.1.2 The Hardware (H/W) Requirements 
The Test-bed prototype development requires the following hardware apparatus: 
• Three machines: (1) the client, (2) IdP and (3) SP are arranged. The client 
and IdP machines must have been implanted with a “TPM” security 
hardware chip. The client and IdP machines possess 1GB and 2.5GB 
RAM, 2.00GHz and 1.83GHz CPU, and each has a 40GH HDD, 
respectively.   
• 10/100Mbps switch and category.5e UTP cables to connect the client, IdP 
and SP machines. 
4.4.1.3 The Software (S/W) Requirements 
To construct a PUSTPF for the FIAM, the HD and FD entities software requirements 
are: 
• Machine 1- The home domain identity provider: 
o Installed Ubuntu (9.10) Linux OS 
o Installation of Java (e.g., jdk 1.6) 
o Apache (Tomcat) installation 
o Setting Light Weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
o Setting Java AuthN and AuthR Service (JAAS) etc. 
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o Compilation - Linux Kernel ver. 2.6.35 with IMA 
o Using TC for the Java (tm) platform (i.e., jTSS, jTPM Tools and 
PrivacyCA setting) 
• Machine 2:- The foreign domain service provider: 
o CentOS 5.6 Linux OS 
o Log4ccp package 
o Xerces-C package 
o XML-Security-C package 
o XML Tooling-C package 
o OpenSAML-C package 
o Apache 2 (httpd) web server etc. 
• Machine 3: The home domain client (user system) 
o Ubuntu (9.10) Linux OS installation 
o Java (e.g., jdk 1.6) installation 
o Compilation - Linux Kernel ver. 2.6.35 with IMA 
4.4.2 Data Requirement and Analysis Approach 
In this research experimentation is used to acquire the data (section 6.2.2.1). The 
obtained data (i.e., AuthN data, mutual attestation data and performance data) then 
investigated and discussed (Chapter 6 mention here). In the experiment Shibboleth 
(i.e., IdP and SP), jTSS, jTPM, and IMA are used to construst a PUSTPF. Since 
Shibboleth IdP, jTSS, jTPM and IMA all are Java based consequently Java is the 
optimum option use to construct the machine platform mutual attestation. The detail 
such as “how this is achieved?” discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.4.2.1 Reasons to Choose Test-bed Experiment 
The particular reasons for choosing the test-bed experiment are given below: 
• The majority of the past and current works related to federated resource 
access and trusted commuting in a web service environment were carried 
out using the experiments to validate their concepts. Please refer to Table 
3.3 (section 3.3) the past works analysis in Chapter 3. 
• The formalization of the PUSTPF is hard to model [107]. This is due to 
“formal methods have limitations in that they become too complex when 
applied to real systems because these systems generally are too complex to 
be practically modelled with formal methods”. 
4.4.2.2 Performance Measurement 
The analysis of the mutual attestation performance measurement (i.e., relationship 
among the number of measurements and the attestation time) discussed in the section 
6.2.1.2 (EUSTPF) and section 6.2.2.1 (PUSTPF). The comparisions of the mutual 
attestation performance (i.e., (i) client and server vs HD client and IdP and (ii) IMA 
based attestation scheme comparision) disucssed in the section 6.2.4.   
4.5 Assessment of the Framework 
The result analysis and discussion of the acquired results from the proof of concept 
implementation and test-bed experiments are presented in Chapter 6. The précis of the 
result analysis and discussion which will be discussed in Chapter 6 are: 
• TMAP proof of concept result analysis 
• Practicable framework test-bed result analysis 
• Comparison between the emergent and practicable schemes 
• Mutual attestation protocol performance comparison 
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• Comparison of proposed framework with existing works 
4.6 Summary 
The framework foundation phase was discussed in the second section of this chapter. 
It explored the pros and cons of the four basic procedures, the threat model, the 
chosen STP aspects and the available existing attestation schemes’ pros and cons. The 
third section described the design of the hypothesis phase which covers the PUSTPF 
test-bed prototype development methodology. The test-bed prototype implementation 
phase presents the requirements in the fourth section. It described the verifification of 
the hypothesis, data requirement and the analysis approach. The fifth section lists the 
assessment of the framework discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DESIGN OF THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the the architecture design of the system. The system architecture 
in second section presents the different entities (or stakeholders), PUSTPF, and 
comprehensive PUSTPF protocol architecture. The third section focuses on the 
system architecture design of the PUSTPF functionalities through use-case, activity, 
class, sequence diagrams, packages and classes and algorithms in the form of 
flowchars. The chapter is summarized in the fourth section. 
5.2 System Architecture 
Establishing secure hardware root based mutual trust among different stakeholders in 
a Federated Identity and Access Management (FIAM) is a challenging task. FIAM 
provides a complete security model to cater different security aspects of online 
resource management, such as identification, AuthN, AuthR and auditing. However, 
some important aspects of security are still missing in the current FIAM frameworks. 
Establishment of mutual trust among the stakeholders involved in an online 
transaction need to be addressed in such a manner that will not only cater to the 
problems of unequivocal identification, AuthN, and AuthR but will also address the 
challenges of verifying integrity and privacy of the platforms involved. Therefore, 
lack of mutual trust in federated identity and resource (access) systems can possibly 
lead to several security threats. However, in federated identity and resource (service) 
access environment sharing machines platforms integrity lead to the machine 
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platforms measurements (security credentials) privacy concerns in the Inter-domain 
scenario. 
This section presents the PUSTP system architecture for federated identity and 
resource (service) access environment (Figure 5.1). The scheme comprehensive 
architecture details are explained in the sub-section 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 It leverages the 
integrity measurement mechanisms in the hardware rooted based security and mutual 
trust among different stakeholders. The Shibboleth (Figure 2.5) [12], [13] which is a 
FIAM Systems provides a standard base, complete open source implementation of 
proxy true WSSO scheme within or crossways in different security domains. In other 
words, it provides a complete implementation of FIAM features. Shibboleth is used to 
protect sensitive resources from unauthorized access across organizational 
boundaries. In proposed architecture for PUSTPF prototype Shibboleth will be 
utilized as test-bed target architecture. The rationale behind selecting the Shibboleth 
as target architecture can be explained from the following sscenario: 
Generally in FIAM, a HD client machine requests certain resource or service from 
a FD SP. The FD SP machine and the HD client machine are assumed to have no 
former trusted association between them and the FD SP machine entails some sort of 
AuthN information about the HD client machine before making any access decision. 
The FIAM architecture is designed in such a manner that each and every HD user is 
associated with a single or multiple HD IdPs machine. Since the HD IdPs machines 
are inside the user’s organizational structure, the user has trust over the HD IdPs 
machine, which authenticates the users. The HD IdPs machine authenticates the users 
on behalf of the FD SP and provides the FD SP with AuthN information associated 
with the HD user. Thus, the FD SP machine makes access decisions to allow or deny 
access to a particular resource based on the AuthN information from the HD IdP and 

















Figure 5.1: The PUSTP system architecture 
In the above architecture description, the HD IdP and FD SP both play their own 
respective roles. That is, the FD SP delegates the AuthN mechanism to the HD IdP 
that provide the HD user AuthN information to FD SP. This way, the FD SP does not 
need to manage the HD user’s credentials as the number of users may vary from 
organization to organization. The FD SP only utilizes this information in order to 
make access decision and apply organizational security policies. Therefore, the 
current FIAM address the issues of HD user AuthN, AuthR and auditing in a 
sophisticated and widely accepted manner. However, the problems related to the 
verification of mutual integrity of different platforms involved in this architecture 
remain unsolved.  
Consider the scenario where a HD user’s machine that gain access to a protected 
and sensitive resource is compromised or not in a trusted state at that particular 
instance. This is certain that such un-trusted or compromised platforms may lead to 
several security threats in a highly sensitive organization. Furthermore, the HD IdP 
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machine authenticates the user and sends the AuthN information i.e., HD user 
credentials to the FD SP for making access decision. What if the HD IdP machine 
platform is tampered with a malware or in an un-trusted state at the time of AuthN? 
The infected HD IdP machine platform can steal user credentials and may misuse 
these credentials at a later time by accessing the sensitive resource. The FD SP also 
needs some sort of assurance that both the HD client and IdP machines platforms are 
in a mutual trusted state when some sensitive resource is accessed.  This assurance 
can be provided by employing mutual attestation technique in the current FIAM 
solutions. Therefore, verifying mutual integrity of the communicating machines 
platform via mutual attestation protocol is one of the important security aspects in the 
FIAM that needs to be addressed. In addition to that using mutual attestation protocol 
in FIAM may raise machines platforms privacy concerns. Therefore, to conserve the 
HD client and IdP machines platforms integrity privacy at the FD SP and the HD IdP 
machine platform integrity privacy to conserve at the HD clients machines needs 
careful considerations. Therefore, the disused STP challenges lead this research to 
develop a PUSTPF for federated environment which at least combine some of STP 
aspects specified in chapter 4 section 4.2.3. The subsequent sections describe the 
PUSTPF architecture and the implementation details of mutual attestation technique 
in the Shibboleth architecture. 
5.2.1 Proposed System Architecture 
There are a number of stakeholders involved in PUSTPF architecture for FIAM. They 
provide: (1) Integrated AuthN (e.g., user basic AuthN mechanism integration with the 
TMAP), (2) Mutual trust and security formation through TMAP, (3) Mutually attested 
machines privacy conservation in TMAP and (4) Resource or service AuthR decisions 
on the basis of the HD clients and IdP machines platforms’ successful mutual 





5.2.1.1 Home Domain Stakeholders/Entities 
The HD consists of two main entities: (1) Home Domain client machine and (2) 
Home Domain identity provider machine. In a federation there may be many HDs and 
each HD may have many clients, and each single IdP has embedded with the TPM 
and IMA configuration. The details of both entities are given here: 
a) Home Domain User and Client Machine 
In PUSTPF architecture the HD user has to known the username/password issued to 
him/her by the HD organization and this user has also assigned a client machine 
platform whose integrity is verified by the HD IdP at time when the client request to 
access a protected resource residing at the FD SP. In order to verify integrity of the 
client machine platform it is mandatory that the platform must be a TPM-enabled 
system. To leverage the capabilities of the TPM in a broader spectrum, there are some 
prerequisites that need to be fulfilled by the HD DoD organization prior to deploying 
the architecture. The prerequisites are: 
• The TPM residing at the HD client machine platform must be enabled, 
activated and owned by the user and/or by the system administrator of the 
HD organization where the client works (such in the FIAM scenario 
www.dod.org). 
• Each HD client machine platform needs a specific Attestation Identity Key 
(AIK) that needs to be created after taking the ownership of the TPM. 
• According to TCG specification [68] the client’s machine AIK must be 
registered with a PrivacyCA so that the TPM authenticity can be 
accomplished. (This can be done by deploying own PrivacyCA and 
registering the AIK with it). 
• In order to use the AIK in an attestation scenario, the AIK secret value 
(generated at time of AIK creation) must be accessible to the Daemon-
Attestation_Presenter named here Attestation Collector Agent (ACAgent) 
Daemon running on the client machine. 
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Each prerequisites is performed only once during the entire process of 
deployment. The procedure on how to accomplish these prerequisites will be 
described in detail in the later sections. 
b) Home Domain Identity Provider Machine 
The Home Domain IdP machine is one of the major entities in PUSTPF architecture 
that performs user AuthN on behalf of the FD SP machine. The process the HD user 
credentials in such a manner that it releases attributes related to the HD user that is to 
be used by the FD SP machine in resource or service decision making process. Since 
the FD SP machine protects sensitive resources and it will releases these resources to 
the HD client machine only in a scenario where the FD SP machine can build a trust 
association with the HD client machine as well as the IdP machine. In order to build 
the trust among the entities involved (e.g., HD client and IdP, and FD SP machines) 
there must be an entity that is capable to perform mutual integrity measurement of the 
HD client and IdP machines platforms on behalf of FD SP machine. The FD SP 
machine can also perform the mutual integrity measurement of these platforms 
directly but it will give rise to several privacy issues. 
Firstly, in a federated identity and resource or service access environment there 
are a large number of HD clients machines and the FD SP machine has to provide 
them with different type of resources (e.g., sensitive and protected resources or 
normal and unprotected resources). The FD SP machine has to maintain its own 
security mechanisms and AuthR policies rather than attesting the integrity of each and 
every HD client machine with-respect-to their HD IdPs machines, therefore, this is 
not a feasible solution. Secondly, the FD SP machine usually resides outside the 
organizational boundaries of the HD client machine (e.g. in PUSTPF scenario both 
client and IdP machines are members of the HD department of defense organization, 
whereas SP machine sited at FD department of research organization). If the HD 
client and IdP machines reveal their platform security credentials that are required for 
integrity measurement, their privacy will no more be conserved. 
Keeping in mind the above mentioned problems, the FD SP machine must 
delegate the process of mutual integrity measurement to some other entity. In the 
current Shibboleth architecture the HD IdP machine can perform AuthN of the user 
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but cannot assure the integrity of the client’s platform. Since in the PUSTPF 
architecture, the integrity of both the HD client and IdP machine platforms are 
validating therefore a better option for the mutual integrity measuring entity should be 
the HD IdP machine. The rationale behind this option is that in a federated 
environment almost every HD organization has its own IdP machine to authenticate 
their HD users and the HD users already are aware of the HD IdP machine. For 
AuthN, the HD clients machines already release their credentials to the HD IdP 
machine, so the possibility of releasing information related to their machines platform 
configuration to the HD IdP is much higher and the user is in strong trust association 
with his/her HD IdP. 
c) Corroboration Agent/ Service 
Corroboration Service is a specialized entity that actually performs the mutual 
attestation on behalf of the HD IdP and client machines. The HD IdP machine 
initiates the process of integrity verification regardless of the target machine platform 
(e.g., client or IdP) and the CS performs the mutual integrity verification. This means 
the primary challenging party is the CS. The CS can be a dedicated entity within the 
HD organizational boundaries of the user or it can be an internal part of the IdP 
machine platform. For the realization of PUSTPF proposed architecture, the CS is 
defined as integral part of the HD IdP machine but for the sake of clarity, it is termed 
as a separate entity other than the HD IdP. In general FIAM, there is no concept of 
using CS as it is a specialized entity for performing mutual attestation only but in 
PUSTPF, CS plays an important role by verifying mutual integrity of the HD client 
and IdP machines platforms. In addition to that, the CS entity asset in this work is to 
conserve the HD machines privacy because it is the part of HD IdP and is responsible 
for performing the HD machines mutual attestation. 
5.2.1.2 Foreign Domain Stakeholders/Entities 
In FD and particularly in FIAM, SP is one of the core entities that provide users with 
different type of resources and services. The SP protects sensitive resources and is 
responsible to enforce organizational policies to make access decision for the 
resources. Since this work is proposing to verify the mutual integrity of machine 
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platforms used in PUSTPF architecture, so the SP is extended with limited changes to 
incorporate the integrity measurement mechanism. The changes made to the SP are 
only limited to the application end of the SP and the core modules of the SP are not 
modified. 
Access decision to grant or deny access to a particular resource is based on the 
organizational policies and the attributes that are returned by the IdP about the user 
after successful AuthN is performed. The web server running on the SP is responsible 
for enforcing these policies and the decision making to allow or deny access to a 
particular resource. In PUSTPF architecture, an application is created that protects 
certain sensitive resource to be accessed by a client. The application is responsible to 
release the resource to the client after checking the AuthN and the integrity 
verification attributes released by the IdP. Since in this work the mutual attestation 
protocol performing the attestation of HD both the client and IdP machines platforms, 
in order to build a trusted relationship among the entities, so the application at the FD 
SP shall check whether the mutual attestation attribute resulted in true before 
releasing the resource. 
5.2.1.3 Discovery Service (DS) 
Generally, in a FIAM system each and every participant organization may have their 
own separate HD IdP machine that performs AuthN of the users on behalf of the FD 
SP. Thus, in a federation there may have multiple numbers of IdPs machines to 
facilitate HD user’s AuthN in its organization boundaries. Each and every FD SP 
machine must also be registered with these IdPs machines in a federated environment. 
The DS is a specialized entity in the Shibboleth architecture that is used to select a 
particular IdP machine for AuthN among the available IdPs machines in a federation. 
When a user access a resource at the FD SP, the FD SP redirects the HD user to the 
DS, which presents an interface to the HD user to select their particular HD IdP 
machine. Once the HD IdP machine is selected the user is redirected to that selected 
HD IdP machine for AuthN by the FD SP machine. Since, the DS plays the role of 
selecting HD IdPs machines only; there is no need to make any changes to it in order 
to make it work with the proposed architecture. The proposed architecture and the 
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modifications need to be performed in order to incorporate machines mutual 
attestation mechanism in a federated identity and resource or service access 
environment. 
5.2.2 Practicable Unified Security, Trust and Privacy Framework 
Federated Identity and Access Management (FIAM) mode provides WSSO features 
that are designed specifically to address the issues in secure online resource sharing 
and collaboration among different HD and FD organizations. Shibboleth is one of the 
most significant and widely adopted FIAM modes that provide user’s AuthN, AuthR 
and auditing in a privacy conserving manner. However, a major limitation of almost 
all of the current FIAM in general, and Shibboleth in specific, is that there is no 
mechanism available for assuring the HD communicating machines mutual 
trustworthiness and security in the online resource sharing system. A HD user 
accessing a sensitive resource sited in a FD may be trustworthy. However, the HD 
client machine platform and the HD IdP machine that the user used to authenticate 
with and provide AuthN and AuthR information to the FD to access the resource or 
service might probably be tampered with some malware or Trojans. This may 
compromise the sensitive resources. This is a major issue in the process of 
establishing mutual trust among different entities in security critical organizations. 
To alleviate these problems, a solution is proposed to leverages the features of 
FIAM (e.g., SSO, password management, AuthR, auditing privacy etc.) and to 
incorporate mutual attestation technique to verify the integrity of the HD 
stakeholder’s machines platforms (e.g., client and IdP) involved in online 
collaboration among different organizations. Furthermore, in PUSTPF architecture the 
concept of machines mutual attestation is proposed to not only verifies the integrity of 
the HD client’s machine platform but will also verify the integrity of the HD IdP’s 
machine platform. This will build a secure and trustworthy base for the FD SPs to 
share sensitive resources with the HD users in a secure and trusted environment. For 
the realization of mutual integrity verification mechanism in the architecture, the IMA 
[15] (section 2.8.3) is implemented as a proof-of-concept. To understand the proposed 
architecture and the overall system it is necessary to understand the information flow 
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in the Shibboleth system. The information flow in Shibboleth architecture is explained 
with a simple scenario in section 2.5.3.2. 
How the PUSTPF architecture incorporates the machine mutual attestation 
mechanism in the federated environment particularly in the HD (Figure 5.1). In 
addition, what changes are made to the entities involved in the FIAM system to 
incorporate the mutual attestations are also discussed. 
In essence, the incorporating integrity measurement in PUSTPF architecture can 
be categorized in to two different phases: (1) Integrity Measurement phase and (2) 
Validation phase. In the first phase the trust tokens are calculated and processed and 
in the later phase validation is performed. 
5.2.2.1 Mutual Integrity Measurement Phase (MIMP) 
The modifications carried out in the HD organization for mutual integrity 
measurement is discusse here:  
a) Home Domain Client Machine Modification 
The HD client’s machine platform is one of the most important entities to be trusted 
in a federated identity and resource or service access environment because sensitive 
resources and services are meant to be released to the HD user. The HD user may be 
trusted but his/her client machine platform may not. Therefore, a solution is proposed 
that will validate the mutual integrity of HD client’s and IdP machines platforms prior 
to releasing any sensitive resource to it. As discussed earlier, that in order to verify the 
mutual integrity of both HD client’s and IdP machines platforms, it is mandatory that 
the both HD machines platforms must be TPM-enabled. The HD client machine 
platform modification is presented in this section whereas the HD IdP will present in 
next section. For machine mutual integrity in this work IMA is implemented as a 
proof-of-concept implementation. Since IMA measures each and every executable 
loaded for execution and configuration files on the HD target machine platform 
(client’s machine platform in this case) and then report these measurements to the 
challenging party (CS) located at the HD IdP machine, the HD client’s machine 
platform need to be modified to perform the measurement and report it for 
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verification. For this purpose, a Java based ACAgent_Daemon is developed that is 
responsible for performing the following tasks: 
• It listens to the incoming attestation request from the CorroborationAgent 
(CAgent) and responds accordingly. 
• It requests the TPM to execute a quote operation over the PCR values, 
which store the measurements calculated by IMA and the received nonce 
from the challenger. The quote operation means that the TPM digitally 
sign the PCR10 value by its AIK. How this AIK is created will describe in 
the implementation section.   
• During attestation process it reads the Stored Measurement Log (SML) for 
reporting to the challenger. 
• It processes the incoming SAML requests and outgoing SAML responses 
during the attestation process. 
The ACAgent_Daemon consists of different attestation collectors that perform the 
above mentioned tasks. The ACAgentt has its own operations to perform (Figure 5.1). 
During the attestation process, when the ACAgent_Daemon receive an attestation 
request from the challenger, it first calls the AttestClientPCR. The AttestClientPCR is 
responsible for performing the TPM quote operation. The attestation request contains 
a nonce (i.e., a random number), the AttestClientPCR takes this nonce and send it to 
the TPM to perform the quote over the nonce and PCR10 (in this work PCR10 is used 
by IMA describe in Section 2.8.3). The AttestClientPCR encodes the quote as an 
XML node and populates SAML response.  
Afterwards, the ACAgent_Daemon initiates the AttestClientSML to read and 
extract the SML from the file system. IMA stores the SML in a specialized file system 
on the hard disk. The file system is known as securityfs. The AttestClientSML 
extracts the SML from securityfs and encodes it as XML node. For the sake of 
pithiness, the quote over PCR10 and SML is termed as trust tokens. Once the 
attestation collector agents collect these trust tokens, the ACAgent_Daemon encodes 
these tokens into a single SAML response. The resulting SAML assertion is known as 
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attestation response. The attestation response is returned to the challenging party i.e., 
CS for the process of verification. 
b) Home Domain Identity Provider Machine Modification 
The Shibboleth Identity Provider is, part of the HD organization, and its 
implementation is primarily based on Java Servlets which are built on top of the 
Spring Framework. The HD IdP machine consist of a number of components that are 
defined as interoperable XML data structures. The HD IdP machine uses these XML 
configurations to resolve different attributes related to a HD user. The LoginHandler 
component of the HD IdP machine is responsible to define the AuthN mechanism 
(e.g., username/password using LDAP in this work). First the HD user is 
authenticated using the above mentioned mechanism then the requested attributes 
related to the HD user are released. 
The IdP uses different AttributeResolvers to retrieve different attributes related to 
a particular authenticated user. Since the HD IdP machine does not store user’s 
credentials and attributes, it just make use of these credentials and attributes that are 
stored in separate data stores e.g., RDBMS or LDAP. The AttributeResolver uses a 
specialized component known as DataConnectors to communicate with these data 
stores. Depending upon the nature of each data store, the DataConnectors are 
responsible for communicating with the data store in such a format that is 
understandable by the particular data store. Furthermore, the DataConnectors are also 
responsible for mapping the returned attributes from the data stores to such a structure 
that is understandable by the AttributeResolvers. 
Shibboleth framework provides different default DataConnectors for 
communicating with different data stores (e.g., LDAP connector, Relational Database 
connector etc.). In the architecture (Figure 5.1), for the AuthN mechanism, the LDAP 
connector is used to communicate with the underlying LDAP server but the default 
AttributeResolvers and DataConnectors (DCs) cannot be used to accommodate the 
integrity verification attributes related to both the HD client and IdP machines 
platforms. For this reason, own AttributeResolver is developed which is known as 
MutualIntegrityResolver (MIR) and a DC known as 
MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector (MIPDC). The MIR communicates with the 
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MIPDC to populate the MutualPlatformIntegrity (MPI) attribute that contains the 
mutual attestation result performed for HD client and IdP machines platforms. 
As mentioned earlier, that in order to achieve a high degree of mutual trust among 
the entities involved in federated identity and resource or service access environment, 
a mutual attestation technique is proposed that will first perform the integrity 
verification of the HD client’s machine platform. If the HD client’s machine platform 
is in a trustworthy state then the integrity verification of the HD IdP’s machine 
platform will be performed. If both the HD entities mutual attestation resulted in true 
– assuring that both platforms are in trustworthy state – only then the resource will be 
released to the HD user. To achieve this, the MIPDC calls the CS and sends the HD 
client’s machine IP address to the CS to perform its integrity verification. If the 
attestation result is true then the MIPDC calls the CS again to perform the attestation 
of the HD IdP machine. The CS collects both the HD entities attestation results and 
returns it back to the MIPDC. The connector then populates the MPI attribute with the 
result and returns it to the MIR.  
In PUSTPF architecture the actual challenging party (that initiates and performs 
the attestation) is the CS. The CS may reside as a separate entity or as part of the HD 
IdP machine platform. In order to perform the HD machines mutual attestation 
process, the CS requires the trust tokens be returned by the HD client and IdP 
machines respectively. The previous section described how these trust tokens are 
collected at the HD client’s machine platform. The mechanism to collect trust tokens 
for the HD IdP machine platform is the same. The same ACAgent_Daemon is used to 
listen to the attestation request from the CS and respond with the trust tokens to HD 
IdP machine. The AttestIdPPCR and AttestIdPSML are used to collect the trust 
tokens. This concludes the measurement portion of IMA in the architecture (Figure 
5.1). The verification of these measurements is performed at the CS located at HD IdP 
machine to assure that the HD target machine platform is in a trustworthy state. 
5.2.2.2 Validation Phase (VP) 
In this phase of the architecture (Figure 5.1), the CS plays its role for performing 
verification of the HD client and IdP machines platforms measurements to assure the 
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trustworthiness and security of the HD machines platforms. The machines mutual 
attestation process starts after the successful AuthN of the HD user is performed by 
the HD IdP machine. After HD user AuthN, the HD IdP machine has to release HD 
user’s attributes to the FD SP. Since in PUSTPF architecture the mutual machines 
integrity validation of the involved HD machines platforms is carried-out, the MIPDC 
residing at the HD IdP machine sends an attestation request (including HD client’s 
machine IP address) to the CS to start the HD machines mutual attestation. The 
AttestationRequester_ Module at the CS generates a random number i.e., nonce and 
include this nonce in an attestation request. It then sends this request to the HD client 
machine (since the client’s machine platform attestation is performed). The rationale 
behind including nonce in the attestation request is to ensure the freshness of the 
attestation request. This will counter to several replay attacks.  
The ACAgent_Daemon running on the HD client’s machine platform generates an 
attestation response as discussed in the section 5.2.2.1 (a). The attestation response is 
returned to the CS and it contacts different specialized Attestation Validation Agent 
(AVAgent) components to ensure the trustworthiness of the trust tokens and thus 
ensuring trustworthiness and security of the HD target machine platforms. The 
AVAgent uses different types of validation components according to the nature of the 
trust tokens namely ValidationofReceivedNonce (VRN), ValidationofReceivedPCR 
(VRPCR), ValidationofReceivedSML (VRSML) and ValidationofReceivedCertificate 
(VRCertificate). In proposed mutual attestation technique for federated identity and 
resource or service access the validation components first asses the HD client machine 
platform security and trustworthiness. If successful then it will asses the HD IdP 
machine platform security and trustworthiness.  The whole validation process is 
described in (a) to (d) below: 
a) Validation of Received Nonce (VRN) 
The nonce received in the attestation response is checked against the nonce which is 
sent by the CS to the HD client machine in the attestation request. If the received 
nonce matches the one which is sent by the CS, then it assure the freshness of the 
nonce and hence the attestation response is legitimate and not a reply attack. 
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b) Validation of Received PCR (VRPCR) 
The attestation response includes a quote over the PCR10. The quote is performed by 
the TPM. The PCR10 contains aggregate value of all the hashes measured by the IMA 
and signed by the TPM. The VRPCR utilizes the SML included in the attestation 
response to re-calculate the aggregate value of the PCR10. It then matches the 
received PCR10 value with its re-calculated aggregate PCR10 value. Therefore, if 
received PCR10 value is identical to the calculated aggregate PCR10 value then this 
means that SML values are not altered/ tampered (i.e. dishonest) by a malevolent 
software or man-in-the-middle attack. This way, if an eavesdropper somehow 
manages to modify the SML in the attestation response, the value of the PCR10 
(signed by TPM) will be different from the one which is re-calculated by the CS using 
the same SML used by the TPM. 
c) Validation of Received SML (VRSML) 
The third and final check at the CS is performed when the CS calls the VRSML for 
validation process. The VRSML extracts the SML from the attestation response and 
iterates through all the entries in the SML. It checks whether the hashes in the SML 
that represents the executables and configuration files loaded for execution on the 
target platform is known-good hashes or not. To realize this feature, the CS creates 
and manages a database of known-good hashes. The VRSML matches each and every 
hash in the SML against the database. If all of the hashes successfully matched to the 
known-good hashes in the database then it is considered that the executables running 
on the HD target platform are trusted and hence the platform is considered as 
trustworthy and secure. 
However, maintaining such a database is not a trivial task. The CS needs to be 
aware of the executables and configuration files of all the platforms that are to be 
verified. In PUSTPF architecture, the CS only performs the integrity verification of 
the HD target platforms within the boundaries of an organization; therefore the CS 




d) Validation of Received Certificate (VRCertificate) 
The CS also uses a specialized component for validating the certificates used in the 
attestation process. During the attestation process the TPM residing at the HD target 
platform (i.e., client or IdP) creates an AIK for signing the PCR value (known as 
quote operation). The TPM uses its Endorsement Key (EK) in the AIK creation. The 
private portion of the EK is only known to the particular TPM and it never leaves the 
TPM. The public portion of the EK is registered with a certification authority known 
as PrivacyCA. This registration is done by the owner of the TPM. When the TPM is 
asked to perform the quote operation over the PCR values during the creation of 
attestation response, the TPM sends the public portion of the EK and AIK to the 
PrivacyCA to confirm the validity of these keys. Since the PrivacyCA is assumed to 
know the public portion of the TPM, it checks the particular EK against its certificate 
list and if found, it signs the AIK with the public portion of the EK. All this procedure 
is done only to ensure that a genuine TPM signs the attestation response and not a 
fake one. 
The TCG has provided a standard implementation of the PrivacyCA. It can be an 
authorized Certification Authority or an implementation of the standard PrivacyCA 
for an organization or a federation. In proposed architecture, since there is no 
authorized PrivacyCA available, the standard implementation of the PrivacyCA is 
used. During the validation phase the CS performs the certificate validity check in 
order to confirm that the attestation response that the CS received was from a genuine 
TPM and was not faked. 
Once all the validators have performed their respective of validation, the CS then 
combined the results and send it to the MIPDC residing at the IdP of the HD 
organization. In this work, the mutual attestation of the HD client machine as well as 
IdP machine platforms are carried out, the MIPDC checks the attestation result of the 
HD client machine. If the HD client machine attestation resulted in true (i.e., the HD 
client’s machine platform is in a trustworthy and secure state), the MIPDC sends a 
new attestation request to the CS (including HD IdP’s machine IP address) to perform 
integrity validation of the HD IdP’s machine platform. The same process of integrity 
verification is followed by the CS for validating the integrity of the HD IdP’s machine 
platform as discussed above for the HD client’s machine platform.  
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When both the attestation processes mentioned above are completed the MIPDC 
again checks the attestation result from the CS and if both the results are true (i.e., 
both the HD client and IdP machines platforms are in a trusted state), it passes the true 
result to the MIR. If any of the attestation resulted in false it will make the HD client 
and IdP machines mutual attestation to false, thus the MIPDC will pass false in the 
result to the MIR. The MIR populates the MPI attribute with the result as true or false 
depending on the result of the mutual attestation. The HD IdP machine then releases 
the MPI attribute along with any other attributes that are mentioned in the 
AttributeReleasePolicy of the HD IdP machine. Finally, the HD IdP machine releases 
these attributes to the FD SP, which verifies the released attributes against its access 
decision or organizational policies and makes an access decision to allow or to deny 
access to a particular resource by the HD client machine. 
5.2.3 Comprehensive System Architecture Protocol 
The section 5.2.1 to 5.2.2 describes the PUSTPF architecture for federated identity 
and resource or service access using mutual attestation technique. Those sections also 
described the modifications needed to be made to incorporate IMA based mutual 
attestation technique in the Shibboleth framework. This section describes the 
information flow among different entities in PUSTPF architecture. Figure 5.1 (section 
5.2), shows the comprehensive architecture of the framework and the information 
flow among the entities. 
The proposed architecture steps shown in Figure 5.1 described below: 
1. The user located in the HD organization (www.dod.org) opens a browser and 
request a resource access sited at the FD organization (www.dor.org). After 
receiving the request the FD SP then checks to see if the requested resource is 
an unprotected entity. If yes, then it simply releases the resource to the user 
(Step 1 & 2). 
2. In the second case if a resource is a shielded resource then the FD organization 
SP forwards the HD organization user’s machine browser to the DS in order to 
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select his/her HD IdP  machine (in case of multiple IdPs) and to get 
authenticated. The user selects his HD IdP machine and the DS redirects the 
user’s machine browser to the selected HD organization IdP (Step 3 & 4). 
3. The WSSO AuthN service at the HD IdP machine brings a HD user to a 
selected HD organization IdP log-in portal. The HD user then enters his/her 
basic AuthN credentials (username/password) and the HD organization IdP 
machine then verify the user entered credentials against the entries in the 
LDAP (Step 5 & 6). 
4. Upon successful AuthN the WSSO service contacts the Login Handler Service 
residing at HD IdP machine to create a session for a HD user and sends a 
handler to the user’s machine browser. This handler is used by the WSSO 
service for providing WSSO features for this particular user. If any other FD 
SP in the federation request the HD IdP to authenticate this particular user, the 
WSSO service at the HD IdP checks for any pre-existing session and handler 
for this user and then performs the next step without prompting the user with 
login page. In this way, during the session time-period the HD IdP shall 
provides WSSO AuthN for the authenticated user across different 
organizational boundaries (i.e., different FD SPs )  (Step 7 & 8).  
5. The user’s browser sends this handler to the mod_shib module residing on the 
FD SP in order to proof that his AuthN is successful (Step 9). 
6. Since FD SP organization requires different attributes about a user, the 
mod_shib module sends a request to the Shibboleth daemon (shibd) running 
on the FD SP to request the attributes about a particular user from the HD IdP 
machine (Step 10). 
7. The shibd sends a request to the Attribute Resolver module at the HD IdP 
machine to release the attributes related to the HD client and IdP machines 
mutual attestation. (This request contains the authenticated user’s AuthN 
handler in order to know which HD user’s client’s and IdP machine attributes 
are requested) (Step 11). 
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8. The Attribute Resolver checks its configurations and collects some of the 
attributes (e.g., name, common name etc.) about the HD client machine from 
the underlying LDAP server using the default DataConnectors. Since in the 
architecture, the mutual integrity validation of the HD client and IdP machines 
(i.e. HD target machines) platforms. So for this purpose a new MIPDC is 
created in this research work.  The Attribute Resolver contacts the MIPDC for 
the required MPI attributes (Step 12).  
9. The MPI attribute needs the mutual attestation to be performed. The MIPDC 
first send an attestation request to the CS to perform attestation of the HD 
client’s machine platform (Step 13). 
10. The AttestationRequester_Module residing on the CS (i.e. Part of a HD 
organization IdP machine) then generates a nonce and creates an attestation 
request to send to the ACAgent_Daemon running on the HD client’s machine 
platform (Step 14). 
11. The ACAgent_Daemon at the HD client machine initiates the 
AttestClientPCR and AttestClientSML to collects the trust tokens (PCR10 & 
SML) from the HD client machine TPM. The HD client machine TPM 
performs the quote operation over PCR10 value. The ACAgent_Daemon 
collects these tokens and sends it back to the AttestationRequester_Module at 
the CS (Step 15 & 16). 
12. Upon receiving the trust tokens for the HD client machine, the CS initiates the 
ValidationofReceivedPCR and ValidationofReceivedSML to validate the trust 
tokens respectively. The CS also checks the certificate validity by contacting 
the PrivacyCA and uses its validation database to verify the hashes in the SML 
against the hashes in the verify database. In addition to that CS also performs 
the ValidationofReceivedNonce by comparing the received nonce that it sent 
in the earlier attestation request message. (Step 17). 
13. The CS combines the validated results and encodes it as XML node. This 
result is then returned to the MIPDC at HD IdP machine (Step 18).  
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14. In this work the mutual attestation of the HD client and IdP machine platforms 
is carried out, then the MIPDC shall checks the attestation result of the HD 
client machine. If the result is false (i.e., HD client’s machine platform is not 
in a trustworthy state) then the Steps 20 – 25 (Figure 5.1) will not be processed 
(Step 19).  
15. If the result is true (i.e., HD client’s machine platform is in a trustworthy state) 
then the MIPDC again sends an attestation request to the CS to mutually 
verify the integrity of the HD IdP’s machine platform (Step 20). 
16. The AttestationRequester_Module residing on the CS part of the HD IdP 
machine generates a nonce and creates an attestation request to the 
ACAgent_Daemon running on the HD IdP’s machine platform (Step 21). 
17. The ACAgent_Daemon at the HD IdP machine initiates the AttestIdPPCR and 
AttestIdPSML to collects the trust tokens (PCR10 & SML) from the HD IdP 
machine TPM. The HD IdP machine TPM performs the quote operation over 
PCR10 value. The ACAgent_Daemon collects these tokens and sends it back 
to the AttestationRequester_Module at CS part of the HD IdP machine (Step 
22 & 23). 
18. Upon receiving the trust tokens for the HD IdP machine, the CS initiate the 
ValidationofReceived PCR and ValidationofReceivedSML to verify the trust 
tokens respectively. The CS then also checks the certificate validity by 
contacting the PrivacyCA and uses its validation database to verify the hashes 
in the SML against the hashes in the verify database. In addition to that CS 
also performs the ValidationofReceivedNonce by comparing the received 
nonce that it sent in the earlier attestation request message. (Step 24). 
19. The CS then combines the validation result and encodes it as XML node. This 
result is then returned to the MIPDC at the HD IdP machine (Step 25).  
20. The MIPDC collects the mutual attestation result and passes this result to the 
Attribute Resolver at HD organization IdP machine (Steps 26). 
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21. For HD machines mutual attestation, MIR is created and populates the MPI 
attribute with the mutual attestation result and sends this attribute to the 
Shibboleth Daemon (shibd) running on the FD SP machine (Step 27).  
22. The shibd passes the attributes to the FD Shibboleth SP module (mod_shib) in 
order to apply its resource access policies and check the attributes values 
against its organization policy (Step 28). 
23. The mod_shib is responsible to apply organizational resource access policies 
according to the value of the attributes (e.g., MPI is true or false). It contacts 
the application that is protecting the sensitive resource and makes the decision 
to allow or to deny the resource to the HD client machine on the basis of HD 
client and IdP machines successful mutual attestation result (Step 29). 
24. According to the access decision in step 29, the resource is either released to 
the HD user or the access is denied for this particular resource (Step 30). 
5.3 System Architecture Design 
This section describes PUSTPF functionalities through different diagrams such as 
use-case, activity, class, sequence diagram, packages, and algorithms flowcharts 
(5.3.6): 
5.3.1 Use-Case Diagrams 
The use-case diagram is used in capturing the system functional requirements. The 
functional requirements are the behaviors of the system. The behavior maybe a single 
service and a function (or group of services and tasks) that a system is obligatory to 




5.3.1.1 Use-case Diagram-1 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the HD user AuthN using basic AuthN mechanism with the HD 








Figure 5.2: Use-case diagram-1 
5.3.1.2 Use-case Diagram-2 
Figure 5.3 shows HD client and IdP machines mutual attestation. This step will 
execute only if the HD user is successfully authenticated to the HD IdP using his/her 













5.3.1.3 Use-case Diagram-3 
The use-case diagram given in Figure 5.4 shows the FIAM mode functionalities that 













Figure 5.4: Use-case diagram-3 
5.3.2 Activity Diagram 
An activity diagram represents the system behaviors or activities. The activity 
diagram for the proposed scheme is given in Figure 5.5. The user may access two 
different resources (services): (1) the protected resource (services) which requires the 
HD user AuthN, and the HD client and IdP machines mutual attestation processes’ 
successful execution. (2), the unprotected resource (service) may not require user 
AuthN and AuthR processes execution. The core of the framework is Mutual Integrity 
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Provider Data Connector (MIPDC). The MIPDC has three major functions: (1) 
Extractions of the HD client’s and IdP’s machines IP addresses, (2) Initiating the 
attestation process by sending the HD client’s and IdP’s machines IP to the 
CS/CAgent  and (3) Attestation result collection from the CS and encoding it to 





























Figure 5.5: Activity diagram 
5.3.3 Class Diagram 
Figure 5.6 shows the interactions of different classes of the system architecture 
(section 5.2) and relationship among each other. The MIPDC class has five major 




protected resource at the HD IdP machine, (2) Kick off the requested target machine 
attestation procedure by forwarding the target machine IP to the CS, (3) Collects the 
HD targets machines attestation outcome, (4) Carry out the HD IdP machine 

























Figure 5.6: Class diagram 
5.3.4 Sequence Diagram 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the scheme (section 5.2) sequence diagram in which a user 
requests a protected resource sited at the FD organization. It also shows the necessary 
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Figure 5.7: Home domain client and idp MA sequence diagram 
5.3.5 Packages and Classes 
5.3.5.1 Home Domain Client Machine Attestation Collector 
The package pustpf.ima.net.client consists of attetstaioncollector sub-package. The 
sub-package consists of AtesstClientSML and AttestClientPCR classes (5.2.2.1 (a)). 
The agent DaemonAttestationCollectorAgent listens to the HD IdP machine 
attestation request. The TssService and XmlService provide the trusted computing and 

















Figure 5.8: HD client machine attestation collector package 
5.3.5.2 Home Domain Identity Provider Attestation Collector 
The package pustpf.ima.net.identityprovider consists of attetstaioncollector sub-
package. This sub-package further consists of AtesstIdPSML and AttestIdPPCR 
classes (5.2.2.1(b)). The agent DaemonAttestationCollectorAgent listens to the HD 
IdP machine attestation request. The TssService and XmlService provide the trusted 



















Figure 5.9: HD identity provider machine attestation collector package 
5.3.5.3 Home Domain Target Machines Mutual Attestation Validation 
The package tbed.pustpf.ima.net.avagent consists of a sub-package such as 
tbed.pustpf.ima.net.avagent::services. The tbed.pustpf.ima.net.avagent package 
consists of Target and MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector classes. The 
tbed.pustpf.ima.net.avagent::services cosnsist of XmLServices, LogHashSlotin and 
LogHashSlotinInquiryProducer classes. The XmlServices class provides Xml related 
services, whereas the LogHash classess provides the hashing services in attestation 
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process. The VRN, VRPCR and VRSML components are used to validated the returned 























The section 5.3.6.1 to 5.3.6.5 discusses the use-cases, activity and sequence diagrams 
algorithm in the form of flowchart. 
5.3.6.1 Flowchart 1: Use-case Digram -1 
Figure 5.11 shows the flow of user basic AuthN process in Shibboleth architecture. 
The user keyin first his/her basic AuthN credentials (e.g., UN/PWD) to the login 
screen prompted by the HD IdP. The details of Shibboleth basic user AuthN process 















Figure 5.11: HD user AuthN with basic AuthN credentials 
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5.3.6.2 Flowchart 2: Use-case Diagram-2 
Figure 5.12 shows the flow of HD IdP and client platforms mutual attestation process. 
The mutual attestation process executes after the successful run of user basic AuthN 





















5.3.6.3 Flowchart 3: Use-case Diagram-3 
Figure 5.13 shows the flow of the HD user AuthN and HD IdP and client machine 
platforms mutual attestation processes. The details of the HD user AuthN by basic 





















5.3.6.4 Flowchart 4: Activity Diagram 
Figure 5.14 shows the flow of the HD user AuthN, HD IdP and client machine 
platforms mutual attestation and AuthR processes. The details of the HD user AuthN 
by basic AuthN credentials, HD client and mutual attestation and AuthR via MPI 

















Figure 5.14: HD user AuthN, client and IdP mutual attestation and AuthR process 
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5.3.6.5 Flowchart 5: Sequence Diagram 
Figure 5.15 shows the flow of the HD organization and FD organization processes 
such as: (1) HD organization user AuthN and IdP and client machine platforms 
mutual attestation and (2) FD organization AuthR. The details of the HD organization 





















In this chapter, the system architecture desgin is presented. The system architecture 
which includes different entities or stakeholders and comprehensive PUSTPF protocol 
architecture discussed in the second section. The architecture desgin of the proposed 
scheme was explained through different use-case, activity, class, sequence diagrams. 




EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the experimental desgin, experiment outcomes obtained from 
the proof of concept for the trustworthy mutual attestation protocol and the practicable 
cohesive security, trust and privacy framework test-bed prototype. The second section 
describes the experimental desgin and explain how the IMA [15] based mutual 
(bidirectional) attestation protocol is integrated in a standard FIAM system (such as 
the Shibboleth framework). The third section presents the experiment outcomes. It is 
divided further into five sub-sections. The first sub-section describes the proof of 
concept for the trustworthy mutual attestation result analysis. The practicable 
cohesive security, trust and privacy framework test-bed result analysis is provided in 
the second sub-section. The third sub-section offers a comparison analysis of the 
emergent and practicable unified frameworks. The analysis of the mutual attestation 
performance comparison is presented in the fourth sub-section. The fifth sub-section 
describes the comparative analysis (such as security, trust, privacy and practicability) 
of the PUSTPF with the other works with the existing works. This chapter is 
summarized in the fourth section.  
6.2 Experimental Design 
In realizing PUSTPF for federated identity and resource or service access different 
technologies are used. In the experiment of the PUSTPF two different technologies 
are used in a broader spectrum. For user AuthN and AuthR in this Shibboleth an open 
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source framework was used to provide a secure WSSSO mechanism for AuthN and 
AuthR. To establish mutual trust among different entities in a federated identity and 
resource access scenario, in this work TCG-based IMA is used in mutual attestation 
protocol to measures and verifies the integrity of different platforms. The Shibboleth 
framework and IMA both depends on a variety of underlying technologies that need 
to be implemented and configured. In this section how these technologies are used 
and implemented in the prototype are discussed. In addition to that how some of the 
important components of the Shibboleth framework are implemented and configured 
are also discussed. The core of the proposed model is measuring the mutual integrity 
of the HD target platforms (i.e. client and IdP machines) for the establishment of trust. 
Therefore the implementation and configuration of the IMA and its underlying 
technologies with respect to the Shibboleth framework are discussed. 
The implementation and configuration of two important and related entities of the 
Shibboleth framework (e.g., HD IdP and FD SP) are also discussed in this section. 
The Shibboleth framework is an open source FIAM Solution for federated identity 
and resource or services access which is widely adopted in universities, and 
governmental organizations around the world for online secure resource sharing and 
collaboration. The source code of the Shibboleth framework is openly available for 
used or modified for custom implementation. This section describes the Shibboleth 
IdP and SP installation and configuration process for the prototype implementation 
and in the later sections will demonstrate how IMA can be incorporated in the 
Shibboleth framework. 
6.2.1 Home Domain Shibboleth Identity Provider Installation 
The HD Shibboleth IdP installation steps are described below (the corresponding 
complete command-line instructions and code is given in Appendix B): 
6.2.1.1 Operating System 
In PUSTPF test-bed prototype Ubuntu 9.10 OS is used for the HD organization IdP 
machine platform. The rationale behind selecting this flavor of Linux OS for the HD 
111 
IdP machine is that this version can easily support IMA, which will be used for 
mutual attestation of HD IdP and client machine platforms. 
6.2.1.2 Home Domain Identity Provider Pre-requisites 
The HD IdP pre-requisites are: 
a) Java 
The Sun Java 1.6 or later is required to be installed as a prerequisite for the Shibboleth 
IdP installation. Download the latest version of Sun’s Java (e.g., jdk 1.6), place it in 
the user’s home directory and install it (Appendix B [1(i)]). 
b) Apache Tomcat 
Apache Tomcat is used as a Servlet container for the deployment of HD organization 
IdP. Since Shibboleth IdP is based on Servlet 2.4 specification, so a Servlet container 
needs to deploy the IdP. For this reason the Apache Tomcat is chosen as the Servlet 
container (Appendix B [1(ii)]). 
6.2.1.3 Home Domain Identity Provider Installation 
The installation process is fairly easy. However to use the HD IdP, some post-
installation configuration are required. These configurations will be explained in the 
coming sections. The installation process includes download the latest Identity 
Provider software package (Appendix B [1(iii)]). 
During the installation process the IdP installer will ask for a directory where the 
IdP will be installed and the IdP name. The default directory used is /opt/shibboleth-
idp. The IdP directory is known as IDP_HOME in the rest of the thesis. 
6.2.1.4 Home Domain Shibboleth IdP Configuration 
a) Apache Tomcat Configuration 
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The Apache Tomcat acts as the base Servlet container for the Shibboleth IdP. Since 
the configuration files of the IdP are XML based, the Tomcat must be enabled to 
parse XML into the HTML or text format. For this reason Xerces and Xalan are used 
with the Tomcat. The Xerces is a Java parser for XML and Xalan provides an XSLT 
processor for transforming XML documents into HTML. These two XML libraries 
come with the Shibboleth IdP installer which is needed to copy these to the 
TOMCAT_HOME/endorsed folder (Appendix B [1(iv)]). 
Apart from the above, the IdP needs some specific memory configurations for its 
functioning. The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) memory options need to be set by 
editing the TOMCAT_HOME/bin/catalina.sh file (Appendix B [1(v)]).  
b) Setting SOAP Endpoints 
Generally, the communication between the Shibboleth IdP and SP is triggered by the 
user’s browser but in some situations both the HD IdP and FD SP may required to 
communicate directly without using the user’s browser. The situation may include 
certain operations such as Attribute Query, Logout, or Artifact Resolution etc. For this 
reason, the HD IdP needs to use an additional port that is different from the one used 
by the client because both have different purposes and security requirements. The port 
is known as Connector in Tomcat’s terminology. Tomcat uses Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP), an XML based, in order to realize this communication between the 
HD IdP and FD SP (Appendix B [1(vi)]). 
c) Deploy IdP WAR File 
The IdP WAR file is the collection of the IdP jar files and other configurations that 
are deployed in the Tomcat as WAR files. Whenever the Tomcat restarts it restarts all 
of the deployed WAR files and hence accommodates any changes made to the IdP 
software. To automatically deploy the IdP WAR file by the Tomcat, this need to use 
an XML petite bit of code to inform the tomcat about the HD IdP WAR file 
(Appendix B [1(vii)]). 
The Shibboleth HD organization entity, the IdP, is now up and running. However 
later it will requires some advance level configurations after installing the FD 
organization entity (i.e., Shibboleth SP).. The HD IdP status now can be checked by 
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accessing the URL from the same platform where IdP is installed and configured. 
This URL is used to check the status of the IdP: http://idp.dod.org/idp/profile/Status. 
The URL will show an “OK” page indicating that the IdP is successfully installed. 
6.2.1.5 Enabling Communication Security via SSL 
In the proposed architecture, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol is used to secure the 
communication between different entities during online transactions. The 
communication between IdP and SP or IdP and Client or SP and client need to be 
secure in order to provide a secure architecture. The SSL enabling the IdP platform to 
communicate securely with an entity (e.g., client or SP). In essence the IdP needs to 
have a secure communication with the client to secure the incoming traffic for the 
login page. Similarly the IdP needs a secure communication link with the SP to secure 
the process of sending and receiving attribute requests. 
In prototype implementation the RSA key pairs are created for generating 
certificates to make the communication secure for IdP (Appendix B [1(viii)]). Since 
the IdP is based on Tomcat, for this the Tomcat configuration needs to be modified to 
reflect the newly created RSA keystore (Appendix B [1(ix)]). 
6.2.1.6 Configuration of Authentication Mechanism 
In the proposed architecture the HD user is first authenticated and then his/her client 
and the HD IdP machine platform integrity is mutually verified in order to authorize 
him/her for accessing a secure and protected resource. The HD user AuthN is 
performed at the HD IdP end on behalf of the FD SP as mentioned in the previous 
sections. This section will describe the steps required for configuring the AuthN 
mechanism for the HD organization IdP machine. The Shibboleth IdP supports 
different type of AuthN mechanisms. In the prototype implementation 
username/password is used as a basic user AuthN mechanism via the Light Weight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). 
The configuration of AuthN mechanism is performed out in different sequence 
such as configuring the LoginHandler first, then in
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LDAP browser and finally setting up the Java AuthN and AuthR Service (JAAS) for 
the Shibboleth framework. 
a) Configuring LoginHandler for Username/Password based Authentication 
The LoginHandler is responsible for authenticating users with a username/password 
pair using the JAAS mechanism. During the AuthN process the LoginHandler 
provides a login page to the user for entering his credentials, which are then verified 
against the LDAP server (Appendix B [1(x)]). 
b) LDAP Server and Browser 
As the HD organization IdP machine does not store any credentials of the users. It 
uses different data stores to store user’s credentials and access these stores when 
required. In this work, LDAP server is used as the data store to store user’s credentials 
related to the AuthN purposes. For this purpose Apache Directory Server (ApacheDS) 
is deployed as LDAP server in the prototype implementation for the reason that it is 
written in Java and provides some very good and advance features (Appendix B 
[1(xi)])  
The ApacheDS runs as a backend service. Therefore a frontend interface is 
needed to create own directory for HD organization (i.e., users, their usernames and 
passwords and other credentials like address, phone numbers, and email etc). Thus, 
Apache Directory Studio is used to create and maintain own directory of users. The 
Apache Directory Studio is an LDAP browser used for communicating with the 
backend ApacheDS server (Appendix B [1(xii)]). With the Apache Directory Studio, 
directory of users in an organization can be created and the users can be created and 
maintain in the LDAP server. 
c) Configuring the JAAS policy 
The LoginHandler element ((5.4.1.6)) contains a specific attribute mentioning that the 
AuthN policy used by the Shibboleth IdP will be JAAS Authn policy as 
“jaasConfigurationLocation <=> "file <:///> opt/shibboleth-idp/conf/login <.> 
config"”. The IdP login configuration needs to be changed to reflect the fact that 
LDAP server is used as AuthN data store by the Shibboleth IdP (Appendix B 
[1(xiii)]).  
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d) LDAP Data Connector 
As the HD organization IdP machine does not store user’s credentials or attributes. 
These are stored in data stores outside the IdP software. The IdP uses specific data 
connectors for extracting these credentials and attributes from the data stores. Since in 
this work LDAP used as the data store for storing user’s credentials and other 
information, for this default data connector is used for LDAP. The data connectors are 
residing at the HD organization IdP machine at the location folder 
</>opt</>shibboleth<->idp</>conf in the file: attribute<->resolver<.>xml (Appendix 
B [1(xiv)]). 
6.2.1.7 Attribute Resolution and Filtering 
The Shibboleth HD IdP entity is responsible for authenticating a user on behalf of the 
SP. After successful AuthN, the user’s browser is given a handler (an AuthN token) 
and is redirected to the FD SP. The FD SP uses this handler to request attributes 
related to the login user. Each FD SP requests for attributes according to its 
requirements for access decision making. 
In the proposed architecture the HD client and IdP machines platforms integrity 
measurement are involved. So the HD client and IdP machines platforms mutual 
attestation is required to be achieved in proposed architectre. Since the trust tokens 
that are required for the integrity validation are not stored in the default data stores as 
the user’s credentials, for this it is needed to create own DataConnector to collect the 
trust tokens and initiate the validation process. In addition to that it is also needed to 
create own AttributeResolver to populate the custom attribute (i.e., MPI). 
To realize the above mentioned data connector and attribute resolver to populate 
own attribute for the machines mutual platform integrity the following 
DataConnector, AttributeResolver and attribute are added to the HD organization IdP 
configuration file known as attribute-resolver.xml. The custom data connector will be 
discussed in the later section (6.2.4) where the incorporating of the IMA into the 
architecture is explained. 
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Data Connector, Attribute Resolver, Attribute Definition and Policies 
Apart from the attribute resolution the HD organization IdP machine also enforce 
some policies to define (Appendix B [1(xv)]) which attributes have to be released to 
the SP. These policies are defined in the form of rules in the attribute-filter.xml file at 
the IdP. In this work the releasing of an attribute (i.e., HD client and IdP machines 
platforms successful mutual attestation) to the FD SP for the resource decision 
making process so for this purpose customized rule is created. 
6.2.2 Foreign Domain Shibboleth Service Provider Installation 
The FD SP installation is described in the following sub-section (6.2.2.1 to 6.2.2.7). 
The corresponding complete command-line instructions and code are given in 
Appendix B: 
6.2.2.1 Operating System 
In the prototype implementation of the Shibboleth framework, one of the most stable 
versions of Linux OS was used CentOS 5.6. The reason for selecting this OS is that 
the Shibboleth framework officially supports this version of Linux for the FD SP 
software. 
6.2.2.2 Foreign Domain Service Provider Pre-requisites 
The FD organization Shibboleth SP is based on number packages that need to be 
configured and install prior to the installation of the SP software. These packages are 
used by the FD SP to provide different functionalities. Some of the packages are 
developed in C/C++ language so for configuring and installing these packages the 
installation of C and C++ compilers is needed using the CentOS provided installer 





This package is specifically designed for the Shibboleth FD SP and is a modified 
version of the log4cpp. This package provides the logging mechanism that is used to 
maintain logs during accessing a protected resource through Shibboleth SP. This 
package can be downloaded from its homepage at: 
“http://www.shibboleth.net/downloads/log4shib/” (Appendix B [2(ii)]). 
b) Xerces-C 
The FD organization Shibboleth SP configuration is based on XML files. The SP 
requires a validating XML parser that can be used to parse and validate different 
XML based configurations. The Apache Software Foundation has developed a C++ 
based XML-parser namely Xerces - C that is used for processing XML in the 
Shibboleth framework. It enables the FD SP to: (1) Read and write the XML data and 
(2) provide a communal library to parse, generate, manipulate and validate XML 
documents (Appendix B [2(iii)]). 
c) XML-Security-C 
In the proposed architecture SSL is proposed to use for securing the communication 
between the FD SP and other entities in federated identity and resource access mode. 
Therefore, to utilize this feature the FD SP needs to be able to use XML based 
encryption and digital signatures. The Apache Software Foundation has provided a 
C++ based library for XML Encryption and Signatures known as XML-Security-C. 
This library is responsible for processing XML Encryption and Signatures in the 
Shibboleth framework. This library uses the previously installed Xerces-C parser to 
provide the digital signature and encryption implementation. XML-Security-C 
requires OpenSSL to be installed prior to its configuration and installation (Appendix 
B [2(iv)]). 
d) XML-Tooling-C 
OpenSAML 2 is responsible for providing a high level interface for processing XML 
especially for encryption and signing purposes. The OpenSAML 2 itself requires a 




The C language implementation of the OpenSAML 2 is known as OpenSAML-C. In 
the above step the XML Tooling-C library was installed for installing the 
OpenSAML-C (Appendix B [2(vi)]). 
6.2.2.3 Foreign Domain Service Provider Installation 
The FD organization Shibboleth SP requires all of the above packages to be installed 
before installing the SP (Appendix B [2(vii)]). 
6.2.2.4 Foreign Domain Shibboleth SP Configuration 
a) Apache Web Server Configuration 
The FD organization entity (i.e., Shibboleth SP) is based on the Apache web server. 
So, after installing the Shibboleth SP some minor modifications in the web server is 
needed to be performed (Appendix B [2(viii)]). 
The Shibboleth daemon (shibd) must have to be started independently to execute 
the apache web server. This daemon is responsible for handling requests coming to 
the FD organization SP (Appendix B [2(ix)]). 
6.2.2.5 Enabling Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
In the HD organization IdP configuration section (6.2.1.5) the details have been given 
about the using of SSL for securing the communications within the proposed 
architecture. Among the entities involved are client, IdP and SP. In this section the 
procedure of enabling SSL security for the FD organization SP machine platform is 
described. 
Since an open source implementation of the SSL naming openssl is available, in 
the prototype implementation, this openssl is used along with its available libraries to 
integrate it with the Apache web server. The mod_ssl is used to enable the SSL 
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features in the Apache web server. In the CentOS repositories both of these packages 
are available (Appendix B [2(x)]) in the CentOS. 
In the prototype implementation RSA key pairs are generated to create the 
certificates to be used for enabling the SSL (Appendix B [2(xi)]). Now the 
communication with the FD SP machine by any other entity or machine (e.g., client or 
IdP) is secure and a secure channel is used for accessing the resources protected by 
the FD organization SP. 
6.2.2.6 Metadata for HD IdP and FD SP 
The SAML metadata [29] is an integral part of the Shibboleth framework. The 
metadata is used to identify the organizations HD IdPs and FD SPs in a federation. It 
is also used to advertise certain capabilities that an FD SP or HD IdP can perform. 
This section will discuss how to generate metadata for the federation and how to 
exchange the metadata between the HD IdP and FD SP organizations in order to 
identify each other as legitimate entities of the federation. 
During the HD organization IdP installation process the Shibboleth IdP installer 
generates a default metadata for the HD IdP and place it at /opt/shibboleth-
idp/metadata folder by the name of idp-metadata.xml. The IdP configuration file also 
reflects this metadata using the <MetadataProvider> tag in a configuration file known 
as relying-party.xml that is located at the /opt/shibboleth-idp/conf folder. To establish 
a communication channel between the HD IdP and FD SP, the HD IdP metadata 
needs to be transferred from to the FD SP and vice versa. 
In the prototype implementation, the HD IdP metadata file is copied and placed in 
a configuration folder used by the FD SP. The Shibboleth SP provides a specialized 
tool for generating a basic metadata for the FD SP machine platform. The tool is 
known as metagen.sh and is residing at the SP at location /etc/shibboleth. This is the 
default location for all the configuration and XML files required by the Shibboleth 
SP. Using the metagen.sh tool the metadata for FD SP are generated by the sp-
metadata.xml file. This metadata is also located in the same configuration folder as 
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mentioned above. This metadata file is then copied and placed in the /opt/shibboleth-
idp/metdata folder at the HD IdP machine platform. 
Finally, both the HD IdP and FD SP configuration files need to be modified to 
incorporate the metadata files and their locations. At the HD IdP machine platform the 
relying-party.xml needs to be modified to include the location for the FD SP metadata 
by adding some XML code (given in Appendix B [2(xii)]). At the FD SP machine 
platform the shibboleth 2.xml file located at the /etc/shibboleth folder is the main 
configuration file. This file needs to be modified to include the location for the IdP 
metadata (given in Appendix B [2(xii)]). 
This way, both the HD IdP and FD SP organizations have each other’s metadata 
files located locally on their platforms respectively and both have added it to their 
configuration files. Now they can communicate with each other by identifying each 
other as a member of the same federation. In this manner new FD SPs can be easily 
added to the federation by adding their metadata information at the organization HD 
IdP. 
6.2.2.7 Protecting Resource via Shibboleth SP 
The Shibboleth SP is designed to protect any web based resource or application. The 
nature of the resource or application depends upon the services provided by an FD SP 
organization. For example a bank providing financial services to their customers 
would place financial resources and applications on their SP to make these resources 
secure and accessed by authorized users with valid mutual platform integrity state. A 
research organization may put their classified research findings on their SP to protect 
their resources. Therefore, the implementation of these applications for protecting 
resources depends upon the nature of services an SP is providing. In the prototype 
implementation, as proof-of-concept, a PhP based web application (i.e., simple static 
web page) is implemented and then it is protected through Shibboleth SP. This 
application or protected resource is sufficient enough to proof the secure access to the 
resource by taking into consideration the mutual attestation attribute for the access 
decision making process. 
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This section presents the procedure of protecting any web based resource through 
Shibboleth SP. As mentioned earlier (section 6.2.2.4 (a)) that the SP is based on the 
Apache web server for providing online services. So to protect a resource, a directory 
has been created by the name secure in the web server resource directory folder. 
Generally, the Apache web server uses the /var/www/html/ directory for storing its 
resources. In this work the secure directory is placed in /var/www/html/ at the FD SP 
platform. In addition to that a simple PHP script is added to the secure directory to 
show the User Name, Common Name and MutualPlatformIntegrity attributes of the 
HD IdP and client machines platforms that is accessing the resource. The SAML 
assertion that is sent by the HD IdP is also displayed. If the HD user is successfully 
authenticated and also his/her machine platform integrity along with the HD IdP’s 
machine platform integrity is successfully mutually validated then only the user 
access to these resources will be granted (in the form of displaying the page). If the 
user AuthN is not successful then the HD IdP machine will display an error page. If 
the AuthN is successful but either HD client or IdP’s machines platform integrity is 
not mutually validated then the FD SP will not provide access to the resource. 
The shib.conf file residing at FD SP at the location /etc/httpd/conf.d/ is 
responsible for defining and imposing the access control policies. For this purpose an 
access policy has been defined that will only allow access to an authenticated user if 
the mutual attestation of the HD client and IdP machines platforms are validated 
successfully (Appendix B [2(xiii)]). 
Generally, not all the resources residing on an FD SP are sensitive and protected 
through the access mechanism described above. An SP may offer some resources 
which does not need any protection and security. Such resources can be accessed 
freely while the same SP can provide protected and secure resources at the same time. 
For this purpose, in the prototype implementation, another resource has created 
(simple web page) and placed in another directory that is to be accessed freely without 
AuthN and validation of the machines mutual integrity platforms. Therefore, another 
directory was created with the name “unsecure” and placed in the Apache web server 
resources directory. To inform SP about this directory and its access policy a policy 
rule is added to the shib.conf file. 
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Hence, if the URL https://sp.dor.org/secure is accessed by any HD client, it will 
require successful AuthN and validation of machines mutual attestation process in 
order to access the secure resource. On the other hand, the URL 
https://sp.dor.org/unsecure requires neither AuthN nor machines mutual attestation to 
be performed to access the unsecure resource. 
6.2.3 Web Single Sign-On (WSSO) Service 
In the proposed architecture, the Shibboleth HD IdP WSSO functionality is leveraged 
for multiple resources access. The WSSO service is the first contact point at the HD 
IdP machine platform. When a user is redirected to his selected HD IdP by the DS, the 
SSO service at HD IdP initiates the AuthN process and a user is presented with the 
login page. The implementation and configuration details of WSSO service is 
discussed below (section 6.2.3.1 to 6.2.3.2). 
Since Shibboleth framework is based on the SAML v2.0, it provides two different 
profiles for AuthN [32], [33].  The two profiles are Browser/Artifact profile and 
Browser/Post profile. The Browser/Artifact profile is mainly used in AuthN in a 
federated environment.  The configurations of these profiles are defined in the SAML 
v2.0 specification [114]. Since in this work, the Shibboleth framework is using as the 
baseline framework, the HD IdP uses the Browser/Artifact profile for authenticating 
the HD users and providing SSO services. The HD and FD metadata configuration for 
WSSO is described below (section 6.2.3.1 to 6.2.3.2). 
6.2.3.1 Home Domain IdP Metadata Configuration 
The metadata is the starting point of trust between the HD IdP and FD SP 
organizations and provides the information about different functionalities that the HD 
IdP and FD SP are capable of performing (Appendix B [2(xiv)]). 
• The information (1) shows that the IdP supports both the SAML v1.1 and 
SAML v2.0 protocols. 
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• The configuration (2) shows the end location for the 
ArtifactResolutionService used in the SSO. 
• The configuration (3) explains the actual SSO service running on the IdP. 
The bindings of different protocols used for SSO with the SSO service are 
given and the end location URLs are provided where SSO requests are 
forwarded.   
All Location tags used in the configurations are accessed via the Servlet path 
"/profile" so the Servlet (Tomcat in this work) construct these URLs to be used by the 
user browser. 
6.2.3.2 Foreign Domain SP Metadata Configuration 
The FD SP metadata must also be configured to add the SSO configurations. For this 
reason, the configurations (given in Appendix B [2(xv)]).are added to the SP metadata 
This configuration informs the HD IdP how and where to push the SAML assertions 
for SSO through the browser. Generally, the FD SP informs the HD IdP about the end 
location to use in its request. The HD IdP then uses the above configurations in the 
FD SP metadata (located at IdP) to validate the end location for the SSO requests. The 
HD IdP also extracts the information about the version of the SAML used and the 
binding to be used accordingly. 
6.2.4 Implementing Mutual Attestation 
The establishment of mutual trust among different entities in a federated identity and 
resource or services access environment is one of the major security concerns for 
many organizations to securely share their resources. To establish mutual trust among 
the entities, in this thesis a PUSTPF architecture is proposed for federated identity and 
resource or service access to: (1) Integrate of HD user basic AuthN with the mutual 
attestation technique, (2) mutually validate the HD communicating machines 
platforms mutual integrity by leveraging mutual attestation technique known as 
mutual IMA and (3) privacy conservation of HD client and IdP machines in the 
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mutual attestation technique. This section will describe the procedure of using TPM 
and its keys to maintain and collect mutual trust tokens for the HD target machines 
platforms using the IMA technique. In addition to that the data connector is created 
for initializing the machines mutual attestation process after a successful user AuthN 
process by the HD IdP machine. This section comprises of TPM configuration, IMA 
implementation and configuration into the HD IdP and client machines platforms, and 
configuring the underlying Java Trusted Software Stack (jTSS) for communicating 
with the TPM on both the HD client and IdP machines platforms. 
6.2.4.1 Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Configuration 
It has already discussed (section 2.7.1) that the TPM is a small cryptographic chip that 
is used to generate and store secret keys and platform configurations. The TPM may 
report these configurations to a validator system or challenger machine in order to 
validate the target or attestor machine platform’s integrity. In the proposed 
architecture, both the HD client and IdP machines platforms must be TPM-enabled in 
order to facilitate mutual attestation technique. On both the HD machines platforms 
the TPM can be enabled and activated by the steps: 
• Enter to the BIOS settings on system restart and find the Security tab. In 
the Security tab an option for Enable/Disable TPM will be given. Select to 
Enable the TPM and restart the system. It may ask for confirmation upon 
restart about the TPM enable option, confirm it and the TPM is enabled 
but cannot be used until it is activated. 
• Once the TPM chip is enabled the next step is to activate it. The 
Activate/Deactivate option can be found on the same Security tab in the 
BIOS settings. Select the Activate option and restart the system. By 
activating the TPM all of the previous data in the TPM will be vanished 
and the TPM will be ready to use.  
• The current Linux kernels come with built-in device drivers for TPM chip. 
However, for older versions of kernels these drivers need to be installed. 
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Since in this work new kernels has used, so no separate drivers for TPM 
have installed. 
• The TPM chip is ready after its ownership is taken by the user or a system 
administrator in the organization. For using the TPM functionalities and 
taking its ownership some software is needed that can communicate with 
the TPM. This software is known as Java Trusted Software Stack (jTSS). 
The TPM ownership step will discuss in the later sections (section 
6.2.4.3). 
6.2.4.2 Installation and Configuration of IMA 
Integrity measurement architecture is an integral part of the Linux Security extensions 
that are pre-built in the Linux kernels. Fortunately, kernel version 2.6.30 and onwards 
has the security extensions like IMA and a few others comes within the kernel source 
code. However, it requires a compilation process to incorporate it into the kernel and 
to utilize its functionalities. In the prototype implementation, IMA is used for 
validating integrity of the HD client and IdP machines platforms. Therefore, Linux 
kernel version 2.6.35 is utilized for both the HD machines platforms. For this purpose, 
steps have been performed to compile the Linux kernel for incorporating IMA for 
both the HD IdP and client machines platforms (Appendix B [3(i)]). 
6.2.4.3 Installing Open Source Trusted Computing for JAVA 
In this work jTSS [40] is used which is an open source execution of the Trusted 
Software Stack (TSS) provided by the IAIK [113] to communicate with the TPM in a 
trusted manner. jTSS is primarily based on the Java language and it provides a trusted 
API for Java applications to communicate directly with the TPM chip. In the 
prototype implementation, jTSS is used for communicating with the TPM and 
creating AIKs (Appendix B [3(ii)]). 
The jTSS provides the low-level libraries for communicating with TPM chip. To 
use these low level libraries some high level tools are required. jTPMTools provides 
the implementation of such high level tools that can be used with the jTSS to 
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communicate with TPM. The jTPMTools are downloaded and extracted in the same 
folder as the jTSS was downloaded (Appendix B [3(iii)]). 
Some external libraries are also required by the jTSS to perform its functionality. 
These libraries are downloaded from TrustedJava homepage and placed in the 
ext_libs folder of the jTPMSTools software. Similarly, the ext_libs folder in the jTSS 
is copied and placed in the ext_libs of the jTPMTools. The jTPMTools can now be 
used with the TPM. 
• Taking TPM Ownership: When the TPM is enabled and activated the next 
step is to take its ownership. This is done using the jTPMTools. The 
jTPMTools provide an executable script by the name jtt.sh that is used to 
perform different tasks like take ownership, creating AIKs and PCR read 
etc. The TPM ownership is necessary to create AIKs that are required by 
the IMA for machines mutual attestation in this work. The command to 
take TPM ownership is given in Appendix B [3(iv)]). 
• Creating Attestation Identity Key (AIK): The IMA uses AIK for 
performing the quote operation over the PCR10 value by the TPM. For 
IMA to function properly AIK creation is mandatory. The AIKs are 
created in HD organization on both the client and IdP machine platforms 
(Appendix B [3(v)]). 
6.2.5 Implementation of IMA in Mutual Attestation 
In the previous sections (5.2.2.1 to 5.2.2.2) the procedure of initializing and 
performing mutual attestation is described in detail. In the implementation, when the 
HD IdP machine receive request for the MPI, the data connectors residing at the HD 
IdP machine initialize the mutual attestation process by sending a request to the CS to 
perform the client’s machine platform validation. Afterwards, it performs the HD 
IdP’s machine platform validation (in case HD client’s machine platform integrity 
resulted in trusted state) and then encode the result by using MIR that populates the 
MPI attribute with the final result. 
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6.2.5.1 Integrity Measurement and Reporting Phase 
A data connector naming MIPDC is created to perform three tasks. Firstly, it extracts 
the HD client’s machine platform IP address from the request coming to the HD IdP 
machine. Secondly, it initiate the process of attestation by sending the HD client’s 
machine IP to the CS for attestation and thirdly, it receives the attestation result from 
the CS and encode it to populate the MPI attribute. The code snippet shows the 








Figure 6.1: Dataconnector-mip snip shot 
The attestation request for HD IdP’s machine platform is processed in the same 
manner as that of HD client’s machine platform by the data connector. The CS 
receives the attestation request for a particular HD target machine platform (i.e., client 
or IdP) and generates a random number called nonce to be part of the attestation 










The CS sends the nonce within the attestation request to the HD target machine 
platform, where ACAgent-Daemon is running to extracts the trust tokens (i.e., PCR10 
quoted value and SML) and returns these values back to the CS for validation phase. 
To realize the above, two sub classes of the ACAgent -Daemon class is developed 
namely AttestClientPCR class and AttestClientSML class respectively. The 
AttestClientPCR extracts the PCR10 value from the TPM and initiates the TPM to 
sign the PCR10 value along with the nonce received from the CAgent. Similarly, the 
AttestClientSML reads the /sys/kernel/security/ascii_runtime_measurements file and 
extract the SML. These two values are returned back to the CS for validation phase. 
6.2.5.2 Integrity Validation Phase 
The CS receives the trust tokens and performs validation of the nonce, PCR10 value 
and the SML that it receives as the trust tokens. For the purpose of validation three 
different sub classes for trust tokens validation is developed, namely, VRN, VRPCR 
and VRSML. The VRN class is used to validate the nonce received from the HD 
target machine platform against the nonce that CS sent to the HD target machine 
platform. For this a nonce matching function is created which performs the nonce 
matching. If both the nonce matches, it assures that the attestation response from the 
HD target machine platform is a fresh one and the target machine is not resending 
some older trust tokens. 
The VRPCR is created to validate the PCR10 value. IMA uses PCR10 to store the 
aggregate hash of all the executables and the hashes are stored in the SML. It means 
that the CS can calculate its own PCR aggregate value from the SML by performing 
the same PCR-Extend function that is performed by the TPM to store the aggregate 
hash in PCR10. The VRPCR first extract the SML list from the trust tokens that is 
passed to it and re-calculate an aggregate value from the SML. Once the PCR 
aggregate is calculated it then checks the calculated value against the PCR10 value. If 
both the values matched, it assured that PCR10 values reflect the SML list and the 
SML or the PCR10 value is not tampered with any malware or changed by an 
eavesdropper. Therefore, in the proposed architecture, if an attacker somehow get 
access to the SML or PCR10 value and modifies it, the changes made to these trust 
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tokens can be easily identified during the VRPCR process. In addition to that in 
VRCertificate phase the CS performs the certificate validity check to confirm that the 
attestation response that the CAgent has received is from a genuine TPM and is not a 
fake one. 
Finally, the VRSML is responsible to check each and every measurement in the 
SML against the validation database that contains known-good hashes about the 
machine platforms. The VRSML process the SML list and extracts the template-hash 
from the SML which is a combined hash of the file-hash and file-name calculated for 
each executable by the IMA. It then checks each template-hash against the validation 
database and validates the measurements. If all of the SML is successfully validated 
against the validation database, it is assured that the machine platforms are in a 
trustworthy state. 
The result of all these validation is sent to the Client class (the same class is used 
for HD client and IdP machine platforms), which combines the results and return the 
final attestation result to the MIPDC as true or false, meaning HD target machine 
platform’s integrity is validated successfully or unsuccessfully. The DataConnector 
checks if the HD client’s machine platform integrity is validated then it sends another 
attestation request to the CS for validating integrity of HD IdP’s machine platform. 
The same procedure is followed for IdP attestation as mentioned above. The MIPDC 
receives both the attestation results and it combines the results into the MPI attribute 
that is sent to the FD SP for decision making process. 
6.3 Experiment Outcome 
To validate this work different experiment were carried out: (1) Trustworthy mutual 
attestation protocol proof of concept and (2) practicable unified security, trust and 
privacy framework test-bed prototype implementation. The hardware and software 
components used in (1) and (2) are given in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 respectively. The 
various results collected from TMAP proof of concept for native true Web SSO and 
PUSTPF test-bed are discussed. 
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6.3.1 Emergent Unified STP Framework Result Analysis 
The TMAP proof of concept for native true web SSO was implemented using java. 
The hardware and software used in TMAP proof of concept implementation are given 
in Table 6.1. The jTSS is an implementation of TCG software stack for the java 
platform. The jTSS covers greate part of specification TSS1.1 and substantial parts of 
specification TSS 1.2. The jTSS featurs are: TSS Device Driver Library (TDDL), TSS 
Core Service (TCS) and TSS Service Provider (TSP). The jTPMTools are collection 
of command line tools.  The jTPMTools are used for interaction with the TPM and the 
jTSS. The basic tools include in jTPMTools: tacking and removing ownership, PCRs 
readind and extending, creating keys (e.g., AIK creation), AIK certification and data 
binding. The latest kernel version 2.6.35.11 (Ubuntu OS) was installed and configured 
with the IMA on client and server machine. The client and server machines 
motherboard contain TPM hardware chip that complies with the TCG TPM 
specification 1.2. 






6.3.1.1 Platform Trustworthiness Result 
To assess the trustworthiness of the attested machines platform for native true WSSO 
scheme a rootkit is purposely inserted to the client and server machine to demonstrate 
“how, the TMAP will reacts if a malevolent program such as a rootkit is detected”. 
The trustworthiness of machine platforms means a machine components are protected 
and all hashes in the SML (in attestation request and response) were received and 
successfully compared with the good known hashes (in the DB) to show no rootkit or 
any other malevolent program is running. 
Client Server 
Ubuntu 
RAM 1GB RAM2.5GB 
2.00GHz Genuine Intel (R) CPU Dual 1.83GHz Intel Core (TM) 2 CPU 
MySQL DB (contains good hashes of executables) 
jTSS (used for communication with the TPM) Used to perform the quote operation over the 
PCR and nonce value, and extract this value for us to report to the challenging party. 
jTpmTools (we use jTSS to communicate with the TPM) Create the AIK using the AIK_TPM 
key jTpmTools and jTSS libraries. 
TPM 1.2 (Complies with the TCG TPM specification v1.2) 
Kernel version 2.6.35.11 (Kernel configured to work with the IMA) 
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The experiment was performed to test that the TMAP would fulfill the goal of the 
scheme (i.e., its defense against a particular threat). Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 shows 
that how the precise goal of the protocol is precisely achieved (i.e., against a 
particular threat such as rootkit (lrk5)). 
Figure 6.2 shows the log of a secured and trustworthy machine. It clearly indicates 






Figure 6.2: Trustworthy and secured system log 
Figure 6.3 shows the log of a compromised machine platform to a rootkit attack 






Figure 6.3: Infected or compromised system log 
6.3.1.2 Mutual Attestation Performance Measurement Result 
a) Client and Server Platform Attestation Time Taken 
Figure 6.4 shows (a) the client and (b) the server machine platforms attestation time 





machines attestation is performed individually and collected the attestation data for 
client and server so that it can be graphically presented. 
Figure 6.4 shows the client (a) and server (b) attestation data results. The x-axis 
stand for the independent variable SML (i.e., number of measurement in SML) and y-
axis signifies the dependent variable Time (i.e., attestation time taken (in ms)). The 
graph data (Figure 6.4) obtained for client and server machine platforms attestation 
((a) and (b)) shows the number of measurement in SML affect on the attestation time. 
Simply, when the number of measurements in the SML increments the corresponding 
number of measurement in the SML attestation time (in ms) also increases. The graph 
also shows the attestation time plus the network overhead (i.e., attestation request and 
quote operation). The platforms attestation data analysis shows the increments in the 








Figure 6.4: Client and server platform attestation graphs 
b) Client and Server Platforms Mutual Attestation Round Trip Time 
Figure 6.5 shows the round trip bidirectional (mutual) attestation time for the client 
and server (i.e. SP) machine platforms.  Theattestation includes sending and receiving 
of the attestation request, response and validation operations. The attestation data for 
this graph is acquired by combining the data of client and server side machine 
platforms attestation. In Figure 6.5.the x-axis stand for the independent variable 
“SML” (i.e., number of measurement in SML) and y-axis signifies the dependent 
variable “Time” (i.e., attestation time taken (in ms)).  
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Figure 6.5 also reveals the relationship between the number of measurement in the 
SML and attestation time (i.e., the increase in the number of measurements in the 
SML raise the corresponding attestation time taken. The same is true for the round-







Figure 6.5: Client and server platforms mutual attestation round-trip 
6.3.2 Practicable Framework Test-bed Result Analysis 
The hardware/software requirements used in PUSTPF test-bed prototype 
implementation are given in Table 6.2. Ubuntu 9.10 was installed on HD entities (i.e., 
client and IdP) and CentOS on SP machine. Static IP addresses are assigned to client, 
IdP and SP machine. The executables good hashes DataBase (MySQL) is created and 
maintained at the HD IdP machine. The configuration of IMA was perforemed on the 
HD client and IdP machine. The HD client and IdP machine motherboard contain 
building TPM 1.2 that complies with the TCG TPM1.2 specification. The jTTS and 
















6.3.2.1 Integrated Authentication Result 
The integrated AuthN (Figure 6.6 to Figure 6.9) result is the combination of: (1) 
Home domain user AuthN process and (2) Home domain machines mutual attestation 
process.  
For user AuthN data, LDAP was used to store the user credentials. Whereas, the 
MA data is derived from the HD clients and IdP’s machines platform attestation 
processed by the CS (part of the HD IdP). For successful user AuthN and MA (i.e. 
OUTPUT =1) the values of all INPUTS must be “1” (Table 6.3). 





So, if any value in the INPUT combination is “Null” or “_” or “0” or “1” then the 
OUTPUT will be “0”. The output will be zero (False) in the case when inputs are 
“Null” or “_” and “0”. This means that to get “OUTPUT=1” (AuthN or mutual 
attestation successful) all INPUT combination must be “1” (Table 6.3). The complete 
Scenarios 
(section 6.3.2.3) 
Input Process Output 
HD User AuthN Data MA Data 
HD Client (target) HD IdP (challenger) 
Scenario - 1 (a) 1 Null - 0 
Scenario - 2 (b) 1 0 - 0 
Scenario - 3 (c) 1 1 0 0 




HD Entities FD Entity 
Client IdP SP 
OS  Ubuntu 9.10 CentOS 5.6 
Machines IP Add. 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.1 
Switch & Cable 5-port 10/100Mbps + category.5e UTP 
RAM 1GB 2.5GB 1GB  
CPU 2.00GHz 1.83GHz DC 1.86GHz DC 
Web Server  Web server Web server 
Database MySQL DB which holds good hashes of executables  
Shibboleth IdP Installation & Configuration SP Installation 
& Configuration 
IMA Configuration for Mutual Attestation  
jTTS jTSS (used for communication with the TPM) 
Used to perform the quote operation over the PCR and nonce value, 
and extract this value for us to report to the challenging party. 
jTPM Tools jTpmTools (we use jTSS to communicate with the TPM) Create the 
AIK using the AIK_TPM key jTpmTools and jTSS libraries. 
TPM Chip Type TPM 1.2 (Complies with the TCG TPM specification v1.2) 
Kernel Version 2.6.35 (Kernel was configured to work with the IMA) 
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HD IdPs (www.dod.org) user AuthN and AuthR at the FD SPs (www.dor.org) is 


































Figure 6.9: HD machines mutual attestation failure 
a) Home Domain User Successful Authentication Process Log Data 
The HD user successful AuthN process log data is shown in Figure 6.10. The process 
log data includes resource request sited at the FD SP (www.dor.org), user redirection 
to the HD IdP (www.dod.org), user AuthN with his basic AuthN security credentials 













b) Home Domain Machines Platform Successful MA Process log Data 
The HD IdP and client machines mutual attestation (Figure 6.11) will occur if the HD 








Figure 6.11: HD client and IdP successful MA process log data 
Therefore, to access a protected resource sited at the FD the user AuthN and the 
HD client and IdP machines mutual attestation outcome must be true. The HD user 
AuthN or machines mutual attestation failure means the AuthR process will not 
carried-out. The HD client and IdP machines platforms successful mutual attestation 
process log data outcome is given in Figure 6.11. 
6.3.2.2 HD Machine Platforms Performance Measurement Result 
a) HD Client and Identity Provider Platform Attestation Time Taken 
Figure 6.12 shows the HD client and IdP machines platform attestation time Vs the 
number of measurements in SML. Figure 6.12 shows the HD client (a) and IdP (b) 
machine platforms attestation data results. The x-axis stand for the independent 
variable “SML” (i.e., number of measurement in SML) and y-axis signifies the 
dependent variable “Time” (i.e., attestation time taken (in ms)). The graph data 
(Figure 6.12) obtained for HD client and IdP machine platforms attestation ((a) and 





means when the number of measurements in the SML increments the attestation time 








Figure 6.12: HD client and idp platforms attestation result 
The attestation of the HD client and IdP machine platforms is performed 
individually for number of times and collected the attestation data so that it can be 
graphically presented (Figure 6.12). The attestation data (Figure 6.12) reveals the 
attestation time facts such as when the number of measurements in the SML 
increments the attestation time (in ms) also increases accordingly. This means the 
IMA attestation scheme is depended on the number of measurement in the SML list. 
So if the number of measurement in the SML list increases then corresponding 
attestation time of measurement in the SML list also increases or vice versa. 
b) HD Client and Identity Provider Platforms Attestation Round-trip Time 
Figure 6.13 shows the round trip mutual attestation time for the HD client and IdP 
machines which includes sending and receiving of the attestation request, response 
and its validation. The x-axis stand for the independent variable “SML” (i.e., number 
of measurement in SML) and y-axis signifies the dependent variable “Time” (i.e., 
attestation time taken (in ms)). The graph data (Figure 6.13) obtained for HD client 
and IdP machine platforms mutual attestation attestation. The graph (Figure 6.13) 
shows the number of measurement in SML affect the attestation time taken. This 
means when the number of measurements in the SML increments the attestation time 








Figure 6.13: HD client and idp round-trip attestation result 
6.3.2.3 HD Machines Platform Trustworthiness Result 
The HD machines platform trustworthiness is tested through four different scenarios. 
a) Scenario-1 
When the attestationcollector-daemon at the HD client machine (Figure 6.14) is not 
running, client machine is not equipped with the TPM or not configured for mutual 







Figure 6.14: HD client machine not configured with IMA/ no TPM 
Figure 6.14 shows when the attestationcollector-deamon could not contact the CS 
(Figure 5.1) then assume that the HD client’s machine platform integrity is false. In 
this scenario the HD client’s machine platform integrity failure demonstrates that the 
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client’s machine is not a trustworthy HD organization (i.e., DoD), Figure 6.14, 
machine assigned to a particular user. 
b) Scenario-2 
In the second scenario when HD client's machine platform integrity has failed then the 
CS will not perform the HD IdP machine platform attestation and hence the mutual 
attestation has failed. In this scenario the HD client’s machine platform integrity 
failure demonstrates that an unknown “hash:eog” was found (Figure 6.15). The 
unknown hash entry shows that the signature of the “eog” is already changed and 
indicates that a malevolent action had replaced the original “eog” with a malicious 
version. The unknown hash detection given in Figure 6.15 demonstrates that the HD 




Figure 6.15: HD client machine platform attestation failure result 
c) Scenario-3 
In the third scenario, when the HD client's machine integrity is verified, i.e., 
attestation resulted in true but the HD IdP's machine platform integrity is not verified 





Figure 6.16: HD idp machine platform attestation failure result 
In third scenario the HD IdP’s machine platform integrity failed and demonstrates 
that an unknown “hash: idp.war” was detected. The unknown hash entry shows that 




replaced the original “idp.war” with a malicious version. The unknown hash detection 
given in Figure 6.16 demonstrates that the HD IdP’s machine platform is not in a 
trustworthy state or already compromised to a malevolent activity. 
d) Scenario-4 
In fourth scenario, (given in Figure 6.17), when the HD client’s and IdP’s machine 
platform attestation is successfully validated, i.e., mutual platform attestation resulted 
in true. The HD client’s and IdP’s machines platforms are mutually attested 
successfully, it shows that both machines platforms are in a trustworthy state or not 








Figure 6.17: HD client and idp platforms successful MA result 
6.3.2.4 HD Attested Machines Privacy Conservation Proof 
Figure 6.18 shows how the HD machine (i.e., client and IdP), DoD, platforms privacy 
is protected in the FD SP (DoR). The HD IdP machine attest the HD client machine 
platforms as well as perform its own machine platforms (IdP) attestation. In this way 
the HD client and IdP machine platforms security credentials are protected because 
the platforms security credentials are not shared with the foreign domain entity (SP). 















Figure 6.18: HD attested platforms privacy conservation proof 
6.3.3 Comparison between Practicable and Emergent Schemes 
Table 6.4 shows the comparative analysis of STP aspects of EUSTPF (section 4.3.1.1) 
and PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2). 
6.3.3.1 EUSTPF vs. PUSTPF 
The comparative analysis of the two schemes is given in Table 6.4. In EUSTPF user 
identity privacy (anonymity and unlinkability) is protected via Blind Token 
Generating Service (BTGS). However, sharing of platforms security credentials 
(measurement) in the EUSTPF may raise network privacy concerns. The other 
network concerns in EUSTPF scheme are: good hashes management, performance 
deceleration, trusted privacyCA establishment in the interdomain scenario and 
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expansion to the new domains. The EUSTPF scheme partially or fully provide 
protection against security threats: (a) rootkits, (b) Trojans that leading to the phishing 
attack, (c) man-in-the middle attack, (d) relay attack, (e) replay attack and (f) client 
and server (IdP) legitimacy. The mutual platform trust in EUSTPS is established by 
validating the integrity of client and server platforms.  
In PUSTPF scheme the machine platform security is harden by integrating the 
Shibboleth user basic AuthN method with the HD client and IdP machine platforms 
mutual attestation. The trust in the HD client and IdP machine platforms is established 
by platforms mutual integrity validation technique. The platforms integrity validation 
ensures that HD client and IdP machine platforms are not compromised to security 
threat (section 6.3.5.5). In PUSTPF scheme the sharing of platforms security 
credentials privacy concerns in intra-domain scenario is neglegiable as compared to 
the inter-doamin scenario. This is mainly due to the trust relationship beucase in intra-
domain scenario the entities (client and server) are in strong trust in as compared to 
the inter-doamin scenario.  















Solutions Binding user AuthN. with 
the MA protocol 
Client & server machines platforms 
mutual integrity validation  
BTGS attains the user privacy 
(i.e. anonymity and 
unlinkability) 
Advantages Partial or full protection against threats a, b, c, d, e & f (section 
6.3.5.5) 




External network: (1) Good hashes management, (2) 
Performance deceleration, (3) Trusted PrivacyCA  
establishment particularly in inter-domain scenario (4) 
Expansion to the new domains 
platforms measurement privacy 





Solutions HD user AuthN. fused with the HD client 
and IdP machines mutual attestation 
HD client and IdP  
machines mutual 
integrity validation  
HD client & IdP machines 
privacy is protected at the FD SP 
Advantages 1. Partial or full protection against threats a, b, c, d, e, f  & g 
(section 6.3.5.5) 
2. Mutual attestation scheme use in HD network turnover the 
IMA concerns into the pros. 
1. Attested HD client and IdP 
machines privacy is 
protected at the FD SP 
2. Trusted Attribute “MPI” is 
exchanged only with the FD 
to access a resource 
Network 
Concerns 
Using of IMA in inter-domain scenario to strengthen the security and trust between the HD and FD 
may leads to  the privacy concerns 
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6.3.4 Performance Measurement and Benchmarking 
Table 6.5 illustrates the comparison of the machines platform mutual attestation in 
EUSTPF and PUSTPF. The attestation data given in Table 6.5 is taken by combining 
the client side and server side platforms attestation data. In Table 6.5 the Round-Trip 
(R-trip) data means attestation of client (and server) machine (ATc+s) in column 
“Client and Server”. The column “HD Client and IdP” shows the Round-Trip (R-trip) 
data for client (and HD IdP) machine platforms (ATc+idp). The SMLc+s and 
SMLc+idp represents the number of measurmenet in SML list for the HD entities 
(client and IdP). The “R-trip ATc+s +N/W Overhead c+s” signifies roundtrip 
attestation time for client and server plus network overhead for client and server 
machine.   
Table 6.5 shows in column “Client and Server” that when number of 
measurement in the SML list increments the corresponding attestation time round trip 
and network overhead also increases. .Similarly, in column “HD Client and IdP” 
shows increase in the round trip and overhead attestation time due to increase in the 
number of measurement in the SML list at HD client and IdP. Another important 
element can also observed (Table 6.5) that the SML entries in HD organization (i.e. 
SMLc+idp) is quite large than that of simple client and server attestation. The is 
mainly due to the Shibboleth large number of configuration and liberies files.  





The Table 6.6 illustrates the performance comparison for the machines platforms 
attestation [2], [95], [99], [115]. The Table 6.6 also shows that all of the schemes 
make use of the IMA. Therefore, the assumption is established on the basis of the 
SML role in IMA because in IMA the SML plays a major role and strongly affects the 
attestation time. This can be observed from the client and server machines data 
Machines Mutual Attestation 
Client and Server  HD Client and IdP 
SMLc+s R-trip 
ATc+s 




R-trip ATc+idp +N/W 
Overhead c+idp 
1633 25668 26309 1716 41742 42262 
1696 26474 27202 1783 42422 42890 
1729 36336 37063 1817 52122 52586 
1774 37406 37943 1862 53202 53672 
1786 39142 39758 1880 55022 55476 
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(Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4) and HD client and IdP machines data (Figure 6.11 and 
Figure 6.12) that when the no.’s of SML entries increases so the respective attestation 
time also incrementing. The incrments in attestation time distress the performance of 
the scheme.  
Table 6.6: Comparison of IMA based attestation schemes 
 
 
6.3.5 Comparison of Proposed Solution with Existing Works 
In this work a PUSTPF is proposed for federated identity and resource access system 
by combining the security functionalities of the trusted computing with a FIAM 
Shibboleth system. Shibboleth is used to supports the privacy conservation features 
that can enhance the HD machines mutual security and the trust and privacy 
conservation at the FD SPs in our architecture. The anonymity [25] in this work 
means that “a user may use a resource or service without disclosing the HD client's 
and IdP machine's measurements”. Each column of Table 6.7 discussed in section 
6.3.5.1 to 6.3.5.5. 














No. of SML  Attestation Time 
TMAP proof of concept 
(Section 6.2.1.2) MA IMA SML ↑ (e.g. 709) ↑ (e.g. 11146ms) 
Pashalidis et al. [2] RA IMA SML ↑ (e.g. 500) ↑ (e.g. 10022ms) 
Garriss et al. [95] RA IMA SML ↑ (e.g. 580) ↑ (e.g. 11020ms) 
Ali et al. [99] RA IMA SML ↑ (e.g. 630) ↑ (e.g. 11100ms) 













Table 6.7 shows the existing works are mainly focused on the integration of (1) 
security with the privacy or (2) security with the trust and not too much of the existing 
works focus on the STP aspects unification in a federated environment. Table 6.8 
signifies the STP and practicability keys used in Table 6.7. The comprehensive 
comparative analysis of security, trust and privacy in PUSTPF are discusses in section 
6.3.5.1 to 6.3.5.5. 
6.3.5.1 Practicability 
Practicability, noun of practicable, signifies something (e.g., a plan or an action) that 
is flexible, scalable and simple to used, implementable in a real environment within 
the available technologies [78] and fully compatible with the existing FIAM system 
infrastructure such as Shibboleth [74]. 
PUSTPF is practicable because it is well-matched with the existing FIAM 
infrastructure without modifications at the FD SP side. The main modification is at 
the HD, in which the changes are easier and feasible to carry out because all of the 
entities such as the users, clients and IdP are part of the HD organization. The 
practicability of the PUSTPF and other works is analyzed (Table 6.7) on the basis of 
scalability, flexibility and simplicity (e.g., login convenience) of the approaches. 
Keys: 
 
BAMPPP = Bidirectional Attested Machines Platform Privacy Protection                  [f] = flexible 
MTEbCM = Mutual Trust Establishment between Communicating Machines            [Nd] = Not discussed 
MA = Mutual Attestation                                                                                               [s] = sclable 
IA = Integrated Authentication                                                                                      [Ns] = Not scalable 
PWD = Password                                                                                                           [su] = simple to use 
NA= Not Applicable                                                                                                      [nsu] = Not simple to use 
SECURITY TRUST PRIVACY PRACTICABILITY 
Keys: Keys: Keys: Keys: 
IA 
☑ - Achieved 
☒ - Absent 
MTEbCM 
⊘ - Accomplished 
⊗ - Not Accomplished 
⊖-  Not Applicable  
BAMPPP [✔] -  Fully Conserved 








⊙ - Satisfied 








 - Shielded 





Root Kit  - Protected 




In Shibboleth, an open source and standard FIAM mode, user Auth N handler and 
other attribute production is delegated to the HD entity IdP. Therefore, due to the 
segregation of the jobs the FD SP doesn’t bind to posses the HD user’s identities and 
client machine records which certainly reduces the identity management redundancy 
and enhance the scalability if additional FD SPs are added afterward. 
In bi-directional attestation the mutually integrity measurement of server and 
client machine platforms in federated environment leads to the privacy and scalability 
concerns. In PUSTPF, choosing the HD IdP machine (i.e., server) as a challenger 
entity guarantees that TMAP conserves: (i) To preserve the HD client and IdP 
machine platforms privacy in the FD, and also the HD IdP machine platforms privacy 
at the HD client machine, (ii) Scalable. Therefore, in PUSTPF adding new client and 
revoking of the current client machine platforms trusted security credentials is an easy 
task because all client machines are registered with the HD organization. Only the HD 
organization (i.e., IdP) is responsible for its client machine platform’s security 
credential validation and revocation, updating and management of the HD machine 
platforms good hashes data base entries. 
The schemes such as PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2), [96], [97], [100] is scalable “[s]” 
because all of the approaches are compatible with the corresponding infrastructure. 
Whereas, the schemes (e.g., EUSTPF (section 4.3.1.1), [2], [95], [115], [116], [117], 
and [118]) are not scalable “[Ns]” because they are not fully comparable with the 
corresponding infrastructure. The rest of the works (e.g., [12], [70], [71], and [72]) are 
not making use of a remote or mutual attestation protocol. 
b) Flexibility 
PUSTPF is flexible because the framework may accommodate any other mutual 
attestation mechanisms. The only changes may require at the HD client and IdP 
machines are the agents (e.g., ACAgent and AVAs) according to the newly chosen 
mutual attestation mechanism. 
The “[f]” in the column “flexible” under practicability shows that the attestation 
collector and verification operation in PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2), EUSTPF (section 
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4.3,1.1) and [100] is flexible which means these schemes in the future can 
accommodate any type of attestation mechanism. The schemes such as [12], [70], 
[71], [72] are not making use of attestation mechanism. The rest of the works (e.g., 
[2], [95], [96], [97], [115], [116], [117], [118]) do not discuss “[Nd]” the flexibility of 
the schemes. 
c) Simplicity – Login Convnience 
PUSTPF is simple to use in real environment because the HD end user only needs to 
recall his/her basic AuthN credential (i.e., UN/PWD) and not to memorize the HD IdP 
and client machines platform security credentials. The HD IdP and client machines 
TPM must be enabled, activated and owned. The enabling, activation and owning 
TPM is the pre-requisites and one time process. Later in the integrity reporting phase 
the HD IdP and client machine TPM, work similar to the smart card, report the 
collected hashes aggregate plus the nonce signed by the respective TPM to the 
challenging entity. Therefore, after HD user successful login with basic AuthN 
credential the HD client and IdP mutual integrity attestation process will execute in an 
automated way. 
The schemes (e.g., PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2), [96], [97], [99], [100]) are simple to 
use “[su]”. The schemes (e.g., EUSTPF (section 4.2.1.1) and [2]) are not “[nsu]” 
because of the complex infrastructure. The rest of the schemes in [95], [115], [116], 
[117], [118] are not discussed “[Nd]” their schemes use in real environment, whereas 
simplicity of schemes is not applicable “[NA]” to [12], [70], [71], [72] because these 
schemes do not make use of attestation schemes. 
6.3.5.2 Privacy - Machines Platform Privacy Conservation 
Shibboleth, used in this work, short-term random IDs certainly preserve the HD user's 
privacy (i.e., anonymity) in the FD [98]. While unlinkability [25] means the user may 
use multiple resources (services) without others being able to link together the 
mutually attested machine platform measurement. In many works, the pseudonym or 
pseudonymity has been used to ensure that a user may use a resource or service 
without disclosing his/her identity [25] to the resource (service) provider. Therefore, 
the user transaction unlinkability at the SP/RP is achievable by using transaction 
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pseudonyms; the transactions which are independent with respect to the user [119], 
[120]. In the similar fashion HD mutually attested machines anonymity and 
unlinkability of the transaction at the FD SPs is conserved. 
The machines platform privacy conservation (Table 6.7) is discussed below: 
• Sharing the HD IdP machine platform security credentials with the client's 
machine is not suitable because of two reasons: (1) The HD IdP serving 
many clients so transferring its platform security credential list of the 
clients may downgrade the IdP performance and (2) May also raise the 
privacy concerns because the clients and SPs should not need to know the 
big boss IdP’s machine's platform credentials. Therefore, in PUSTPF the 
client’s and IdP’s privacy (i.e. anonymity and unlinkability) are conserved 
at the FD by constructing the new data connector-MIPDC. The HD IdP’s 
machine in PUSTPF perform its own platforms attestation instead of 
transferring the platforms credentials to the HD client’s machine. 
• Under Bidirectional Attested Machines Platform Privacy Protection 
(BAMPPP) in “Privacy” column “[✔]”shows that the HD client and IdP 
machines platform anonymity and unlinkability is fully conserved at the 
FD Sp in PUSTPF discussed in section 6.2.2. Whereas, “[✕]”indicates 
that the rest of the work ([12], [72], [100], [96], [97], [71], [70], [2], [95], 
[99], [115], [116], [117], and [118]) are not fully conserving the mutually 
attested platform privacy or mutual platform attestation is not included in 
these architecture. 
6.3.5.3 Trust - Mutual Trustworthiness Establishment 
In PUSTPF, both the HD client and IdP machines mutually validate each others’ 
platforms integrity to confirm that both machines are not infected by a malicious 
attack such as rootkits. Therefore, uncompromised machine platforms mean they are 
trustworthy and secure. 
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Table 6.7 illustrates, that the works ([2], [100], [96], [97], [95], and [99]) utilizes 
the trusted computing based remote machine platform attestation technique. Whereas 
others ([115], [116], [117], and [118]) make use of the mutual attestation scheme in 
different areas. While in this work the focus is federated identity and resource 
(service) access system. 
Beneath Mutual Attestation Establishment between Communicating Machines 
(MTEbCM) under the “Trust” column “⊘”specifies that PUSTPF (section 4.3.1.2), 
EUSTPF (section 4.3.1.1), ([115], [116], [117], and [118]) all using the mutual 
attestation technique to establish mutual trust in the machine's platform. Under the 
MTEbCM “⊗”against [96], [97], [100], [2], [95], [99] shows all of the works missing 
mutual platform attestation scheme. Whereas, the “⊖”beneath MTEbCM against [12], 
[72], [70], [71] shows that the TPM is not included in their architecture. 
In this work validation and comparison of IMA based attestation schemes (e.g., 
the effect of SML on the attestation time) are provided. However, the issue such as an 
increase in the attestation time for the purpose of a user convenience relates to the 
usability of the attestation scheme which is out of the scope of this work. In this work 
using SSO feature the mutual attestation of HD client and HD IdP will carried only 
once the user AuthN with basic credential is successful. Accessing successive 
resources (e.g., 2nd, 3rd, 4th,…, Nth) the scheme will reuse the “MPI” attribute which 
represents the HD IdP and client machines platform trustworthiness. Therefore, in this 
way until the session is active the user can access multiple resources making use of 
the “MPI” attribute which certainly brings convenience to the end user. 
6.3.5.4 Security - Integration of Basic Authentication with MA 
In this work Shibboleth basic user AuthN mechanism integration with the trusted 
computing based mutual attestation scheme, to strengthen the AuthN mechanism, is 
deomonstrated. The “☑” under Integrated AuhtN (IA) in the security column 
indicates that the PUSTPF and EUSTPF completely assure combining of UN/PWD 
mechanism with the mutual attestation mechanism. However, the rest of the works 
under IA in the security column “☒” indicates that these approaches are not fulfilling 
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the IA (i.e., UN/PWD and MA) According to existing knowledge this is the first work 
proposed an IA (i.e., UN/PWD and MA) for federated identity and access 
management mode. 
Under “TPM” in security column reveal that some existing works: (i) Make use of 
the TPM on “Client + Server” / “Mobile Device + Server” side, whereas the other (2) 
With “No TPM” or only make use of it on “client or mobile devices”. 
6.3.5.5  Security - Threats Analysis 
How proposed approach (i.e., in section 6.2.2) may protect the HD machine platform 
against different kind of threat is discussed in this section. The server is referring to 
the HD IdP machine. In the proposed schemes the integrity and confidentiality 
protection of the measurement is critical. Therefore, to guarantee the integrity and 
confidentiality against some threats (such as replay attacks, tampering and 
masquerading) the mutual attestation mechanism may employ on top of a secure (e.g., 
SSL) communication link. The analysis of the scheme against different threats is 
given in Table 6.7. 
The “⊙”, “”and “” against PUSTPF (section 6.2.2), EUSTPF (section 6.1.1), 
[115], [116], [117], [118] shows that both “Client + Server” and “Mobile Device + 
Server” embedded with a TPM to provide platform protection against Phishing via 
Trojans, replay attack and rootkits Whereas, “”, “” and “”” against [12], [72], 
[70], [71] indicates missing of TPM at either client or server side which shows the 
vulnerability of the schemes against Phishing via Trojans, replay and rocket attacks. 
In other works (e.g., [100], [96], [97], [2], [95], [99]) “Yes” denotes only client or 
mobile device embedded with the TPM to protect the platform against Phishing via 
Trojans, replay and rootkits threats. The analysis of PUSTPF against different threats 
is comprehensively discussed in the following: 
a) Rootkits 
Rootkits are malwares that hide themselves in client’s or server’s machines. The 
hidden property of rootkit boosts its effective lifetime (or existence) and prevents 
detection. Therefore, the presence of a rootkit on a client or server machines would 
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allow the adversary to take charge of administrative level control of a rootkit infected 
client or server machines. The client or server machine platforms mutual integrity 
checking mitigates this issue because the rootkits cannot hijack the aggregated SHA-1 
hash values guarded by a client or server TPM. 
b) Trojans that lead Phishing Attack 
In Trojans attack that may lead to phishing attack, the adversary may steal the user’s 
credentials, using key-logger, from the infected client or server’s machines system 
registry. In such attacks the attackers, first, lure the users to download the Phishing 
enabler Trojans from a bogus website and then let it to installed on a client machine. 
Later, whenever a user opens encrypted link (https) to their bogus websites (that 
mimic a bank or government sites) it then records a user keystrokes, and/or capture 
screen shots of a user login operation to capture a user login credentials. To counter 
this attack, in the proposed scheme the TPM based security mechanism is used to 
measure machines platform integrity and hash them using SHA-1 in an aggregated 
format whenever the machine is rebooted. Therefore, the existence of Trojan on the 
attesting machine can be detected in the attestation validation process by checking the 
SML list, calculated aggregate against the TPM PCR quoted aggregate. 
c) Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
The adversary may impersonate a legitimate user (client) to acquire a user login 
credential via a user agent. The adversary then may pretend (by hijacking the 
communication) to be the legitimate user and responding to the server.  To counter 
this attack, SSL is mandatory to protect the confidentiality of the platforms security 
credentials. The attacker may not read the hash (e.g., what it is stand for). However, 
the attacker may use these hashes to prove the server that I am the client machine. 
d) Relay Attack 
The adversary can mislead both the client and the IdP machines by merely relaying 
the messages between a client and IdP and vice versa. The adversary may be either a 
human or system. In relay attack the adversary can read, replace, and alter the 
message. In the proposed architecture, let assume that the adversary intercepts the 
SML and PCR quote which contain the aggregated platform measurement of all 
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components loaded in boot process. However, in practice, due to the strength of a 
tamper proof hardware with TPM based security chip, the reading, alteration and 
replacement of the PCR quote can not be possible. 
e) Replay Attack 
In replay attack either client or server machine could be the victim. In normal 
operation, the CS part of the server is responsible to generate the machine integrity 
query and forwards to the target machine. The integrity query consists of a nonce. The 
addition of the nonce in an attestation response enables the client or server that the 
integrity query and response is not altered. This check is to confirm that the client and 
the server machines platforms are not infected to any replay attack. 
f) Client and Server Machines Legitimacy 
The signing of quote over PCR-10, by a client or server machines, gives assurance of 
PCR quote validation that it is signed by a legitimate (or genuine) TPM. The signing 
of the quote by the TPM is the legitimacy criterion for a client’s and the server’s 
machines are equipped with a legitimate TPM hardware chip. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter explained the experimental desgin, experiment outcomes from the 
trustworthy mutual attestation protocol proof of concept and the practicable cohesive 
security, trust and privacy framework test-bed prototype. The findings from this 
research experiments are: (i) Using a mutual attestation scheme instead of a remote 
attestation in a federated scenario certainly enhances the mutual trust and security 
between the communicating machine platforms, (ii) The proposed cohesive security, 
trust and privacy notion may also be applicable in other scenarios such as e-
government, Cloud and Grid computing, (iii) The proposed unified security, trust and 
privacy framework is flexible enough that it can be incorporated in other relevant 
attestation schemes. The trusted computing is a new security and trust enabler 
technology for a computing platform which may take time to evolve. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusion, limitations and future works for this research 
work. The conclusion of the research work is described in the second section. The 
third section describes the research limitations and future works. 
7.2 Conclusion 
Security, trust and privacy unified solution for FIAM systems are urgently needed to 
curb the STP concerns in these systems. The existing solutions for federated identity 
and resource (service) access are mostly concentrating on security and trust, or 
security and privacy but not all three (i.e., STP) in one. 
In existing federated identity and access management systems right of entry to the 
FD secured resources are conceded by: (i) The HD user AuthN mechanisim, and (ii) 
The HD IdP returns signed SAMLassertion (i.e., the user identifier) to the FD SP, and 
(iii) SSL/TLS is use to establish secure communicationin link between the HD user 
browser and HD IdP machine and (iv) SSL/TLS use for the message encryption 
between the HD IdP and FD SP. In simple words Shibboleth employs uses 
cryptographanic techniques to protect the SAML assertions and messages. The 
SSL/TLS and XML digital signatures are used to protect the SAML profiles. In FIAM  
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(e.g., Shibboleth): (i) HD user trust HD for AuthN and (ii) FD SP trust HD IdP for 
authenticated HD user identity and attribute assertions. The HD IdP trust engine plays 
a major role in trust relationships (i) and (ii). The HD IdP’s has two (2) trust engines: 
(i) Signature trust rngine and (ii) Credentials trust engine. The signature trust engine is 
utilized to validate a digital signature. The purpose of such valdation to ensure that the 
credentials used are trusted. The credential trust engine gurantees that the credentials 
used the FD SPs are valid and trust. .However, current federated identity and access 
management security and trust solutions are based on the software based 
cryptography solution. In exsiting FIAM systems, the absence of a trusted computing 
based mutual security and trust formation mechanism may raise several security 
concerns. The reason is that the infection of an HD IdP or client machine platforms by 
a malevolent activity may lead to the concerns: (i) HD user’s credential theft at the 
HD IdP and client machine, (ii). Absence of tust in HD IdP and client machine 
platforms and (iii) Resource AuthR in the FD is not linked to trusted machine 
platforms attribute. Such security and trust concerns can bring heavy loss to the HD 
organization in the event of an infection by malevolent activity.  
In addition to the security and trust issues, sharing of private and confidential 
information may riase the privacy concerns. Trusted computing binary attestation 
scheme is used to strengthen the computer security and trust in the computing 
platforms. However, sharing private and confidential target machine platforms 
security credentials with the challenger may raise the privacy concerns. 
In this work PUSTPF is proposed for the FIAM systems that integrates some of 
the selected STP in a unified manner. For instance, the chosen STP such as: (i) The 
integration of Shibboleth user basic AuthN mechanism with the HD machine (IdP and 
client) platforms mutual attestation, (ii) The HD machine platforms mutual security 
and trust formation, (iii) The privacy protection of the HD machine platforms 
measurement at the FD and (iv) The resource AuthR in the FD domain by trusted 
machine platforms attribute.The performance measurement and benchmarking of the 
attestation scheme is performed. The security, trust and privacy of PUSTPF is 
validated by the test-bed prototype implementation. The PUSTPF STP, practicability, 
scalability, flexiability and simplicity comparative analysis is carried out with the 
existing works  
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7.3 Research Limitations and Future Works 
The identified limitations and the future work of this research are discussed in the 
following: 
7.3.1 Limitations 
• The designing of the proposed TMAP established on the IMA [15] 
approach which will probably lead to the clients’ machine measurement 
privacy issues in financial transaction scenarios. In such scenarios it may 
not be acceptable for the end users to share their machine platform security 
credentials with the HD in making a financial transaction.  
• In the PUSTPF, the HD IdP does not currently fully support user privacy 
conservation because in the AuthN process the user is not completely 
anonymous and there are possibly links to the user transactions. In this 
work, the main objective is to protect the HD client and IdP privacy in the 
FD instead of in the internal network because both the HD entities in the 
presented scenario are in a strong trust association.  
• The transferring of complete machine platform security credentials (i.e., 
measurement list) may introduce performance overhead.  
• Other security aspects such as availability (e.g., service disruption due to 
power outage, hardware failures, system upgrades and Denial of Service 
(DoS)) and accountability (e.g., access information audit trail). 
• Different types and versions of Operating Systems (OSs), executable and 
application execution. 
• In this work IBM machines are used. These machines motherboard 
embedded with the TPM hardware chip (i.e., infineon brand). This 
research not covers the Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) processors 
which has TPM embedded in the chip. The AMD processors extend the 
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courage to the embedded sytems and mobile device to protect the 
confidential and sensitive information across a wide range of embeded and 
mobile applications.     
• Platform measurement (hashes) tracking which can be of different 
varieties. The home domain IdP machine performs measurements for its 
own attestation and registered clients’ machine attestation. This will 
reduce the complexity of the management of too many good hashes 
because both entities are from the same internal network. 
• Trust measurement - this research focuses mainly on mutual trust 
formation in between communicating machines (i.e., client and server) on 
the basis of loaded executable health. 
• A physical or hardware attack - this research focuses only on a software 
attack. However, the proposed architecture may also mitigate some 
physical attacks: (1) No one can extract the Platform Configuration 
Registers (PCRs) value from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), if the 
TPM is attacked physically and (2) Somehow if the attacker detaches the 
TPM from the IdP or client machine even then they still cannot extract the 
data stored in the TPM by using another machine/system.   
• Network bandwidth and Usability related limitations. 
7.3.2 Future Works 
• The use of the PBA [93] (or the attestation approaches based on the PBA) 
in the proposed PUSTPF, particularly in a mutual attestation protocol, for 
federated identity and resource (service) access management mode may 
overcome the issue of the machine platform measurement privacy.   
• A separate study is also needed on the use of the blind signature scheme 
[36] in the proposed PUSTPF which hopefully shall improve the user 
identity privacy protection at the HD IdP. 
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• The use of the PBA [93] (or maybe the attestation approaches based on the 
PBA) may help to overcome the issue of performance overhead in the 
mutual attestation protocol. 
• In this work, the TMAP made use of the IMA approach between the HD 
IdP and client machines in a web environment based FIAM system. In 
future the TMAP may accommodate the PBA or any other MA 
mechanism, such as the Policy Reduced Integrity Measurement 
Architecture (PRIMA) [112] and the Model based Behavioral Attestation 
(MBA) [69] etc., among the HD clients and IdPs in the PSTPF (or 
between the HD client and the FD SP in an EUSTPF). 
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RELATED SOURCE CODE SNIPS 
 
Home Domain Client MODIFICATION 
1. Home Domain Client Attestation Collector Package 




public interface AbstractCollector { 
public Document process(byte[] nonce); 
} 

























  return pcrs; 
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 } 
 private Node getPCRContainer(Document src) { 
  try { 
   String xpath = "//pcrs[1]"; 
   CachedXPathAPI path = new CachedXPathAPI(); 
   NodeIterator nl = path.selectNodeIterator(src, xpath); 
   Node n; 
   if ((n = nl.nextNode()) != null) { 
    return n; 
   } 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
 public void verify(byte[] signedPcrVal, RSAPublicKey pubKey, byte[] pcrVal) { 
  try { 
   long valPcrStart = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withRSA"); 
   sig.initVerify(pubKey); 
   sig.update(pcrVal); 
   boolean verifies = sig.verify(signedPcrVal); 
   long valPcrEnd = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   System.out.println("Pcr Validation Time:" 
     + (valPcrEnd - valPcrStart)); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 















public class AttestClientSML implements AbstractCollector { 




 public Document process(byte nonce[]) { 
  Document sml = null; 
  try { 
   sml =  
DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder() 
     .newDocument(); 
   sml.appendChild(sml.createElement("sml")); 
  }   
  catch (Exception e) { 
   Log.err(e.getMessage()); 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  String IMAPATH =  
"/sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements"; 
  File f = new File(IMAPATH); 
  String contents = ""; 






XmlService.appendElement(sml, sml.getDocumentElement(), "smlcontents",  
contents); 
  System.out.println(); 
  return sml; 
 } 
} 














public class DaemonAttestationCollectorAgent { 
 public Document doAttestation(Document request) { 
  Document returnedDoc = null; 
  try { 
   returnedDoc = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() 
     .newDocumentBuilder().parse(  
      "/home/zubair/responseSkel.xml"); 
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   String nonce = getNonce(request); 
   byte nonceArray[] = XmlService.toBinArray(nonce); 
   XmlService.appendElement(returnedDoc, 
     getResponseMainNode(returnedDoc), 
"Challenge", nonce); 
   Document pcrs = (new  
AttestClientPCR()).process(nonceArray); 
   XmlService.importName(pcrs, returnedDoc , 
     getResponseMainNode(returnedDoc)); 
   Document sml = (new  
AttestClientSML()).process(nonceArray); 






private Node getResponseMainNode(Document src) { 
  try { 
   String xpath = "//RequestedSecurityToken[1]"; 
   CachedXPathAPI path = new CachedXPathAPI(); 
   NodeIterator nl = path.selectNodeIterator(src, xpath); 
   Node n; 
   if ((n = nl.nextNode()) != null) { 
    return n; 
   } 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
} 
2. Home Domain Client XML and TSS Service Package 







public class XmlService { 
 static char[] hexChar = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 
   'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; 
 public static void appendElement(Document doc, Node to, String name, 
   String val) { 
  Element newEl = doc.createElement(name);  
  Node newElVal = doc.createTextNode(val); 
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public static byte[] toBinArray(String hexStr) { 
  byte bArray[] = new byte[hexStr.length() / 2]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < (hexStr.length() / 2); i++) { 
   byte firstNibble = Byte.parseByte(hexStr 
     .substring(2 * i, 2 * i + 1), 16);  
   byte secondNibble = Byte.parseByte(hexStr.substring(2 * i + 
 1, 
     2 * i + 2), 16); 
   int finalByte = (secondNibble) | (firstNibble << 4);  
   bArray[i] = (byte) finalByte; 
  } 
  return bArray; 
 } 
} 








public class TssService { 
 private static TcTssAbstractFactory cachedFactory = null; 
 public static TcTssAbstractFactory getTssFactory() { 
  if (cachedFactory == null) { 
   try { 
    TcTssAbstractFactory factory = new 
TcTssLocalCallFactory(); 
    TcIContext context = factory.newContextObject(); 








HOME DOMAIN IDENTITY PROVIDER MODIFICATION 
1. Home Domain Identity Provider Attestation Collector Package 




public interface AbstractCollector { 
 public Document process(byte[] nonce); 
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} 


































private Node getPCRContainer(Document src) { 
  try { 
   String xpath = "//pcrs[1]"; 
   CachedXPathAPI path = new CachedXPathAPI(); 
   NodeIterator nl = path.selectNodeIterator(src, xpath); 
   Node n; 
   if ((n = nl.nextNode()) != null) { 
    return n; 
   } 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
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 public void verify(byte[] signedPcrVal, RSAPublicKey pubKey, byte[] pcrVal) { 
  try { 
   long valPcrStart = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withRSA"); 
   sig.initVerify(pubKey); 
   sig.update(pcrVal); 
   boolean verifies = sig.verify(signedPcrVal); 
   long valPcrEnd = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   System.out.println("Pcr Validation Time:" 
     + (valPcrEnd - valPcrStart)); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 















public class AttestIdPSML implements AbstractCollector { 







   } catch (Exception e) { 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
   try { 
    String line = inFile.readLine(); 
    while (line != null) { 
     contents += line; 
     contents += " \n "; 
     line = inFile.readLine(); 
    }  
    inFile.close(); 
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   } catch (Exception e) { 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
  XmlService.appendElement(sml, sml.getDocumentElement(), 
"smlcontents", contents); 
  System.out.println(); 
  return sml; 
 } 
} 














public class DaemonAttestationCollectorAgent { 




String nonce = getNonce(request); 
   byte nonceArray[] = XmlService.toBinArray(nonce); 
   XmlService.appendElement(returnedDoc, 
     getResponseMainNode(returnedDoc), 
"Challenge", nonce); 
   Document pcrs = (new AttestIdPPCR()).process(nonceArray); 
   XmlService.importName(pcrs, returnedDoc , 
     getResponseMainNode(returnedDoc)); 
   Document sml = (new AttestIdPSML()).process(nonceArray); 
   XmlService.importName(sml,returnedDoc , 
     getResponseMainNode(returnedDoc)); 




private Node getResponseMainNode(Document src) { 
  try { 
   String xpath = "//RequestedSecurityToken[1]"; 
   CachedXPathAPI path = new CachedXPathAPI(); 
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   NodeIterator nl = path.selectNodeIterator(src, xpath); 
   Node n; 
   if ((n = nl.nextNode()) != null) { 
    return n; 
   } 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 




2. Home Domain Identity Provider XML and TSS Service Package 







public class XmlService { 
 static char[] hexChar = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 
   'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; 
 public static void appendElement(Document doc, Node to, String name, 
   String val) { 
  Element newEl = doc.createElement(name);  
  Node newElVal = doc.createTextNode(val);  
  newEl.appendChild(newElVal); 






 public static byte[] toBinArray(String hexStr) { 
  byte bArray[] = new byte[hexStr.length() / 2]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < (hexStr.length() / 2); i++) { 
   byte firstNibble = Byte.parseByte(hexStr 
     .substring(2 * i, 2 * i + 1), 16);  
   byte secondNibble = Byte.parseByte(hexStr.substring(2 * i + 
1, 
     2 * i + 2), 16); 
   int finalByte = (secondNibble) | (firstNibble << 4);  
   bArray[i] = (byte) finalByte; 
  } 












public class TssService { 
 private static TcTssAbstractFactory cachedFactory = null; 
 public static TcTssAbstractFactory getTssFactory() { 
  if (cachedFactory == null) { 
   try { 
    TcTssAbstractFactory factory = new  
TcTssLocalCallFactory(); 






   } 
  } 
  return cachedFactory; 
 } 
} 
(v) CLASS: Target (Client or Identity Provider) Attestation Validation 
 















import tbed.pustpf.ima.net. avagent.services.*; 
public class Target { 
 
 private final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(Target.class); 
 /** 
  * @param args 
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  */ 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  } 
 public int remotePort = 4444;  
 public boolean attestTarget(String targetAddr) 
   throws AttestationServiceHookupException { 
  boolean AttestationResult = false;  
  long timeStart = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
 
  Socket kkSocket = null; 
  PrintWriter out = null; 
  BufferedReader in = null; 
 
  try { 
   log.debug("Establishing connection to HD target machine on 
port {}", remotePort); 
   kkSocket = new Socket(targetAddr, remotePort); 
   out = new PrintWriter(kkSocket.getOutputStream(), true); 
   in = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(kkSocket 
     .getInputStream())); 
    
  } catch (UnknownHostException e) { 
   log.error("Don't know about host."); 
   throw new AttestationServiceHookupException (); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   log.error("Couldn't get I/O for the connection to: " + 
targetAddr); 
   throw new AttestationServiceHookupException (); 
VRPCR pv = new VRPCR(); 
   pv.setRSAPubKey(targetAddr); 
   OutcomeMode pcrResult = pv.verify(response); 
   if (pcrResult == OutcomeMode.  
NO_PCRS_VALIDATION_ABORTIVE) 
    log.debug("! --------------- No PCRS found in  
response."); 
   else if (pcrResult == OutcomeMode.  
PCR_DISSIMILAR_VALIDATION_ABORTIVE) 
    log.debug("! --------------- PCRs Validation failed. "); 
   if (pcrResult == OutcomeMode. VALIDATION_POSITIVE) { 
    log.debug("* --------------- PCRs signature is  
validated."); 
    AttestationResult = true; 
   } 
 
   if (AttestationResult) { 
    VRN nv = new VRN(); 
    OutcomeMode nonceResult = nv.verify (response, 
nonce); 
189 
    if (nonceResult == OutcomeMode. DISSIMILAR_  
NONCE) { 
     AttestationResult = false; 
     log.debug("! --------------- Nonce is stale.  
Validation failed. "); 
    } else if (nonceResult ==  
OutcomeMode.NONCE_SIMILARITY_POSITIVE) { 
     AttestationResult = true; 
     log.debug("* --------------- Nonce correction 









 private String generateNonce() { 
  char[] hexChar = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 
    'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; 
 
 
  String nonce = ""; 
  for (int i = 0; i < 20 * 2; i++) { 
 
   Double rnd = Math.random() * 15; 
   nonce += hexChar[rnd.intValue()]; 
  } 
 




3. Mutual Integrity Provider-DATACONNECTOR 






























public class MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector extends BaseDataConnector { 
 
 private String vsUrl; 
 private ATTESTATION_TYPE attestationType; 
 public static enum ATTESTATION_TYPE { 
  IMA 
 }; 
 private static final String ATTESTATION_ATTRIBUTE = 
"MutualPlatformIntegrity"; 
 
 private final Logger log = LoggerFactory 
   .getLogger(MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector.class); 
 
 public MutualIntegrityProviderDataConnector(String url) { 




 public Map<String, BaseAttribute> resolve( 
   ShibbolethResolutionContext resolutionContext) 
   throws AttributeResolutionException { 
 





Target attTarget = new Target(); 
   HTTPInTransport req = (HTTPInTransport) resolutionContext 
    
 .getAttributeRequestContext().getInboundMessageTransport(); 
   targetAddr = req.getPeerAddress();; 
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   log.info("Calling CS for Mutual attestation of HD IdP at 
idp.dod.org and HD Client at {}", targetAddr); 
    
   log.info("Carrying out HD client's machine platform attestation 
at: {}", targetAddr); 
 
   attResultClient = attTarget.attestTarget(targetAddr); 
  } catch (AttestationServiceHookupException e) { 
   log.error("ACDaemon couldn’t be contacted. Assuming bad 
integrity."); 
  } 
  log.debug("Attestation acknowledgement reply about HD client’s 
machine integrity from CS: {}", attResultClient); 
  if (attResultClient == false) {  
   log.debug("HD client’s machine platform integrity is not 
validated, so HD IdP attestation is not carried out"); 




log.info("Sending back the Mutual integrity attributes."); 





 public void validate() throws AttributeResolutionException { 
 } 
 public void setAttestationType(ATTESTATION_TYPE attestationType) { 
  this.attestationType = attestationType; 
 } 
 public ATTESTATION_TYPE getAttestationType() { 
  return attestationType; 
 } 
 public void setVsUrl(String vsUrl) { 
  this.vsUrl = vsUrl; 
 } 
 public String getVsUrl() { 





COMMAND LINE INSTRUCTIONS AND CODE 
1) HOME DOMAIN SHIBBOLETH IDENTITY PROVIDER INSTALLATION 
(i) Steps for installing JAVA 1.6 on the Ubuntu OS 
  
• $ curl -L -O 'http <://> www <.> download <.> oracle <.> com/otn <-> 
pub </> java </> jdk </> 6u25 <-> b06 </> jdk <-> 6u25 <-> linux <-> 
i586.bin' 
• $ chmod + x jdk <–> 6u25 <–> linux <–> i586 <.> bin 
• $ <./> jdk <–> 6u25 <–> linux <–> i586 <.> bin (This will install the Java) 
• $ java <–> version  (This will show java edition "1.6.0") 
(ii) Steps for downloading, installing and configuring Apache Tomcat 
 
• Download Apache Tomcat & extract it to the home directory: 
o $ curl -L -O 'http <://> www <.> apache <.> tradebit <.> com </> pub 
</> tomcat </> tomcat <–> 6 </> v6.0.32 </> bin </> apache <–> 
tomcat <–> 6.0.32 <.> tar <.> gz' 
o $ tar <–> xvzf apache <–> tomcat <–> 6.0.32 <.> tar <.> gz 
o Rename it to an easy name: $ mv apache – tomcat – 6.0.32 tomcat6 
• Set the following variables: 
o $ <space> export <space> JAVA <_> HOME <=/> usr/java6 <–> 
source </> jdk1.6.0_25 
o $ <space> export <space> PATH <=$> JAVA_HOME </> bin <:$> 
PATH 
o $ <space> export <space> CATALINA_HOME <=/> home </> zubair 
</> tomcat6</> 
o $ <space> export <space> CATALINA_BASE <=/> home </> zubair 
</> tomcat6 </> 
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• Start tomcat: 
o $ </> home </> zubair </> tomcat6 </> bin </> startup <.> sh  
o Check if Tomcat is working properly by typing the following in the 
browser: http://localhost:8080 (It will show Tomcat home page) 
(iii) Download the latest Identity Provider software package 
 
• $ curl –O <SPACE> ‘http <://> www <.> shibboleth <.> net </> 
downloads </> identity <-> provider/2.3.0/shibboleth-identityprovider-
2.3.0-bin.zip’ 
• Unzip the archive as:  
o $ <SPACE> jar <-xf> shibboleth <-> identityprovider <-> 2.3.0 <-> 
bin <.> zip 
• Move to the unzipped directory and install the IdP as: 
o $ cd shibboleth-identityprovider-2.3.0  
• $ sudo -i (since the idp install command wants to be execute as root main 
user to make the current user as a root user) 
• Set the environment variables for this session:  
o # <SPACE> export <SPACE> JAVA_HOME <=/> usr </> java6 <-> 
source </> jdk1.6.0_25 
o # <SPACE> export <SPACE> PATH <=$> JAVA_HOME </> bin 
<:$> PATH 
o # <SPACE> /install.sh 
(iv) Copy Xerces and Xalan to the TOMCAT_HOME/endorsed folder 
 
• # cp -r endorsed/ /home/zubair/tomcat6 
• # export JAVA_ENDORSED_DIRS=/home/zubair/tomcat6/endorsed/ 
(v) Setting the JVM memory options 
 
• JAVA <_> OPTS <="-> Djava.awt.headless <=> true <-> Xmx512M <-> 
XX <:> MaxPermSize <=>128M -Dcom.sun.security.enableCRLDP=true" 
(vi) Setting SOAP endpoints for the HD IdP 
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• Downloaded required jar files such as tomcat6.-.dta. -. ssl. - 1.0.0. .. . jar in 
to    TOMCAT_HOME/lib/. 
• Curl – o ‘http <://> shibboleth <.> internet2 <.> edu </> downloads 
</>maven2 </> edu </> internet2 </> middleware </> security </> 
tomcat6 </> tomcat6 <-> dta <-> ssl </> 1.0.0 </> tomcat6 <-> dta <-> ssl 
<-> 1.0.0 <.> jar’ 
• Afterwards, need to add the code given below to TOMCAT_HOME </> 






(vii) Setting the Tomcat’s own variables required for initializing the IdP 
 
• Create a file by the name idp.xml and place it in 
TOMCAT_HOME/conf/Catalina/localhost/ folder then copy XML 




(viii) The generation of RSA keystore for the IdP 
 
• sudo mkdir /home/zubair/idpcerts/ 
• $ sudo keytool -genkey -alias idpkeys -keyalg RSA –keystore 
/home/zubair/idpcerts/idpkeys.keystore 








(x) Configuring LoginHandler in the HD organization IdP  
 





(xi) ApacheDS installation in the realization of the prototype implementation 
 
• Download and install the ApacheDS as: 
o $ wget http <://> www <.> trieuvan <.> com </> apache <//> directory 
</>apacheds < /> unstable </> 1.5/1.5.7 </> apacheds <-> 1.5.7-
i386.bin 
o $ chmod a <+> x apacheds <-> 1.5.2-i386 <.>bin 
o <./> apacheds <-> 1.5.2-i386 <.> bin (this will install the ApacheDS) 
• Now run it by using the command: /etc/init.d/apacheds-1.5.2 start 
(xii) The steps to install the Apache Directory Studio 
 
• $ wget http <://> apache.osuosl.org </ > directory </> studio </> stable 
</> 1.5.3.x.x/ 
• ApacheDirectoryStudio <-> linux <-> x86 <-> 1.5.3.x.x <.> tar.gz  
• $ <SPACE> tar –xvzf <SPACE> ApacheDirectoryStudio <-> linux <-> 
x86 <-> 1.5.3.x.x <.> tar.gz  
• $ <SPACE> mv <SPACE> ApacheDirectoryStudio <-> linux <-> x86 <-> 
1.5.3.x.x /opt/ApacheDirectoryStudio 
• $ cd /opt/ApacheDirectoryStudio 
• $ ./ApacheDirectoryStudio (for initializing the installer) 
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(xv) The dataconnector, attribute resolver, definition, polices 
                      
 
2) FOREIGN DOMAIN SHIBBOLETH SERVICE PROVIDER INSTALLATION 




• # yum install gcc 
• # yum install gcc-c++ 
(ii) log4shib installation 
 
• # Extract the downloaded package & move to the extracted directory: 
o $ tar -xvzf log4shib-1. 0. 4. Tar <.> gz 
o $ <SPACE> cd log4shib-1. 0. 4 
• Configure log4shibd with the following options: 
o $ <SPACE> <./> configure <--> disable-static <-->disable <-> 
doxygen <--> prefix=/opt 
o $ <SPACE> make  
o $$ <SPACE> make$ <SPACE> install 
(iii) Xerces-C Installation and Configuration 
 
• Extract the downloaded package & move to the extracted directory: 
o $ tar -xvzf xcercez.tar.gz 
o $ cd xcers-XX 
o $ ./configure --prefix=/opt/shibboleth-sp --disable-netaccessor-libcurl 
o $ make  
o $ make install 
(iv) Installation of OpenSSL and XML-Security-C 
 
• # yum install openssl 
• # yum install openssl-devel 
     Now configure and install XML-Security-C as: 
 
• $./configure --without-xalan --disable-static --with-xerces=/opt/shibboleth-
sp --prefix=/opt/shibboleth-sp 
• $ make  
• $ make install 
(v) Installation of XML-Tooling-C package 
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• # yum install curl-devel 
• $ ./configure --with-log4shib=/opt/shibboleth-sp --prefix=/opt/shibboleth-
sp -C 
• $ make  
• $ make install 
(vi) The OpenSAML-C package installation 
 
• $ ./configure --with-log4shib=/opt/shibboleth-sp --prefix=/opt/shibboleth-
sp -C 
• $ make  
• $ make install 
(vii) Shibboleth SP downloading and installation 
 
• Additional Requirement: 
o Apache 2 (httpd) web server needs to be installed first. 
o # yum install httpd 





• $ make 
$ make install 
(viii) Apache web server (or httpd) modification 
 
• The configuration file in Apache is located at /etc/httpd/conf/ folder and is 
known as httpd.conf. The following modifications needs to be performed: 
o The ServerName directive has been changed to reflect own created SP 
server as sp.dor.org. 
o During the execution of the SP software certain runtime errors related 
to resource mapping appears. In order to alleviate these errors at 
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runtime a directive naming UseCanonicalName must be set to On. This 
directive could be found in the same configuration file listed above. 
• Restart the Apache by issuing the command given below: 
o #<SPACE>/etc< / >init< . >d< / >httpd restart <PRESS ENTER> 
• The Shibboleth SP daemon (shibd) running on the SP must have to be 
started independently. This daemon is responsible for handling requests 
coming to the FD organization SP. Restart the daemon by issuing the 
following command: 
o # <SPACE> /etc </> init <.>d </> shibd start <PRESS ENTER> 
(ix) Restart the daemon by issuing the command 
• # <SPACE> / etc </> init <.> d </> shibd start <PRESS ENTER> 
(x) Openssl installation 
 
• # yum install mod_ssl openssl 
(xi) Own RSA key generation to create the certificate for enabling the SSL 
 
• An RSA key pair by the name spserver.key for the SP server side is 
created as: 
o # openssl genrsa -out spserver.key 1024 
• Using the above key pair a certificate have been created for the FD 
organization SP by the name spserver.crt as: 
o # openssl req -new -x509 -days 3650 -key spserver.key -out 
spserver.crt  
• Both the key pair and the certificate need to be placed on the FD 
organization SP machine platform from where it can be accessible by the 
Apache web server for the establishment of secure connection. Therefore, 
these keys have been placed in the following location at the FD SP 
machine: 
o # cp spserver.crt /etc/pki/tls/certs/  
o # cp spserver.key /etc/pki/tls/private/ 
• The Apache web server also needs to be informed about the location of the 
keys and certificate that was created and placed in the previous step. This 
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is done by editing the ssl.conf file residing at the FD organization SP at 
location /etc/httpd/conf.d/ folder. Modify the value for the 
SSLCertificateFile option in the conf file to reflect the location of the 
certificate file. Similarly, the SSLCertificateKeyFile value is modified to 
reflect the location of the key file. 


































3) STEPS FOR IMA INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION 
(i) Linux Kernel Complilation for Incorporating IMA for HD IdP and Client 
 
• A new kernel have downloaded for compilation from the kernel download 
page: 
o $ curl –c<SPACE>http< :// >www< . >kernel< . >org< / >pub< / 
>linux< / >kernel< / >v2.6< / >longterm< / >v2.6.35< / >linux< - 
>2.6.35.x.tar.bz2 
• Then extracted the kernel to the location /usr/src/kernel: 
o $ sudo<space>tar< –>C< / >usr< / >src/kernel –jvxf linux< - 
>2.6.35.x.tar.bz2 
• To enter to the extracted directory: 
o $ cd /usr/src/kernel/linux-2.6.35.x 
• In order to configure the drivers and modules for the new kernel, a 
configuration file is required that can be used as a starting point for the 
configurations. for this purpose an existing configuration file is copied by 
copying it from the /boot/ folder to the newly extracted kernel folder by 
using the command: 
o $ cp /boot/config-2.6.x-x-generic /usr/src/kernel/linux-2.6.35.x 
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• Rename the configuration file to .config file as: 
o $ mv config-2.6.x-x-generic .config 
• Before starting the kernel configuration some prerequisites are required to 
be install for the configuration process. 
• $ sudo apt-get install libncurses5-dev  
• Then, the configuration of the new kernel is carried out in order to include 
all the device drivers and kernel modules by the following command. 
After executing the command a configuration process will start that will 
prompt for each configuration options that need to be included in the 
kernel for compilation. 
• $ sudo make oldconfig 
o When the selection portion completes all the changes are saved to the 
.config file and edit this file to incorporate the TPM device drivers and 
IMA option as: 
• $ sudo make menuconfig 
• The above command will open a GUI of kernel configuration options the 
TPM device drivers are selected and the IMA to be included in the new 
kernel. 
• The TPM device drivers option can be selected from: Device Drivers -- > 
Character Devices -- > TPM. Select the * for the TPM device drivers to 
include all the drivers. 
• The IMA option can be selected from: Security Tab -- > Integrity 
Measurement Architecture. Select it and save the .config file. 
• The new kernel is now ready for compilation, the compilation is done as: 
o $ sudo make 
• It will take some time to compile the kernel, afterwards the modules are 
compiled for the kernel as: 
o $ sudo make modules 
• After the modules are compiled the modules are installed first as: 
o $ sudo make modules_install 
• Finally, the new kernel is installed as: 
o $ sudo make install 
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• The new kernel is now installed but to use this kernel instead of the older 
kernel the following steps are carried-out: 
o $ cd /boot  
o $ sudo mkinitramfs -k -o initrd.img-2.6.35< . >x 2.6.35< . >x 
• In order to update the grub entries for the new kernel the following 
command is used: 
o $ sudo update-grub2 
• Now, restart the system (client or IdP platform) and the boot options will 
show the newly compiled kernel with TPM and IMA enabled. These steps 
are performed before installing and configuring the Shibboleth IdP but for 
the sake of clarity the steps are describe here in the IMA implementation 
section. 
• To check whether IMA is working properly or not, upon restart execute 
the following command in a terminal to view the measurement list 
calculated by the IMA for each executable after loading the executables: 
• $ sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements 
• The command will result in the Stored Measurement Log (SML) (example 







(ii) Implementation of the jTSS 
  
• jTSS requires Java to be installed as prerequisite. The Java installation 
steps are covered in the section of HD organization IdP installation. 
• To place the jTSS, its libraries and other tools required for communication 
with TPM a directory is created for this purpose by the name tpm-tools as: 
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o $ mkdir /zubair/zubair-project/tpm-tools  
• The jTSS software and its related packages are downloaded as: 
o $ cd /zubair/zubair-project/tpm-tools 
• $<SPACE> wget<SPACE>–C                                                              
http:// nchc .dl .sourceforge .net/ sourceforge/trustedjava/jTSS_0.5.tar. bz2 
• Extract the downloaded package as: 
o $ tar –xvjf jTSS_0.5.tar.bz2 
• Enter into the extracted folder as: 
o $ cd jTSS_0.5 
(iii) jTPMTools Downloading and Extraction 
 
• $ wget http ://nchc. dl.sourceforge .net/ sourceforge/ 
trustedjava/jTpmTools_0.5.tar. bz2 
• $ tar jxf jTpmTools_0.5.tar.bz2 
• $ cd jtpmtools 
(iv) Command to take TPM Ownersjip 
 
o $ cd /zubair/zubair-project/tpm-tools/jTpmTools 
o $ ./jtt.sh take_owner –o ownersecret (the ownersecret could be any 
password/secret word) 
(v) Home Domain IdP and Client Machine AIK Creation 
 
o ./jtt.sh aik_create –a aiksecret –l aiklabel –o ownersecret (aiksecret 
could be any secret word, it is used during IMA for extracting trust 
tokens from the TPM, aiklabel is used for identifying different aiks, 





DEFINATION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
Attacker: Attacker is an entity which may install an unauthorized program on a 
client or server machine without the knowledge of a machine user or administrator. 
The objective of an attacker maybe user credentials theft, wealth and personal or 
industrial sabotage.   
Basic User Authentication Credential: It is referred to the basic user AuthN 
credential such as username/password issued by the HD organization.   
Federation: When pool of organizations or service providers that come together to 
form “Circle of Trust (CoT)” for the purpose of distributing user’s identities 
information wit each other.  
Federated Identity: Federated identity signifies subject’s e-ID and attributes linkage 
which stocked across various separated identity administration systems.  
Foreign Domain Organization: It is an external network entity which may provide 
resources or services to HD organization users.  
Home Domain Client Machine: It is a user desktop/laptop machine assigned by the 
HD organization to the new user or staff.   
Home Domain User: The HD user is a registered user of HD organization. 
Home Domain Organization: It is a local or internal network which consists of 
entities such as a user, client and IdP. In this work the HD IdP also registers the HD 
client and its own machine platforms measurement in a good hashes repository. The 
IdP is the one who responsible to release a user AuthN and attributes assertion in 
response of the AuthN and user attributes request received it from the FD 
organization SP. 
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Integrated Authentication: Integrated AuthN is different than two factors AuthN 
which normally combines one or more user AuthN techniques (e.g., 
username/password, biometric and smartcard etc.) to authenticate the user. But 
integrated AuthN in this thesis means integration of user AuthN mechanism (e.g., 
username/password) with the client and server machines platform mutual attestation 
technique. 
Machine Platforms Security Credentials: It refers to the IMA configured and TPM 
enabled and activated machine platform boot-time time measurement (i.e., binary 
values). One copy of the boot-time measurement list is recorded in the SML and 
second list of these measurements are aggregated in TPM to protect the integrity of 
the boot-time measurement list. These measurements are type of security credentials 
and reports to the challenger as an integrity response for integrity validation purpose.  
Malevolent: A malicious activity such as Trojan, Rootkit and key-Loger etc. which 
is installed and executed on a client or server machine for the purpose of stealing 
user credentials or IDtheft. 
Practicable: It means a notion, project, or scheme that may competent of being 
completed by means of available tools and in particular conditions as they are 
feasible, executable, viable and workable.  
Resource or Service: Resource or Service such as utilizing library portal, air-line 
reservation system, or secret document which may provide by the FD organization to 
the HD users. The resource or service may be protected or unprotected.  
Threat: Threat is a risk to a machine platform by installing a malevolent program on 
computer machine to get control (or unauthorized access) of an infected machine.  
Trustworthy: Trustworthy in this work refers to a machine platform that may 
operate in secured, reliable and privacy protected manner while performing an online 
transaction. Secured means no malevolent or unauthorized program installed or 
active whereas reliable means a dependency of a security device (e.g., TPM) which 
must always work accordingly.  
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Trusted Token: Trusted token in this thesis refers to a trusted machine platform 
security credentials measurement list image (i.e., target machine) which is trusted by 
the challenger machine and represents the trustworthiness or honesty of a target 
machine. 
Web Single Sign-On (WSSO): Using SSO facility user can access multiple 
resources or services in web environment through a single credential and one-time 
log-in operation. Whenever user tries to access a WSSO-enabled Web resource or 
service, the WSSO forwards the user's agent to an authentication service provider to 
let the user log-in. The user agent then sends rear to the resource or service provider 
and the user may access the requested resource or a service. 
 
